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ABSTRACT 
EVALUATING INTRADISTRICT RESOURCE ALLOCATION AND 
ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR EQUITY: A CASE STUDY 
 
Stephanie Levin 
Richard M. Ingersoll 
 
Financial and human capital resources play a vital role in the ability of a school 
to fulfill its mission of educating students. Access to these resources varies – and this 
variation is often due to districts’ allocation of resources among schools. Research on 
equity often disregards this concern and focuses attention on differences among district-
wide revenue sources. My dissertation explores the implications for equity of 
intradistrict resource allocation through an examination of school disparities and district 
practices in a mid-sized urban school district.  
First, I establish a comprehensive equity framework which joins together 
principles of adequacy and vertical equity. Then, using financial, personnel, student 
enrollment/ demographic, and student achievement and behavior data from the 
Allentown, Pennsylvania School District (ASD), I employ a mix of quantitative and 
qualitative methods to ascertain how resources are directed to schools in accordance 
with the comprehensive equity framework. I describe resource allocation using 
horizontal equity statistics and I provide context by evaluating the relationship between 
student outcomes and attending a particular school. Subsequently, I test: adequacy, 
looking at school outcomes for the entire student population and various subgroups 
with higher needs; vertical equity, identifying how inputs are allocated differentially 
based on schools’ characteristics and demographics; and, comprehensive equity, a 
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construct incorporating both adequacy and vertical equity designed to measure the 
justness of the district’s approach to resource allocation. I also measure the portion of 
resource allocation in unexplained by vertical and comprehensive equity and conduct a 
simulation of weighted student funding.  
Qualitative analysis, comprised of interviews with district administrative 
personnel – at the central office and in schools – provides context and the rationale for 
district resource allocation policies. Overall findings uncover a misalignment between 
school-level student needs and resources in the ASD. Results are strongest when 
considering human capital resources, including teacher effectiveness and teacher 
efficacy. Based on my findings, I conclude that the ASD does not achieve 
comprehensive equity in school year 2009-2010. This case study provides a window 
into equal educational opportunity within school districts and offers a template for 
districts seeking to determine the extent to which they are serving students equitably.  
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CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION 
Financial and human capital resources play a vital role in the ability of a school 
to fulfill its mission of educating students. Access to these resources varies – and this 
variation is often due to districts’ allocation of resources among schools. Research on 
equity often disregards this concern and focuses attention on differences among district-
wide revenue sources. My dissertation explores the implications for equity of 
intradistrict resource allocation through an examination of school disparities and district 
practices in a mid-sized urban school district.   
Both the state and the federal government contribute significantly to school 
district revenues. However, with the exception of Title I requirements, neither entity 
mandates specific distributions of resources among schools, programs, or classrooms 
within a district. Even state requirements that all students be provided an adequate or 
thorough and efficient education have seldom been pursued below the district level.
1
  
Pennsylvania’s former education finance reform agenda is a prime example of 
state policy designed to improve spending equity for individual students through 
allocation of funds to school districts. In 2008, the Pennsylvania state legislature voted 
to alter the state’s basic education funding formula to address both inadequate funding 
and serious inequities among school districts. Similar to other states’ approaches to 
address inequities, this action requires restructuring at the interdistrict, rather than 
intradistrict level. The formula adopted by the State is based on an adequacy target 
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 There have been only two major cases that look at resource allocation below the district level: Hobson 
v. Hansen in the District of Columbia and Rodriguez v. Los Angeles Unified School District (LAUSD). 
Both were de-segregation cases and both relied on the theory of horizontal equity as the plaintiffs 
charged that minority and poor students were deprived of equal protection of the laws. 
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determined to provide all students with the necessary resources to become proficient on 
state assessments and to meet state standards in twelve academic areas. It includes 
weights to provide additional funds for economically disadvantaged students and 
English Language Learners (ELL).
2
  With this policy, the State aimed to address a 
multifaceted vision of equity; primarily, the new funding formula was designed to 
achieve adequacy, an outcomes-based principle whereby all students are provided the 
necessary resources to reach a predetermined standard. To realize this objective, 
Pennsylvania’s new funding formula addressed vertical equity, an inputs-based 
measure, by providing additional resources for students with additional needs. Also, the 
new funding formula sought to improve horizontal equity, an inputs-based measure 
requiring equivalent resources for all similarly situated students, by increasing the 
State’s financial contribution such that children are not penalized due to the wealth of 
their district
3
.  
While the new funding policy seemed promising, realizing these ideals of equity 
cannot be accomplished by the State alone. Districts, not states, are responsible for 
allocating resources generated from all levels of government at the building or student 
level. These district level allocation decisions impact how students with different 
educational needs are served. My dissertation evaluates intradistrict resource allocation 
using a conceptual framework built on theories of equity.  
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 District size and regional cost differences are also incorporated in the funding formula. While higher 
weights for special education students had been recommended, they were not included in the revised 
funding formula.   
3
 The State’s financial contribution is determined by each district’s need for revenue to meet the State 
adequacy target. It assumes no increase in local property tax rate. 
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The data used in this dissertation is drawn from a case study of a mid-sized, urban 
school district, the Allentown School District (ASD). This case study seeks to answer 
the following research questions: 
1. How are resources allocated among schools?  
2. What is the rationale for resource allocation patterns among schools? 
3. Using a comprehensive equity framework which encompasses adequacy and 
vertical equity, what are the implications of resource allocation patterns? 
4. What would be the financial impact of an alternative approach to resource 
allocation aligned with the comprehensive equity framework?
4
  
ASD, the third largest urban school district in Pennsylvania
5
, offers a rich environment 
for research. Approximately 18,000 students are served in two early learning centers, 
14 elementary schools, 4 middle schools, and 2 high schools. Seventy-eight percent of 
students in the district are classified as economically disadvantaged
6
, 84% of students 
in the district are non-white, and 64% are Hispanic. In the 2009-2010 school year, 8 of 
20 schools met Adequate Yearly Progress goals; the graduation rate for the district was 
70%; and 57% of all students tested proficient or above in math
7
. Leadership in the 
district supported a thorough assessment of budgeting practices as well as an analysis of 
the distribution of teachers among schools.     
 
                                                 
4
 School-year 2009-2010 data is used answer these research questions.  
5
 The Allentown School District is approximately two-thirds the enrollment size of Pittsburgh, 
Pennsylvania. 
6
 These students are eligible for free and reduced priced lunch. 
7
 Thirty-nine percent of a sample of 4
th
 grade students tested proficient or above on the National 
Educational Assessment Program (NAEP).    
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Significance of the Study  
Though there is a sizeable body of research on interdistrict equity, the research on 
intradistrict resource allocation is relatively sparse as most U.S. school finance research 
that discusses equity focuses on the district.  Concerns regarding the equal distribution 
of resources, the appropriate enhancements to ‘level the playing field’, and the impacts 
of resources on student outcomes have driven research almost exclusively at the federal 
and state levels. Too little is known about the decisions districts make when 
determining how to allocate resources to schools and students (Betts, Rueben, & 
Danenberg, 2000). Below the district level, all schools are supported by the same state 
aid package and local tax base and formulas to allocate dollars to schools are not 
designed to address disparities in wealth (Schwartz, Stiefel & Rubenstein, 2008). 
However, there are serious implications for equity at the school, program, and 
classroom level, as well (Monk & Hussain, 2000; Roos, 1998; Satz, 2008).  Rubenstein, 
Stiefel, and Schwartz (2006) point out that the focus on “total or average resources at 
the district level implicitly assumes that the average resources reach all schools more or 
less evenly within a district” (p. 3). While state and local policies may be intended to 
provide for all students equally, institutional, organization, political¸ and economic 
factors can derail this objective (Picus, 1995; Roza & McCormick, 2006). Research has 
shown that much of the variation in resources happens at the school level within, not 
between, districts (Betts et al., 2000; Clotfelter, Ladd, Vigdor & Wheeler, 2007; 
Imazeki & Goe, 2009; Rubenstein et al., 2006). Furthermore, even in schools that have 
a diverse student body, it is not uncommon for minority and low-income students to be 
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taught by less qualified teachers (Roos, 1998). By not paying attention to how districts 
allocate resources, policy makers miss potential large-scale inequities.  
In recent years, there has been increasing interest in resource allocation below 
the district level. Researchers have debated the value of money in improving student 
outcomes, and many have come to the conclusion that the way in which money is spent 
is as important as the amount of money spent (Odden, Goertz, Goetz, Archibald, Gross, 
Weiss & Mangan, 2008). Analysis of resource allocation below the district level 
provides valuable information about the relationships between expenditures and student 
outcomes (Stiefel, Rubenstein & Berne, 1998). Also, patterns of inequitable distribution 
of resources become more evident. This information should lead to more efficient and 
fairer spending decisions by educators, helping them to target effective interventions to 
students in need (Schwartz et al., 2008). As demonstrated in the following chapter, 
evaluations of equity among schools within districts have found uneven distributions of 
resources, with less privileged students most often receiving inferior resources, such as 
less experienced teachers (Schwartz et al., 2008). 
Another reason that the examination of how districts allocate resources has 
become particularly advantageous is that, under our present accountability system, 
schools are held responsible for student outcomes. Standards-based reform under the 
federal No Child Left Behind (NCLB) Act requires schools to demonstrate the 
proficiency of all their students (Odden, Goetz, & Picus, 2008). It is important that 
schools understand what resources are necessary to meet this goal (Denison, Stiefel, 
Hartman & Deegan, 2009). Clotfelter, Ladd, and Vigdor (2007d) explain: “it is logical 
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to investigate the extent to which schools of different types are playing on a level 
playing field in terms of their access to the teaching and leadership resources that are 
essential for meeting the achievement goals required under … accountability systems” 
(p. 6). The focus on school accountability has led to the proliferation of assessments to 
determine if students are achieving proficiency goals. Data collection and analysis has 
improved greatly in recent years. Assessment results, integrated into sophisticated data 
systems that link students and teachers over time, are now becoming available to help 
determine if an adequate education is being provided within schools and districts 
(Odden et al., 2008). Schools and districts can investigate the impact of classroom 
effects (e.g., teachers), school effects (e.g., peers), and student mobility on student 
achievement outcomes (Denison et al, 2009). 
In 2005, California passed the first legislation of its kind requiring schools to 
provide data on per pupil expenditures. This data must represent the actual salaries of 
school personnel along with information on teacher credentials and experience 
(Rubenstein et al., 2006). As required, online school accountability report cards 
disclose school-level average teacher salaries. Analysis of this data reveals significant 
intradistrict inequities
8
 (Miller, 2010). This appears to be the beginning of a national 
trend, as Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) reauthorization discussions 
have included calls for different measures of school-level comparability as well as 
school-level reporting of teacher characteristics and teacher spending.   
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 Researchers report: “a 10 percent increase in the rate of student poverty in a California public school is 
associated with a $411 drop in average teacher salary, on average, controlling for several characteristics 
of districts and schools known to affect funding streams” (Miller, 2010, p. 2). 
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Challenges to evaluating intradistrict equity – including the complexity of 
district budgets, lack of accessible data at the school level, and difficulty in allocating 
shared resources – impede research. Addressing these challenges is imperative, 
however, as much of the variation in resources happens at the school level within, not 
between, districts (Betts et al., 2000; Imazeki & Goe, 2009; Roza, 2005; Rubenstein, 
Schwarz, Stiefel, & Hadj Amor, 2007). Insufficient focus on district level decision-
making has left a gap in our knowledge as to the ability of districts to achieve equitable 
resource allocation (Lankford, Loeb & Wyckoff, 2002; Miller & Rubenstein, 2008; 
Rubenstein, Schwartz, Stiefel & Hadj Amor, 2007). Additional research is necessary to 
highlight inequities where they exist.  
In addition to a lack of understanding about intradistrict inequities, there is a 
lack of evidence on the comparative efficacy of various resource allocation strategies. 
For example, investigations into the impacts of weighted student funding initiatives
9
 
have shown them to have positive, though often small, effects on equity (Carr, Gray, & 
Holley, 2007; Chambers, Levin & Shambaugh, 2010; Roza & Hawley-Miles, 2004). 
Yet, Baker (2009) points out that much of this research neither isolates the impacts of 
the change to the allocation formulas, nor adequately considers the merit of the weights 
used to direct additional funds to high cost students. Additional research is necessary to 
help policymakers understand the implications of different resource allocation policies, 
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 Weighted student funding is a system with two components: 1) funding follows the student through an 
allocation formula that directs real dollars to schools according to the needs of the students within the 
building; and, 2) funds are controlled at the building-level, not the district-level. 
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including impacts on opportunities and outcomes for students, so that they may make 
informed decisions that will support the learning of all children.  
My research, a mixed methods case study of a mid-sized, urban school district 
helps to fill this gap in the literature by offering a unique view into resource allocation 
below the district level; insight into how and why a district’s resource allocation 
decisions are made; and an analysis of how a district’s allocation decisions might 
impact equity.  
Methods 
Using financial, personnel, student enrollment/ demographic, and student 
achievement data
10
, I employ a mix of quantitative and qualitative methods to ascertain 
how resources are directed to students. First, I describe ASD resource allocation using 
horizontal equity statistics. I provide additional context by evaluating the relationship 
between student outcomes and attending a particular school through the use of an 
unconditional 2-level model. I then test: (1) adequacy, looking only at school outcomes 
– both at the school level, taking into account the entire student population, and based 
on outcomes of various student populations with higher needs; (2) vertical equity, 
identifying how inputs are allocated differentially based on schools’ characteristics and 
demographics; and, (3) horizontal equity post vertical equity, identifying how much of 
resource allocation in unexplained by vertical equity. Lastly, I test comprehensive 
equity, a construct I have developed which incorporates both adequacy and vertical 
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 Additional student outcomes data (i.e., attendance, disciplinary actions), is included in the analysis. 
9 
 
equity and is designed to measure the effectiveness of the district’s approach to 
resource allocation. 
My measurement of adequacy is quite strait forward. I consider a number of 
student outcomes (i.e., state assessment results, attendance, and suspensions) at the 
school level as well as at the subgroup level within schools – and employ simple 
statistical measures of dispersion to quantify the variation among schools.  
In the remaining analysis, I take an analytical approach similar in theory to 
methodology used by researchers to examine equity among school districts, whereby 
regression analysis is used to determine whether funds allocated to districts match the 
weights occurring in the state’s funding formula (Toutkoushian and Michael, 2007). 
Given a limited sample size, and the desire to have a single measure with which to 
evaluate district equity, I construct an index to use as a single weight at the school level 
to account for school-wide needs given a school’s particular student population. By 
altering my needs index to reflect differing theories of equity, I evaluate both vertical 
equity and comprehensive equity in the Allentown School District. This model allows 
me to examine the unexplained variations in per-pupil funding after taking into account 
the additional needs of certain subgroups of students
11
 - a construct which I refer to as 
“horizontal equity post vertical equity.” By correlating the needs index with various 
resources, I am able to identify the direction, size, and strength of the relationship 
between resources and school characteristics (as defined by the characteristics of the 
student population – e.g., % poverty).While much of the analysis of equity has been 
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 In their paper, Toutkoushian and Michael (2007) refer to this construct as horizontal equity.    
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conducted at the district level, my research focuses its investigation at the building 
level, comparing all elementary schools and all middle schools.  
I employ qualitative research methods, composed of a review of district and 
state financial documents and interviews with senior district administrators and a 
School Board member, to illuminate the quantitative findings by providing a 
description of the current resource allocation system and its rationale. Qualitative 
research is useful in identifying impediments to greater equity among schools.  
To address the final research question, “What would be the financial impact of 
an alternative approach to resource allocation aligned with the comprehensive equity 
framework?" I conducted a simulation. The simulation illustrates the implications of 
two possible changes to the allocation of resources: the first change is based on the 
State’s approach to funding districts and is consistent with vertical equity, and the 
second change builds on this by also accounting for students’ prior academic 
performance and is consistent with the district’s mission of having all students achieve 
pre-determined
12
 academic and social outcomes.  
Ultimately, this research project describes district resource allocation practices 
and how these practices result in a misalignment between school-level student needs 
and financial and human capital resources.   
The remainder of this dissertation is organized into six chapters: a literature 
review; background and data; methodology; district context and qualitative findings; 
quantitative analysis and results; and my conclusion. The literature review begins with 
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 The State sets yearly benchmarks for proficiency, as mandated by federal No Child Left Behind 
legislation.  
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an appraisal of various conceptions of equity leading to a framework used first to 
evaluate existing studies of intradistrict resource allocation – and, later, to inform the 
research questions and analysis of resource allocation in the Allentown School District. 
This chapter also includes a discussion of intradistrict resource allocation policies and 
procedures and completed studies of intradistrict resource allocation. Chapter Three 
presents background information on both state and district policies to provide context 
for the case study; the sources and collection methods of my data are also reviewed. A 
description of the analyses follows, and specific research methods are explicated. In the 
fifth and sixth chapters, I present my research findings from both quantitative and 
qualitative analysis and the final chapter provides a summary of major findings, 
limitations of the study, policy implications, and recommendations for future research.  
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CHAPTER 2 - LITERATURE REVIEW 
The organization of this review of pertinent research reflects my approach to 
understanding how districts allocate resources among students. The first section offers a 
critical review of conceptions of equity consistent with a social justice perspective 
calling for equal educational opportunity for all students. A theoretical framework for 
grounding an analysis of resource allocation is derived from this review. The next 
section explains the mechanisms for resource allocation from districts to schools, 
programs, and classrooms. The first part of this section describes allocation policies 
including institutional procedures and organizational concerns that influence allocation 
patterns, such as incorrect (and correct) assumptions of need, administrative inertia, and 
school reform initiatives. The political influence of key stakeholders (i.e., teacher 
unions, connected parents, and the business community) and external requirements (i.e., 
court cases and supplemental federal funds) are also considered. Following this general 
review is an examination of the constraints on school districts which limit their ability 
to promote equitable outcomes for students. These constraints are categorized as local 
education agency policies and practices and the teacher labor market. Weighted student 
funding, an approach to resource allocation designed to address concerns of governance 
and fairness, is also reviewed. The third section of this chapter offers a summary of the 
major studies of intradistrict resource allocation, beginning with an assessment of 
challenges to this line of inquiry and a discussion of the research methods employed 
and ending with a review of the measures of inputs (i.e., teacher characteristics) used in 
my analysis of intradistrict equity. Finally, this chapter reviews 34 studies of 
13 
 
intradistrict resource allocation utilizing the different theories of equity presented 
earlier in this paper. Studies are categorized according to their authors’ intention of 
testing the existence of horizontal equity, vertical equity, and/or adequacy.  
A Critical Review of Equity Models 
Given the many views of what constitutes equity, analysis and evaluation of the 
equitable allocation of resources at the school district level or elsewhere requires that 
the concept be clearly defined. This section of the literature review explores definitions 
of “equity” in relation to equal educational opportunity. Consideration of the 
implications of four distinct approaches to equal educational opportunity – all which 
have been quantified in the school finance literature - leads to a fifth approach which 
capitalizes on the positive aspects and addresses the weaknesses of existing 
interpretations of equity.
13
 
While “equity” is generally conceived of as fairness in resource allocation by 
economists, political scientists, and philosophers, the various disciplines use the term 
for somewhat different ideas. Many legal scholars and philosophers characterize equity 
in education as “equal educational opportunity”; however, the appropriate meaning of 
this phrase has been debated for decades (Coleman, 1975). Peterson and Woessmann 
(2007) acknowledge two interpretations of “equal educational opportunity:”  
“For some, equal opportunity means only that everyone is treated the same way 
within the school house and each is given instruction appropriate to his or her 
ability, so that all are given the same chance to build on the capabilities they 
bring to the school door. For others, equal opportunity asks schools to remedy 
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 In 1964, James Coleman struggled with a similar task after being commissioned by the United States 
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare “to assess the availability of equal educational 
opportunities to children of different race, color, religion, and national origin.” 
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the deficiencies that some children bring with them to school so that only 
random chance determines which members of the next generation rise to the 
highest positions of society.” (p. 4) 
 
The first definition offered above is embraced by Peterson and Woessmann (2007) 
as all that is required and feasible in a democratic society which values individual 
liberty. This vision of equal educational opportunity calls for equivalent resources for 
all students. The second definition of equal educational opportunity put forth above is 
consistent with Rawls’ views on social justice, whereby students should have access to 
resources such that their subsequent opportunities are equalized (Berne & Stiefel, 1984; 
Rawls, 1971). This goal holds regardless of whether the focus is on inputs into the 
education system or student outcomes. Inputs refer to resources dedicated to schooling 
(i.e., money, human capital), and outcomes refer to results (i.e., knowledge acquired, 
income, life satisfaction). An additional version of equal educational opportunity, one 
that gained more traction in recent years as a result of the persistent ambiguities of 
equity, requires that each student is prepared to perform at (at least) an adequate level 
such that he/she can succeed economically, politically and socially.  
Approaches to equal educational opportunity emphasize inputs (e.g., equal inputs 
for all students), outcomes (e.g., adequate outcomes for all students), or a combination 
of both.  Different measurement tools are required to examine inputs and outcomes, and 
calculating inputs can be more straightforward than quantifying outcomes.
14
 This 
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Welfare to report on “the lack of availability of equal educational opportunities for individuals by reason 
of race, color, religion, or national origin in public educational institutions” (Title IV of the 1964 Civil 
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literature review examines four conceptions of equity which broadly cover the range of 
approaches that have been considered by policy makers and scholars: horizontal equity 
(equivalent resources for all students); vertical equity (resources directed to students 
based on their differing needs); equivalent outcomes for all students; and adequacy 
(equality of either inputs or outcomes up to a threshold level). An analysis of these 
different interpretations of equity leads to a conceptual model of equity against which 
policy makers can measure current practice.  
Horizontal equity. The simplest approach to equity is to provide equivalent 
resources to all students. Essentially, horizontal equity requires that students from 
different backgrounds and living situations have access to comparable resources (i.e., 
financial support, qualified teachers and principals) (Clotfelter, Ladd & Vigdor, 2007). 
This approach treats all students as if they are the same – it does not take into account 
differences in student need or the costs of services. An equal distribution of resources to 
all students ensures that the school is not responsible for creating inequalities, but it 
does not provide the school with a means of redressing existing inequalities. One 
manifestation of horizontal equity is “wealth neutrality” which maintains that “the 
education a child receives should not be dependent on the wealth of the district in 
which the child resides” (Underwood, 1994, p. 143).15 This particular approach to 
horizontal equity addresses differences in local preferences for allocating public funds 
                                                                                                                                              
Rights Act, Sec. 402.) he offered a similar analysis to the one provided in this paper, acknowledging 
numerous concepts of equal opportunity (Coleman, 1975).    
15
 To attain wealth neutrality, Coons, Clune and Sugarman (1970) maintained that state aid should 
supplement local revenues to the extent that local tax rates meet state requirements but local property 
values are too low to meet the state’s guaranteed level of funding. 
16 
 
to education. Wealth neutrality has been used by litigants in court cases challenging 
state funding systems. 
Horizontal equity is an inadequate measure of equity because the cost of 
providing an education to different students varies according to students’ needs and 
school conditions (Underwood, 1994). Certain students require greater supports to be 
successful. Disadvantaged schools and districts are likely to require funds above and 
beyond those of advantaged schools and districts. The reasons for this include the cost 
of acquiring high quality teachers at less desirable schools, maintenance expenditures 
for older infrastructure, the existing resource discrepancies between schools, and the 
propensity of some parents to compensate their children’s education at higher levels 
(Ladd, 2008). Another problem with using horizontal equity as the measure of equity is 
that because no minimum amount of funding is required, even equivalent resources 
could be insufficient, providing a very low quality education and potentially “leveling 
educational resources downward for all” (Satz, 2008, p. 426).   
Vertical equity. Vertical equity responds to some of the critiques of horizontal 
equity by taking into account discrepancies among students. Specifically, vertical 
equity is designed to address the fact that different students and conditions require 
different treatment (or inputs) to have the opportunity to achieve similar outcomes 
(Berne & Stiefel, 1999; Ladd, 2008). For example, economically disadvantaged 
families and minority families often do not have the same access to a range of supports, 
such as secure housing arrangements, health care, and high quality pre-school, that 
17 
 
wealthier and non-minority families do (Rebell, 2007).
16
 For this reason, some students 
require greater resources in order to address their needs. As Ladd (2008) argues, 
“equality of outcomes requires inequality of inputs” (p. 404). This approach to equality 
of educational opportunity leads to a greater consideration of student outcomes. 
Vertical equity falls within a larger characterization of equal educational 
opportunity whereby “all students … have an equal chance to succeed, with actual 
observed success dependent on certain personal characteristics, such as motivation, 
desire, effort, and to some extent ability” (Berne & Steifel, 1999, p. 13). Proponents of 
this form of equity allow for differences in the allocation of resources among students 
based on ability and effort, but do not accept differences based on morally arbitrary 
traits such as wealth or ethnicity (Brighouse & Swift, 2008; Strike, 2008; Walzer, 
1991).
17
 In the field of school finance, vertical equity calls for additional resources for 
students with defined educational needs (Berne & Stiefel, 1999; Owens & Maiden, 
1999; Underwood, 1994). These educational needs are generally identified as student 
characteristics which research has shown to be highly correlated with a lack of 
academic achievement. 
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 See Grissmer, Flanagan, and Williamson, 1999, Reschovsky and Imazeki, 1999, Weiner, 2008 and 
Baker and Green, 2009 for analysis on the costs of educating economically disadvantaged and minority 
students. 
17
 Scholars offer numerous views on this conception of equal educational opportunity. Brighouse and 
Swift (2008) write that “an individual’s prospects for educational achievement may be a function of that 
individual’s talent and effort, but … not be influenced by his or her social class background” (p. 447). In 
other words, students with the same level of “merit,” conceived of as ability plus effort, should have the 
same chance for success.
17
 Underwood (1994) believes that all students have the right to “the opportunity 
to develop the skills necessary to be a productive member of society, to be able to participate in the 
democratic process, and to exercise his or her constitutional rights” (p. 147), and Strike (2008) regards 
“ability, aspirations, choice, and effort” to be “morally appropriate grounds for differences in treatment 
and outcomes” while “race, class, gender, religion, and sexual preference are factors that should be 
(generally) irrelevant” (p. 478). Similar to Strike, Walzer (1991) writes that justice requires that the 
distribution of educational goods not depend upon students’ attributes such as ethnicity or wealth. 
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A compelling reason to support this conception of equal educational opportunity 
is that it is socially just, as students are afforded the same opportunity to succeed, 
regardless of race, class or other ascribed trait (Brighouse & Swift, 2008; Satz, 2008; 
Strike, 2008). Because success includes economic and political attainment, as well as a 
life of enhanced experiences through appreciation of the arts and sciences, it is just that 
all students be afforded the same opportunities (Brighouse & Swift, 2008).  
Drawbacks to vertical equity, as with any approach to equal educational opportunity 
that seeks to allocate resources to redress unfair disadvantages due to external 
circumstances, have to do with its focus on inputs rather than outcomes, for the 
individual and for society as a whole. First, vertical equity does not take into account 
the quality of the education provided to students. Even with a means of compensating 
for student disadvantages, all students might get a low quality education. This approach 
to equity does not require that children be educated to even a minimum level. 
Inadequate education is even more likely for those children with less ability or 
motivation(Gutmann, 1987; Satz, 2008). Additionally, a system that is not concerned 
with outcomes could lead to a reduction in overall productivity, negatively impacting 
all children (Satz, 2008).   
There are additional theoretical concerns that arise when vertical equity is 
adopted as the determinant of equal educational opportunity. These include the 
murkiness derived from holding students accountable for ability and motivation while 
19 
 
compensating students for other ascribed traits
18
, and the conflict that arises between 
the values of parental and local control and those of equality
19
. 
Vertical Equity in Practice. Implementation of vertical equity necessitates a 
way to adjust for the unequal circumstances of students. Adjustments provide greater 
inputs to the students who require additional resources to achieve outcomes similar to 
less disadvantaged students (Berne & Stiefel, 1999). To achieve vertical equity, states 
use categorical programs to address the needs of particular groups of students. Some 
states and districts also use pupil weights in their funding formulas to take into account 
the additional needs of some categories of students such as English language learners or 
Special Education students (Augenblick, Myers, & Anderson, 1997). Similarly, pupil 
weights can be constructed to compensate students for past unequal treatment (Strike, 
                                                 
18
 While vertical equity deems that groups of students should not differ in their outcomes, it does allow 
individuals within these groups to differ. As such, there exists the possibility of large disparities among 
students in terms of inputs and outcomes. Some argue that it is unclear why the line is drawn at this 
point. Satz (2008) points out that it is wrong to hold individuals accountable for such traits at an early 
age. She writes, “We expect children to go to school and master certain capabilities; it is not enough that 
they have the opportunities to do so” (p. 429). Jencks (1998) agrees, stating, “I can understand the 
argument that society is not responsible for children’s genes or for their upbringing. I have never seen a 
coherent defense of the proposition that society is responsible for one but not the other” (p. 523). 
Gutmann (1987) reaches a similar conclusion based on the likelihood that effort “is dependent upon 
happy family and social circumstances” (p. 131). Brighouse and Swift (2008) do acknowledge that it may 
be unfair to hold children accountable for their efforts which may be heavily influenced by background 
circumstances, but address this difficulty by invoking/relying on the democratic process to determine 
how “merit” is defined. 
19
 In the courts, local control has been referred to as a legitimate state interest while education has not 
been identified as a fundamental right to be protected (Underwood, 1994). Ladd (2008) points out that 
affluent districts will not compromise the quality of their schools to allow for equality. And Gutmann 
(1987) makes the argument that they should not have to. She claims that forcing the equalization of 
resources would violate the value of family autonomy. Brighouse and Swift (2008) also have concerns 
with inhibiting parental freedom and, for that reason, are careful to incorporate values of the family into 
their conception of meritocracy. When contemplating the value of family, Brighouse and Swift (2008) 
make clear their view that educational equality should not “jeopardize, threaten, or undermine family 
values” (p. 458). They do, however, carefully define family values in such a way as to limit its scope. For 
example, spending time reading to children should be considered a family value while supporting elite, 
exclusive institutions should not. 
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2008). Implementing pupil weights requires two steps: first, establishing which 
categories of students should be granted additional funds, and second, determining 
appropriate weights for these categories. In practice, vertical equity relies on equivalent 
resources per weighted pupil across schools and districts (Ladd, 2008). Equal outcomes 
for categories of students, rather than individual students, is the desired result (Berne & 
Stiefel, 1994; Ladd, 2008; Strike, 2008). This makes the distinction between 
educational inputs and outcomes unclear (Strike, 2008).   
While the idea of pupil weights is compelling as a theoretical approach to 
school funding, there are concerns with its implementation. First, there is the possibility 
that the weights will be incorrect. Berne and Stiefel (1999) explain that there is no 
consensus on how to determine the correct weights. Strike (2008) shares this view and 
worries that weights are arbitrarily assigned to students. Another issue is that pupil 
weights are based on individual students and do not take into account concentrations of 
disadvantaged students (Baker & Green, 2009). Ladd (2008) explains that to be more 
accurate, “weights should take into account not only the characteristics of the students 
themselves but also the extent to which students whose characteristics make them hard 
to teach are concentrated in particular schools or districts” (p. 412). A final concern 
with pupil weights is that individual students may be stigmatized. Since pupil weights 
sort individuals into groups, the assumption is that these individuals are less responsible 
for their lower achievement than others. As a society, we run the risk of identifying 
some students as belonging to an “inferior” group (Ladd, 2008; Satz, 2008). Addressing 
concerns related to inadequate outcomes for students leads to two additional approaches 
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to equal educational opportunity – both of which use student outcomes to measure 
fairness. 
Equal outcomes. A third conception of equity, “equal outcomes” or “equality 
of outputs” requires that resources be allocated in such a way as to create equal 
outcomes. Outcomes can be defined in any number of ways, including student 
achievement, graduation rates, prospective economic outcomes, or citizenship. A focus 
on outcomes is consistent with recent education policy in the United States in which 
student assessments are used as an indicator of student learning outcomes. In order to 
achieve equal outcomes by all students, it is necessary to determine which inputs are 
required to achieve them, which in turn requires an unequal allocation of resources 
among students. 
The idea of equal outcomes is appealing as it leads one to imagine a more 
communal society with less competition and no disparities between the “haves” and the 
“have-nots.” The adoption of an equal outcomes standard is unlikely, however, due 
primarily to democratic concerns regarding autonomy and the role of government . A 
system designed to ensure equal outcomes for all students would be extremely 
expensive, as it would require the state to devote all of its educational resources to the 
poorest performing students until they can match the accomplishments of the highest 
performing students. Also, there would be a need for significant change in social and 
economic policies outside of the educational arena (Clotfelter et al., 2007; Rothstein, 
2004). Given limited resources, and public needs beyond education, a system such as 
this might never be able to provide resources to higher performing students.  
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Furthermore, it is unlikely that taxpayers would endorse this conception of 
equity, as available resources must be shared to address a variety of public needs 
(Gutmann, 1987; Satz, 2008). The second problem is that, taken to its extreme, a 
system of equal outcomes would lead to a homogenous student population. It is 
unlikely that the public would embrace a system calling for entirely equal outcomes; 
nobody argues in favor of a system where achievement scores are the same for all 
students (Berne & Stiefel, 1999; Gutmann, 1987; Satz, 2008).  
Another deterrent to an equal outcomes model is fear of the effect it would have 
on the behavior of both students and the public. For example, there is concern that 
undesirable incentive effects could reduce individual effort (Ladd, 2008), or that the 
call for equal outcomes would cause a bidding war among parents for improved 
outcomes (Brighouse & Swift, 2008; Gutmann, 1987; Ladd, 2008). Dealing with this 
“arms race” would require restricting the power of parents – resulting in a politically 
unfeasible loss of autonomy for families (Gutmann, 1987; Strike, 2008). 
The final challenge of this equity ideal is that it is difficult to agree on what 
constitutes appropriate outcomes. Even if assessment results were determined to be 
appropriate outcomes to measure, the economic tools used to study the relationship 
between inputs and outcomes, such as production functions and cost functions, are 
inconclusive in terms of the type and amount of resources required to attain specific 
outcomes (Berne & Stiefel, 1999). Therefore, the public lacks important information in 
making accurate decisions regarding pupil weights.  
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Adequacy. The final conception of equity presented, adequacy, has gained 
traction in scholarly debate, policy, and practice as it addresses some of the 
shortcomings of vertical equity and equal outcomes. As with the principle of equal 
outcomes, adequacy is outcome-focused rather than input-focused. Unlike other 
concepts of equity, however, adequacy is not comparative in nature. Similar to the 
difference between a criterion-referenced test and a norm-referenced test, adequacy 
requires measurement against specified criteria, not against other individuals (or 
schools or districts). This difference makes adequacy a politically viable approach to 
equal educational opportunity, since it offers a means of providing students with the 
resources necessary in our society to attain a certain goal, such as citizenship, 
proficiency on assessments, or social mobility. In doing so, adequacy frames education 
as a right, consistent with the views of numerous legal scholars and philosophers.
20
 
Adequacy provides an outcome level below which no student is allowed to fall. 
The determination of this outcome level is crucial as it sets expectations for students 
that may or may not impact their long term success. The theory of adequacy requires 
that each child is allotted the necessary resources to attain a specified goal, but in 
practice policy-makers have measured adequacy as at the district level, meaning that 
districts within a state are held accountable for their students’ attainment of a pre-
determined standard (Berne & Stiefel, 1998). Adequacy differs from other conceptions 
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 Education is considered to be a right because it “is required by individuals (for them) to secure other 
rights to which they are entitled, such as citizenship and autonomy” (Strike, 2008, p. 471). Further, 
society has legitimate interests in educating all citizens – that complements the idea that education is a 
right (Strike, 2008). This is held up in the Supreme Court’s Brown decision which states that education is 
required for the “performance of our basic public responsibilities” (Satz, 2008, p. 432). 
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of equal opportunity in that it requires value judgments as to what outcome is adequate, 
or sufficient, and to what resources will support all students in reaching this particular 
outcome (Guthrie & Rothstein, 1999). Finally, a key difference between adequacy and 
vertical equity or equal outcomes is that it allows for inequality above this minimum 
threshold.  
Scholars and policy makers have debated the appropriate standard for all 
students to meet.
21
 Policy makers have relied on state-wide test scores, construed to be 
a proxy for long-term outcomes. This is problematic to the extent that these 
standardized tests are insufficient in forecasting success
22
, but it does allow for a 
measurable definition of adequacy: being deemed proficient on a state test.
23
 The recent 
requirement that all students be tested provides a measure of school and student 
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 Gutmann (1987) and Satz (2008) share the view that the threshold should be at the level at which a 
person has the ability to participate effectively in the political process. This threshold is democratically 
determined, as is the allocation of resources above the threshold level. This approach enables future 
citizens to determine the appropriate level of adequacy (Gutmann, 1987). For Satz (2008), educational 
adequacy is tied to the requirements of equal citizenship. This means that schools have an obligation to 
break down “stereotypes and animosity between groups and encouraging intergroup knowledge and 
understanding” (p. 425). Satz (2008) includes social and economic rights in her understanding of equal 
citizenship. Therefore, “an education system that precludes the children of poorer families from 
competing in the same market and society as their wealthier peers cannot be adequate” (Satz, 2008, p. 
434). Satz’s view of adequacy requires “accountable output standards on a national level, increased 
funding in many school districts, and substantial integration across class and racial lines” (Satz, 2008, p. 
441). This threshold for adequacy is so high that it appears to converge with the conception of 
meritocracy outlined earlier, where resources are directed to students with greater educational needs such 
that all students reach a level playing field. Other visions of adequacy focus on private outcomes – such 
as the ability to compete in the market. An example of this is Rawls’ view that all students should attain 
outcomes “connected to his or her long-term life chances” (Rawls, 2001, as cited in Ladd, 2008, p. 412). 
While some worry that adequacy may result in “leveling down,” conceptions of adequacy put forth by 
Satz and Gutmann require a high enough threshold to deal with concerns related to a lower quality of 
education. Satz (2008) points out that adequacy offers a minimum threshold of attainment that should 
prevent states from under-funding schools and districts. An additional advantage of Satz’s and 
Gutmann’s versions of adequacy is that they secure support for those that are most disadvantaged and 
ensure that they can participate in society. Ultimately, this should restrict disparities in educational 
outcomes (Satz, 2008).    
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 Proficiency scores in certain disciplines, such as math and reading, might not represent the full set of 
skills and knowledge that are necessary for a successful life (Guthrie & Rothstein, 1999). 
23
 This characterization of adequacy is consistent with the federal “No Child Left Behind” legislation. 
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performance which has been used to determine whether states are upholding the 
Constitutional mandate of provision of public education. Plaintiffs in adequacy lawsuits 
are able to point to a clear definition of an adequate education, increasing plaintiff 
victories and resulting in the allocation of new funds to disadvantaged districts 
Advocates for directing more resources to disadvantaged students report that “the 
adequacy movement has improved educational opportunities and led to gains in student 
achievement, the ultimate litmus test” (Rebell, 2008, p. 436).  
While adequacy has continued to garner support in recent years, there are a 
number of concerns related to its use. Foremost, it addresses neither issues of inequality 
nor the concept that education is a positional good (Reich & Koski, 2006). Adequacy 
provides for a certain level of scholastic attainment, but beyond this level some groups 
of students will have greater resources and better access than others (Baker & Green, 
2008; Strike, 2008). This will inevitably result in the advantaged groups having greater 
success, as the playing field is not truly level
24
. While all students will be able to 
compete, the competition will be unfair as those who need no compensation have, in 
essence, access to a superior education and, therefore, an advantage in economic and/or 
political attainment (Brighouse & Swift, 2008; Strike, 2008).
25
 Since the current 
standards are not being met by many students, this argument has some merit; still, the 
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 An adequate education alone may not provide all the benefits that schooling has to offer. Education is 
valuable for reasons other than economic or even civic pursuits. Education can enhance one’s life 
immeasurably by “enabling (students) to engage in a wide range of intrinsically valuable pursuits, such 
as reading good literature and discussing it with friends, playing complex games, entertaining themselves 
with mathematical puzzles, and socializing with people who speak other languages” (Brighouse & Swift, 
2008, p. 462). 
25
 Adequacy advocates address this concern by claiming that an appropriately high standard would 
minimize disparities (Satz, 2008).   
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call for greater equity which may be achieved through adequacy models is equally 
compelling.  
 Adequacy also suffers from two political liabilities. As educational adequacy is 
highly dependent upon where the bar is set, it is conceivable that districts would set a 
minimal adequacy standard and could thus be judged as providing an adequate 
education, leaving huge variations between disadvantaged and advantaged school 
districts. Affluent districts might even promote minimal definitions of adequacy in 
order to avoid higher taxes to compensate less well-off districts (Strike, 2008). The 
second political liability is that, in the likely event that the legislature is unwilling or 
unable to produce the necessary funds, a theory of adequacy, in place of a theory of 
vertical equity or equal outcomes, could result in an unequal system. This situation 
might be more difficult to overcome than the situation where all schools are equally but 
inadequately funded. Similar to the idea that a universal draft would increase resistance 
to war, in a situation where all schools were equally but inadequately funded, more 
districts would be vested in raising the level of support to an adequate level. With fewer 
schools inadequately funded, there would be no “shared basis for improvement in 
equity” (Kauffman, 2004).  
One last technical issue with adequacy models, discussed earlier with regard to 
equal outcomes, is that it is extremely difficult to address questions regarding 
appropriate outcome measures and the links between inputs and outputs. Augenblick, 
Meyers, and Anderson (1997), Guthrie and Rothstein (1999), and Ladd (2008) agree 
that determining the necessary inputs to achieve certain outcomes is a slowly evolving 
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science. Also, there are practical and theoretical concerns with the allocation of 
resources, including the determination of accurate pupil weights. Researchers and 
policymakers have not yet resolved the education production function and are currently 
unable to ascertain what inputs are necessary to achieve certain outcomes (Ladd, 2008). 
Questions such as “To what extent should schools be held responsible for the specified 
outcomes?” and “Are the level of resources necessary to produce adequate outcomes in 
reading the same as those required to produce adequate outcomes in math, or 
citizenship?” remain unanswered (Guthrie & Rothstein, 1999, p. 251).   
Comprehensive Equity Framework. The previous section reviewed four 
approaches to equal educational opportunity, providing an overview of current methods 
of establishing the existence of the equitable distribution of resources. Here I offer a 
fifth approach, a conception of equity which joins together principles of adequacy and 
vertical equity. This comprehensive equity framework seeks to ensure positive 
outcomes for all students, is consistent with a social justice interpretation of equity, and 
is politically feasible in a democratic society. 
 The intention of this new equity framework is twofold: 1) to ensure that all 
students obtain the skills and competencies required to participate in a democracy and 
be economically and socially self-sufficient and 2) to ascertain that, beyond the 
minimum standards attained, all students are similarly situated to progress according to 
their competencies and desires. The comprehensive equity framework, developed to be 
used in evaluating resource allocation, embraces a definition of adequacy as all students 
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being “college and career ready”26 and, in addition, employs a paradigm of vertical 
equity by requiring that, beyond adequacy, resources be distributed to students based on 
their needs, thereby ensuring that students’ educational opportunities are not impacted 
by circumstances over which they have no control. In this case, the paradigm of vertical 
equity specifies that supplementary resources are directed to students with given 
characteristics based on links between these characteristics (e.g., English-language 
learner status, low-income status) and greater educational need. Supplementary 
resources are not to be directed to students based on their possession of characteristics 
unrelated to educational need (e.g., race). 
 Though they often presented as opposing views of equity, theories of adequacy 
and vertical equity are not incompatible. When combined, they can promote the goal of 
all students obtaining an education that prepares them to achieve a certain “standard” 
and, above this standard, enjoy similar opportunities for success. In fact, adequacy 
theories “should be used in conjunction with equity theories to ensure that all children 
receive an education that (1) affords equal opportunity to all children, consistent with 
educational need, and (2) is a quality education adequate to prepare students from 
diverse backgrounds for life in the twenty-first century” (Morgan, Cohen & Hershkoff, 
1995, p. 561).
27
 This formulation is consistent with the theory that understanding and 
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 College and career ready has been presented by the National Governors Association and the Council of 
Chief State School Officers as “prepared for college-level courses upon matriculation (from high school), 
or for a job that can support a family (Paulson, 2010). 
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 Several researchers, policymakers, and legal scholars agree with this broad interpretation of equal 
educational opportunity. Examples of supporters of an approach to equal educational opportunity which 
includes aspects of both vertical equity and adequacy: 1) Berne and Stiefel (1999) recommend the 
continued use of input measures along with output measures, as “many users (e.g., lawyers, the public) 
find input equity meaningful” (p. 24); 2) Strike (2008) argues that equality and adequacy are 
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rectifying inequities requires researchers and policymakers to take into account both the 
relative position and the absolute achievement of students (Baker & Green, 2008; 
Walzer, 1991).  
A new equity framework is required to overcome the previously outlined 
difficulties of existing approaches to equal educational opportunity. Adequacy’s 
greatest drawback is that it does not fully address the problem of inequality. Vertical 
equity’s most significant shortcoming is that it does not ensure that all students are held 
to a minimum standard. Coupling adequacy and vertical equity provides a means of 
assessing equal educational opportunity, along with a greater capacity to determine the 
appropriate allocation of resources among districts, schools, and students.    
Additional concerns related to adequacy and vertical equity can be addressed 
with morally just policies and practices. For example, fears that the definition of 
adequacy could be incorrect, or the bar for adequacy set too low, are dealt with by 
offering more precise definitions with clear standards. As an illustration, the Obama 
administration is considering moving away from a system which relies on state 
assessments to measure long-term student outcomes and seeks instead to develop a 
minimum criterion for all students of “college and career-ready.” An adequacy target 
reconfigured to “college and career ready” as opposed to “proficiency on state 
                                                                                                                                              
complementary approaches to school finance and proposes a three-tier approach. On the first tier, all 
children receive a level of education that meets a certain threshold tied to outcome goals such as 
citizenship or other social or economic goals. On the second tier, above this threshold, education is 
provided equally to all students up to a specified limit. And on the third tier, families can make choices 
for their children that result in unequal outcomes (Strike, 2008, p. 472); and, 3) Ladd (2008) suggests that 
adequacy should be the primary goal, but disparities above the threshold should be limited, especially to 
the extent that they are publicly funded. She explains that this approach is needed because of the deficits 
of full equality, including its “undesirable incentive effects,” its high costs, and the desire that some 
families may have to retain their position (Ladd, 2008, p. 415-416).  
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assessments” is less likely to result in large numbers of students unable to participate in 
democracy and/or compete in the economy. Furthermore, impediments to the 
implementation of vertical equity, stemming from technical complexities related to 
assigning accurate pupil weights to compensate for student disadvantages, are an 
empirical problem that could be addressed with sufficient research into best practices 
for service provision. 
Lastly, the comprehensive equity framework has an advantage over the current 
“adequacy” systems created by No Child Left Behind legislation. Systems which focus 
only on student outcomes are ill-equipped to comprehend the relationship between 
discrete resources and their impact on student progress. This makes it difficult for 
districts to effectively and efficiently address budget shortfalls or expand programs 
because administrators and policy-makers lack information on how dollars are spent at 
the school level. A system which requires the evaluation of how dollars, personnel, and 
programs are distributed among schools and students creates an environment in which 
policy makers and stakeholders are better equipped to understand the implications of 
resource allocation decisions. 
This new equity framework will still suffer from some of the limitations 
inherent in adequacy and vertical equity models. The most obvious limitations include: 
1) difficulty in resolving the conflicting ideals regarding the appropriate standard for all 
students to meet; and 2) the inability to eliminate all inequities among groups of 
students. Sufficient resources would go a long way to minimize these limitations, but 
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no equity framework can completely satisfy the numerous, and often incompatible, 
requirements of all stakeholders.   
 The Equity Framework in Practice. With access to financial, personnel, student 
enrollment/demographic, and student achievement data, quantitative methods can be 
employed to ascertain how resources are directed to students.
28
 Based on the 
comprehensive equity framework put forth in this dissertation, I test both vertical equity 
and adequacy to provide a complete picture of equal educational opportunity in the 
Allentown School District. Vertical equity is tested by identifying how inputs (i.e., 
expenditures, personnel) are allocated differentially based on schools’ characteristics 
and demographics. This analysis uses weights to compensate for the additional needs of 
certain students with given characteristics (i.e., ELL status, poverty). In order to 
achieve a more detailed understanding of resource allocation, I further investigate the 
allocation of ASD resources by quantifying the variation among school resources which 
is not accounted for by defined school need.
29
 Adequacy is tested by examining student 
outcomes. I first consider the effect of being from a particular school on student 
outcomes. As my primary objective in evaluating intradistrict adequacy is to understand 
the extent to which students are “college and career ready” by school, I look at the 
percentage of students in each school that have not met benchmarks that put them on a 
track to achieve this goal. I also examine the various student populations within each 
school and consider their success in attaining “college and career ready” standards. 
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 Additional student outcomes, such as behavioral data (i.e., attendance, disciplinary actions), can be 
included in the analysis. 
29
 School need is determined by student population. 
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Taken together, the evaluation of vertical equity and adequacy provides a 
comprehensive and useful picture of equal educational opportunity. 
Intradistrict Distribution of Resources - Process 
 In considering the implications of the allocation of resources among schools, 
programs and classrooms, it is important to understand the processes by which funds, 
services, and personnel are distributed within districts. The following section provides a 
synopsis of the means in which resources (dollars, services, and personnel) are 
disbursed. It begins with a description of allocation policies, highlighting institutional 
procedures. These allocation policies are explained in terms of their implications for 
equity. An exploration of organizational concerns, the political influence of key 
stakeholders (i.e., teacher unions, connected parents, and the business community), and 
external requirements (i.e., court cases, supplemental federal funds, and local education 
foundations) follows. Next, district limitations, district human resource practices, and 
the teacher labor market are considered as the constraints on resource allocation. This 
section concludes with a discussion of weighted student funding as an approach to 
resource allocation designed to address concerns related to the current system.  
 Allocation Policies. Schools are funded with federal, state and local revenues. 
Based on 2006-07 U.S. Census data, nationally the local share of revenues is 44.1%; 
the state share is 47.6%; and the federal share is 8.3%. The mix of funds varies 
considerably from state to state. Illinois has the highest local share, at 58.9%
30
, and 
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 The District of Columbia is not included as it is funded with local (88.3 percent) and federal (11.7 
percent) funds.  
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Vermont has the lowest local share, at 5.3%
31
, (U.S. Census Bureau, 2009). This same 
variation can be seen within states as well. For example, in Pennsylvania among the 
school districts with enrollments of greater than 10,000 students, the average local 
share is 63.1%.
32
 Of these 17 districts, 8 districts have a local share higher than 75% 
and 4 districts have a local share lower than 45%(U.S. Census Bureau, 2009).    
In many states, as a result of court rulings or legislative mandate, the state’s 
funding scheme is shaped to equalize spending across districts and ensure that an 
adequate education is provided to all students. While states do not control how all 
dollars are spent, a specific recommendation – especially with regards to per pupil 
funding and additional funding for students deemed to have special needs – is implied. 
However, because state aid is directed to school districts as opposed to schools, 
classrooms or programs (or students), there is no guarantee that districts use funds in 
accordance with the state’s intentions.  
 Institutional Procedures. Financial management of the public school system is 
similar to financial management in the public sector in general. At the district level, a 
budget is developed based on expected revenue (from state and federal aid and local tax 
base) and forecasted expenses. In a small minority of cases, schools within districts are 
provided with a lump sum to spend according to their own determined needs. (This 
model will be discussed further in the section on weighted student funding.) Typically, 
budgets are centrally managed, and district officials administer the use of funds, sorting 
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 Hawaii, with only one school district, is not included. Its local share is 1.6 percent and its state share is 
89.8 percent.  
32
 The statewide local share in Pennsylvania is 57.0 percent. 
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dollars into functions such as instruction, pupil personnel services, staff support 
services, administrative support services, business support services, 
operation/maintenance, transportation, food services, and central support services. For 
accounting purposes, funds are further classified into categories such as salaries, 
benefits, purchased professional and technical services, purchased property services, 
other purchased services, supplies, dues/fees, and property.
33
    
Understanding resource allocation within an equity framework. Roza (2008) 
provides a framework for understanding district resource allocation. She offers eight 
categories of inputs that must be allocated to schools (funds, staff, access to central 
services, professional development, supplies/materials/equipment, program access, 
roaming specialists, and, some combination of these) along with methods for how these 
inputs are distributed. Distribution methods include formula (per pupil, per school, per 
staff, per pupil type, and some combination) and non-formula allocations 
(school/student/staff demand, discretion, politics, application process, other) (p. 12). 
Berne and Stiefel (1994) explain that funding allocated on a per pupil basis is described 
as “general” education funding (p. 407), and as such, can be interpreted as addressing 
the call for horizontal equity. Funding categories designed to address the needs of 
certain groups of students (such as ELL students or students with disabilities) can be 
interpreted as addressing the call for vertical equity. While some forms of vertical 
equity are addressed below the district level, it is important to note that disadvantages 
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 These particular cost functions and categories are used for district reporting to the Pennsylvania 
Department of Education.   
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due to the income level of students are not addressed by the allocation of state and local 
revenues (Rubenstein et al., 2006).
34
 
Just as district central offices allocate funds per pupil, they also allocate staff 
per pupil, based on pre-determined class size requirements and enrollment. Teacher 
positions are included in school budgets and translated into dollars using average 
salaries, though most public school districts utilize salary schedules whereby payments 
are linked to years of experience, level of education (degrees obtained), and coursework 
completed (Podgursky, 2002). Given the range of experience, education, and 
coursework, there is considerable variation among teacher salaries, and those higher on 
the pay scale could be receiving double the salary of those lower on the pay scale 
(Picus, 1999). This can result in large variations of actual expenditures at the school 
level. Using data from four large districts (Seattle, Rochester, Baltimore, and Oakland), 
Roza and Hill (2004) demonstrated that the uneven distributions of teachers (as 
represented by their compensation) leads to large differences in resources devoted to 
children based upon where those children attend school. As salaries and benefits make 
up the largest proportion of school budgets, with the personnel budget representing just 
over 80 percent of total expenditures for public elementary and secondary education in 
2006-2007 (National Center for Education Statistics, 2010), this variation leads to a 
lack of horizontal equity at the school level in many districts.  
                                                 
34
 Certain funding streams, such as Title I, are meant to be allocated through states and districts to 
schools to address the needs of students in poverty. These funding streams are considered to be outside 
state and local allocations.   
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In addition to per pupil funds and positions, school budgets often include funds 
which are intended to be directed to groups of students requiring additional supports, 
such as ELL students and students with disabilities. As stated above, these funds 
address vertical equity. Other funds may be allocated by the district central office to 
address a range of concerns, such as accountability targets (i.e., not meeting Adequate 
Yearly Progress as defined by the No Child Left Behind Act) and community desires. 
Additionally, state legislatures may seek to control districts’ use of additional funds, 
such as those resulting from adjustments to funding formulas, by targeting funds at 
specific programs. This is intended to ensure that new funds are used to the greatest 
benefit, or possibly to guarantee to that politicians receive credit for directing funds to 
their legislative districts (Baker, 2003). Unfortunately, as discussed in the following 
section, constraints on funding often create inefficiencies. 
Not all funds flow from the district central office to the schools; in many cases, 
over half of the budget remains at the district level (Roza, 2008). Examples of district 
expenditures which do not flow through to schools include transportation budgets, 
professional development services, and staff benefits such as pensions (Berne & Stiefel, 
1994). To better understand the costs associated with providing an adequate or 
appropriate education, it would be useful to have more complete information at the 
school level. This would require greater consideration of expenditures that remain at the 
district central office (Denison et al. 2009; Monk & Hussain, 2000).   
 Organizational concerns. Decisions regarding allocation of resources are made 
with a number of considerations in play. While some policy decisions have been made 
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democratically (by state legislatures or local school boards), others are tied to 
organizational concerns, political influence, or external requirements.  
Goertz and Natriello (1999) found that organizational considerations, more than 
economic or political considerations, drive districts in their allocation of resources. 
Their research, conducted in New Jersey after the Abbott Court decision mandated that 
additional resources be allocated to poorly-funded districts, demonstrated that districts 
spend additional dollars based on perceived needs and allocate dollars across 
expenditure categories similarly to wealthier districts (p. 102), rather than in such a way 
as to increase student performance.
35
 Goertz and Natriello (1999) wrote, “It appears 
that at least in this early stage the spending norms were so strong that departures from 
the patterns of spending evident in higher-performing neighboring districts were not 
seriously entertained” (p. 127). Parallel findings have been made at the school level; in 
an analysis of school budgeting, Goertz and Hess (1998) reviewed district expenditures 
in Chicago, Illinois and Rochester, New York  and found that additional funds were 
directed towards long-established uses (such as reducing class size, adding programs 
which had been reduced or eliminated, and professional development). Based on 
surveys and interviews with school administrators, teachers, and parents, they surmise 
that this was due to the budgetary constraints faced by administrators. However, Goertz 
and Hess (1998) also suggest that school administrators make decisions based on their 
own ideas on what is necessary for student success. 
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 The data for this study were collected in the early 1990’s, prior to NCLB requirements.   
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Other researchers have sought to understand the distribution of resources below 
the district level. Monk and Hussain (2000) used New York State data to study 
allocations of existing funds and positions across different academic subject areas. 
They found that considerable variation in expenditure patterns across districts is 
correlated with certain district characteristics (i.e., spending, wealth, poverty, and size), 
with spending having the largest effect on staffing levels (p. 21). They also concluded 
that higher property wealth districts were more likely to move staff to secondary 
academic areas and higher poverty districts were less likely to increase “professional 
staff into the academic program” (p.21). Additionally, all four of these district 
characteristics were positively associated with “the total net supply of resources into 
administration” (p.21). The most interesting outcome of Monk and Hussain’s work, 
however, is the discovery that decision-making was taking place at different levels 
within the system and this is likely to impact resource allocation decisions.  
Administrators at different levels within the education system are likely to have 
different objectives. For example, accountability requirements might compel greater or 
lesser adherence, depending on the ramifications of failure to meet targets. Different 
governance structures also impact where and how decisions are made. In some cases, 
management of school districts has been reconfigured to allow for certain entities, such 
as the Mayor’s office, to have greater control over funds. Examples of this practice 
include the 1995 restructuring of the Chicago school system under the control of a 
Chief Executive Officer appointed by the Mayor (Goertz & Hess, 1998) and the 2002 
restructuring of the New York City school system, when management was reorganized 
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under the Chancellor of the New York City Department of Education (Goertz & Levin, 
2009). Top-down management strategies certainly affect the allocation of funds, but 
schools and districts responsible for implementing new funding plans are likely to 
temper the influence of the central office (Iatarola & Rubenstein, 2007). This may be 
due to a lack of understanding on the part of staff of the district’s goals (Roza, 2008), or 
to the distrust of new agendas (McLaughlin, 1987). While school reform initiatives 
designed to improve student outcomes have been evaluated (Fuhrman & Elmore, 2004; 
Gross & Goertz, 2005), there has been little investigation into the impact of 
accountability requirements on how funds are allocated. This research would clarify 
how and where decisions are made and would provide better knowledge for policy 
makers to understand how different expenditure approaches are related to 
improvements in student outcomes (Denison, Stiefel, Hartman, & Deegan, 2009) .      
Political influence. The allocation of funds by the district central office is 
seldom reviewed or questioned by the public (Schwartz et al., 2008). However, Ladd 
(2008) and Augenblick, Meyers, and Anderson (1997) contend that politics plays an 
important role in the allocation of resources at the local level, pointing out that the 
political costs of higher taxes inhibit spending. Baker (2003) agrees, stating that 
political officials call upon school administrators to increase efficiency to address 
school resource needs. Also, wealthy school districts seek to keep their advantage; 
schools with involved, powerful parents are more likely to demand high-quality 
teachers (Lankford et al., 2002). This increases the likelihood that children of less 
powerful parents will be taught by lower quality teachers (Clotfelter et al., 2005). 
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Political groups, including parents and local community organizations, expend 
significant effort to ensure that candidates (including school board members and state 
legislators) who represent their views are elected (Roos, 1998). The lack of political 
capital among poorer communities helps to explain the inferior conditions of their 
public schools.
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Another influential political group is the teachers’ union (Roos, 1998), which 
generally enjoys the strong support of many parents. A major role of the union is to 
maintain and augment the compensation and benefits of their members. Working on 
behalf of the instructional staff, the teachers’ union is often responsible for negotiating 
labor contracts with the school district. Such contracts include seniority rules, which 
mandate certain guarantees and benefits for educators who have the longest tenure (and, 
consequently, the highest salaries), and are largely responsible for affecting teacher 
allocation. 
School districts’ effort to retain wealthier families is one more explanation for 
the disparities among schools. Research shows that wealthier students are more likely 
to attend magnet schools and other elite programs because the supports they receive at 
home give these students an advantage in the application process (Elis, 2006). Even 
within schools, tracking by ability often serves the more advantaged students, as 
programs for gifted students are more likely to serve wealthier children. The argument 
in favor of this disproportionate allocation of services is the increased tax revenue and 
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 Integration was a successful strategy for improving public schools because families with more political 
capital were willing to fight for the schools attended by their children. As inner-city schools re-segregate, 
schools composed primarily of disadvantaged and minority students no longer have the same powerful 
advocates on their behalf (Orfield & Lee, 2005).    
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social capital provided by these wealthier families increases the ability of the district to 
provide services to all students (Elis, 2006). 
Imazeki and Goe (2009) suggest another reason minority students might be at a 
disadvantage in terms of teacher quality. They contend that parents choose where to 
live and send their children to school based in part on racial make-up, as they seek 
environments with people similar to themselves. When minority parents have their 
children taught by minority teachers, they are increasing the likelihood that the teacher 
will have weaker credentials as measured by indicators such as college selectivity 
(Imazeki & Goe, 2009). A counter to this argument is offered by Dee (2004); utilizing 
data from the Tennessee’ Project STAR, Dee found that minority students benefit (as 
demonstrated by increased math and reading test scores) from having a teacher of the 
same race.  
Although local politics play a significant role in the allocation of funds, politics 
at the national and state level also exerts a great deal of influence. As we have seen in 
Pennsylvania and elsewhere, the current standards-based reform environment, which 
holds schools accountable for student outcomes, makes adequacy a politically viable 
approach for allocating resources.  
External forces. In addition to organizational and political influences at the 
local level, external forces greatly affect school districts’ allocation of resources. Three 
external forces designed to impact district allocation of resources are court cases, Title I 
of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 6301 et seq.), and 
Local Education Foundations (LEFs).  
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Court cases. As mentioned earlier, few court cases have addressed resource 
allocation below the district level. The two that have- Hobson v. Hansen and Rodriguez 
v. LAUSD- looked beyond average teacher salaries and acknowledged the actual 
differences in school per-pupil expenditures. In Hobson v. Hansen, the Court of 
Appeals ruled that per-pupil teacher salary and benefits must fall within five percent of 
the average across the city (Rubenstein et al., 2006b). The consent decree issued as a 
result of Rodriguez v. LAUSD also addressed the unequal distribution of teachers 
among schools; in order to reduce the discrepancies between teachers in low-minority, 
higher wealth schools and teachers in high-minority, higher poverty schools, the 
consent decree provided each school with a dollar budget with which to hire teachers 
(Rubenstein et al., 2006b). The stated goal was to equalize non-categorical per-pupil 
spending in 90% of schools to within $100 of the district average (Biegel & Slayton, 
1997). Furthermore, in an effort to reduce the disparities among school faculties, the 
consent decree required human resource decisions to factor in training and experience. 
According to Michael Rebell, Executive Director of the Campaign for Fiscal Equity, 
there have been no other major cases which have resulted in the redistribution of 
resources from districts to schools (personal communication, October 2009).  
Title I. Title I, Part A of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 
(Title I) is the largest elementary and secondary education federal program, providing 
approximately $14.5 billion in fiscal year 2009 (U.S. Department of Education, 2009). 
Title I provides for greater vertical equity by enhancing resources for disadvantaged 
students in high-poverty schools (McClure, 2008). Unfortunately, there are 
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considerable problems with the allocation of Title I funds, resulting in distribution 
patterns that do not correspond to the intent of the program. While inequities exist at 
the state and the district level, I limit my discussion to inequities below the district 
level. 
States are required to pass not less than 95% of their allotted Title I funds 
through to local educational agencies (LEAs)
37
, and four formulas combine to 
determine the amount and destination of these funds. The Basic Grant, representing 
52% of the total funds in 2010, is allotted as a per pupil value to all school districts with 
at least 10 poor children and 2% of their children in poverty. The Concentration Grant, 
representing 8% of the total funds, is allotted as a per pupil value to school districts 
with higher numbers of children in poverty – at least 15% or over 6,500 children. The 
Targeted Assistance Grant, representing 20% of the total funds, differs in that it 
provides more dollars per child as the poverty rate of the district increases. Finally, the 
Education Finance Incentive Grant, representing 20% of the total funds, targets funds in 
high-poverty school districts in states which do a poor job of allocating money 
equitably among students (New America Foundation). These grants are provided to 
districts in a lump sum which schools can spend on supplemental educational 
assistance, targeted assistance, school-wide programs, and public and non-public 
programs. Title I regulations require that school districts rank their schools according to 
percent low-income and allocate funds to schools accordingly. Schools with greater 
than 75% poverty must be served first, after which the ranking can be adjusted to 
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(U.S. Department of Education website).  
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include attendance areas, such as grade spans. Districts have additional discretion in 
determining the per pupil allocation in each school as well (e.g., designating a school 
attendance area or school with 35% or more of the children from low-income families 
as eligible) (U.S. Department of Education).  
Title I regulations also require “comparability,” meaning that schools within 
districts must be provided with the same state and local funds prior to the addition of 
federal funds. Meeting the criteria for comparability is not burdensome; according to 
the U.S. Department of Education’s non-regulatory guidance on Title I Fiscal Issues 
(2008), a school district has met the comparability requirement if it has demonstrated to 
the state that it has a “district-wide salary; a policy to ensure equivalence among 
schools in teachers, administrators, and other staff; and, a policy to ensure equivalence 
among schools in the provision of curriculum materials and instructional supplies” (p. 
16). The LEA may also meet the comparability requirement by establishing and 
implementing “other measures for determining compliance such as—
student/instructional staff ratios” (p. 16). This allows districts to meet the comparability 
requirement by counting paraprofessionals along with teachers in calculating the 
student/instructional staff ratio.  
A major issue related to Title I comparability is that “staff salary differentials 
for years of employment are not included in comparability determinations” (U.S. 
Department of Education, Title I Fiscal Issues, 2008, p. 17), which allows the true cost 
of educating students to be masked. School budgets are constructed with district 
average salaries; in schools with less experienced and less credentialed teachers (those 
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most likely to have more disadvantaged students) the budgeted amount is higher than 
actual expenditures. In schools with more experienced and more credentialed teachers 
(those least likely to have more disadvantaged students) the budgeted amount is lower 
than actual expenditures. The result is that the highest poverty schools receive fewer 
dollars per low income pupil than middle and low poverty schools (Riddle, 2004). As 
Weiner (2008) explains, “equivalence” can be achieved with the use of a single-salary 
schedule and other vague policies regarding “comparable” access to teachers (p. 37).  
While Title I requires comparability to ensure that federal funds are 
supplemental, the fact that expenditures on teacher salaries are not specified means that 
federal funds supplement an unequal base. True comparability can only be achieved if 
actual expenditures were calculated in school budgets. Compounding this inequality,  
Roza (2008) reports that many districts use categorical funds (such as Title I) to provide 
services to disadvantaged students and then use state and local money, which comes 
with no strings attached, to provide the same services to more advantaged students. 
Districts also fund programs outside of the allocation formula that go unnoticed in the 
comparability calculation.  
Local Education Foundations. Beyond those resources that flow through the 
district and school budget, more privileged schools have access to considerable 
additional assets. Local Education Foundations (LEFs) have been created in some 
communities to raise private funds to supplement school resources (Elis, 2006). These 
financial supports, as well as time commitments from parents and community members, 
can impact resource allocation and reinforce inequality among students (Berne & 
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Stiefel, 1994; Crampton & Bauman, 1998; Elis, 2006). Regarding the magnitude of 
assets contributed by LEFs, a review of the literature by Zimmer, Krop, Kaganoff, 
Ross, and Brewer (2001) found that “foundation contributions represent a small 
percentage of revenue in all but a handful of schools” (p. 88). Given more recent fiscal 
constraints, it is likely that this source of income has grown significantly, and will have 
an increasing impact on differential allocation of resources.  
 Factors Impacting Resource Allocation. Additional factors which impact 
resource allocation between the district and school level include the limitations placed 
on school districts that restrict district administrators’ control of resources, the methods 
in which human capital resources are distributed (i.e., district hiring practices, seniority 
plans, salary schedules, working conditions and hiring preferences), and the teacher 
labor market.    
District limitations. Berne and Stiefel (1999) explain that, “In most cases, 
despite special, bilingual, and compensatory education regulations, districts have 
significant freedom to decide how to allocate revenues to their schools” because “state 
general aid and locally raised revenues come with few restrictions on how it must be 
spread among schools” (p. 5). However, others argue that budgets have considerable 
restrictions, resulting from both external (i.e., federal and state) and internal 
requirements. District obligations due to external sources include mandates from the 
federal government resulting from policy decisions addressing such areas as 
accountability (e.g., student assessment, school evaluation) and equal protection (e.g., 
Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (Title I)). District 
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obligations also include mandates from state governments, often tied to funding, 
implementing federal requirements and creating their own sets of rules and regulations 
(e.g., class size requirements). For example, in Pennsylvania, a recent funding increase 
to previously underfunded districts as a result of a change to the state’s education 
funding formula requires districts to spend 80% of new funds in specific areas tied to 
increases in student achievement. Furthermore, many states courts have ordered 
spending be tied to specific reforms (Peyser & Costrell, 2004). Additional restrictions 
might result from teacher contracts which can specify salaries, class size, teacher 
placements, and tenure (Goertz & Hess, 1998). While administrators have different 
conceptions of what is required for success, in many situations those responsible for 
budgets find that they do not have the necessary authority to make the types of 
decisions they deem necessary. Levin and Quinn (2003) found that this situation was 
magnified for leaders in high poverty schools. It is important to keep these various 
restrictions in mind when holding districts and schools accountable for allocations of 
funds and positions, as administrators have limited control over the distribution of 
resources at the district level and below (Baker, 2003). 
Distribution of human capital resources. A number of institutional policies 
tied to personnel issues impact how human capital resources are distributed to schools 
and programs. Specifically, hiring practices and school situations impact the ability of 
school districts to successfully hire well-qualified teachers who will remain in their 
positions. Conditions which impact hiring include: the use of seniority rules, salary 
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schedules, working conditions, and hiring preferences by district and school 
administrators.  
District hiring practices. Researchers have found significant inefficiencies in 
human resource practices that have serious ramifications on the ability of districts to 
employ qualified teachers (Imazeki & Goe, 2009; Koski & Horng, 2007; Lankford, 
Loeb & Wyckoff, 2002; Levin & Quinn, 2003). These inefficiencies begin during the 
hiring process; many districts are unable to compete for the most qualified teachers 
because they are not in a position to make hiring commitments at the time when most 
teachers are seeking employment. In their study of hiring practices among urban 
districts, Levin and Quinn (2003) and Koski and Horng (2007) identified major 
impediments to well-timed hiring. First, teachers who plan to leave the system are often 
not required to give notice early enough for district personnel staff to plan for the next 
year’s staffing requirements. Second, state and local budgets are often not completed in 
time for districts to have their funding allotments, preventing human resource offices 
from knowing the number of placements they will be able to make for the coming year. 
Finally, transfer rules in many districts give personnel with the greatest experience in 
the district first priority in filling open positions. The result of late hiring is that large 
urban districts lose the ability to hire candidates who are well-qualified and willing to 
work in high poverty schools. Also, those candidates who are placed later in the year 
are more likely to be a poor match and, therefore, more likely to be unsuccessful in the 
position (Imazeki & Goe, 2009). 
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 Seniority. The advantage conferred on teachers with longer tenure is referred to 
as seniority. This status is one of the bargained rights which unions and districts agree 
to as part of the teacher contract.
38
 Seniority preferences are prevalent in many school 
districts and restrict schools from having discretion in employment decisions, impacting 
transfer and reassignment policies as well as hiring.
39
. As teachers gain more 
experience, they tend to move out of schools with disadvantaged students (Betts, 
Rueben, & Danenberg, 2000; Hanushek, Kain, O’Brien, & Rivkin, 2004; Lankford, 
Loeb, & Wyckoff, 2002). While many researchers fear that the movement of more 
experienced teachers out of high-poverty schools results in fewer high-quality teachers 
where they are needed most (Hill, 2006; Moe, 2007), there is a growing body of 
research that suggests that the most effective teachers do not transfer out of high-
poverty schools (Hanushek, 2009; Imazeki & Goe, 2009; Ingersoll, 2002; Nelson, 
2006).  
One argument for strong seniority rules is that districts with robust benefits, 
including seniority rights, attract high quality teachers. Koski and Horng (2007) 
compared California districts with weak and strong seniority rules and found that 
“strong seniority preference rules are associated with a greater percentage of 
credentialed teachers in school districts” (p. 262). While this is true based on a 
comparison of districts, Koski and Horng (2007) found that credentialed teachers are 
not evenly distributed among schools within these districts. In fact, “schools with 
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 Many districts without collective bargaining also have seniority rights firmly in place (citation? Maybe 
the NCTQ website). 
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 New York City has recently changed its hiring practices and now has an open system which allows 
school leadership teams to make employment decisions (Goertz & Levin, 2008). 
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higher percentages of minority students, within districts, have lower percentages of 
credentialed and experienced teachers” (p. 262). That being said, Koski and Horng’s 
analysis does not provide evidence to support the notion that seniority rules have an 
impact on the distribution of teachers among schools within districts. There is, 
however, a great deal of research supporting the impact of teacher preference on 
employment decisions ((Betts, Rueben, & Danenberg, 2000; Hanushek, Kain, O’Brien, 
& Rivkin, 2004; Lankford, Loeb, & Wyckoff, 2002).  Clearly, seniority rules result in 
the fact that new teachers are most likely to teach in schools with the most 
disadvantaged children. However, there is some conflict among researchers as to the 
effect of seniority rules. One would think that it would be beneficial for instructional 
leaders to have control over the composition of their faculty. However, the impact of 
district-union agreements guaranteeing seniority rights seems to be overwhelmed by 
other considerations related to the teacher labor market (Koski & Horng, 2007). 
Salaries. There is significant literature on the impact of wages on the choices 
people make, when entering the job market and when choosing locations in which to 
work (Boyd et al., 2004; Corcoran et al., 2004; Hanushek, 2006; Lankford et al., 2002; 
Murnane et al., 1991). Some of this literature documents how women and minorities 
are moving into fields with greater compensation opportunities than education 
(Corcoran et al., 2004). This research suggests that an increase in wages would have a 
positive impact on the ability of schools with harder to serve students to hire more 
qualified educators. However, while wages can impact the decision of job seekers in 
choosing to become teachers or in choosing between school districts, wages will not 
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impact decisions at the school level because salaries remain the same (Boyd et al., 
2004).  
Working conditions. While teachers report that compensation is an influential 
factor in choosing employment, they also indicate that working conditions are 
extremely important (Ingersoll, 2004). Furthermore, because salaries are unlikely to 
have an impact on choice among schools in a district, working conditions become 
critical in the distribution of teachers within districts, both in the initial employment 
decisions (when there is choice involved) and, possibly more significantly, in later 
employment decisions. 
Working conditions are generally encompass the physical environment (such as 
the condition of school facilities), materials to support instructions (such as books and 
computers), workload (such as class size and time to accomplish tasks), student 
behavior, professional development, decision-making authority, and support from 
administration. In a review of the National Center for Education Statistics’ Schools and 
Staffing Survey and the Teacher Follow-up Survey, Ingersoll (2004) found that 
“significant numbers of those who depart from their jobs (in disadvantaged schools) … 
report that they are hampered by inadequate support from the school administration, too 
many intrusions on classroom teaching time, student discipline problems and limited 
faculty input into school decision-making” (p. 2). Looking at the role of teacher 
workforce policies in improving student outcomes, Boyd, Lankford and Loeb (2004) 
found that school principals can positively alter working conditions in a school. 
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Hiring preferences. District and school administrators often do a poor job in 
identifying the best candidates to improve student outcomes, which can also impede 
successful hiring (Ballou, 1996; Imazeki & Goe, 2009; Strauss et al., 2000). Research 
by Ballou and Podgursky (1997) demonstrates that public schools do not show 
preference for teacher candidates with strong academic records. Additional research 
indicates that districts and schools concern themselves with supplemental roles teacher 
candidates might be willing to take on (such as coaching) above other criteria that may 
be more closely tied to their effectiveness in the classroom (Ingersoll, 2001; Strauss et 
al., 2000). Districts are also likely to prefer candidates who are familiar with certain 
schools or who have attended similar schools in the same district or local schools for 
their training. This becomes an issue in terms of staff composition at the various 
schools within a larger school district. A study by Strauss and colleagues (2000) of 
school districts in Pennsylvania found that most school districts hired a large majority 
of their teachers from schools of education within a 70 mile radius; eight large districts 
(Allentown, Erie, Johnstown, Lancaster, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, Reading, Sharon, and 
Williamsport) hired over 80% of their teachers from within this radius. It would be 
interesting to learn if educators with similar experiences (e.g., education training, 
location of secondary education) are more likely to work together in the same building 
within a district. Finally, as mentioned earlier, districts, on behalf of their parents, may 
hire teachers that are most demographically similar to the children in the school. To the 
extent that disadvantaged schools have provided an inadequate education to former 
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students, teacher candidates who attended these schools may not be effective in the 
classroom.   
 Teacher labor market. The single salary schedule in a school district, which 
mandates compensation for teachers, means that teachers, rather than school districts, 
have the most influence in determining how they are sorted across the school district. 
Goldhaber (2008) explains, “The teacher labor market … adjusts based on the job 
attributes of a school assignment through teacher sorting across schools, rather than 
through salary differentials that depend on the job attributes of a school assignment” (p. 
1). Many researchers have studied the movement of teachers to understand their 
preferences, and have found, not surprisingly, that teachers choose to work in the more 
desirable setting.  For many teachers, this means favorable working conditions, students 
with higher academic performance, less poverty, a lower percentage of minority 
students, and fewer accountability requirements (Imazeki & Goe, 2009). Also, teachers 
choose to work at schools close to their own home.   
A great deal of research supports the impact of teacher preference on 
employment decisions. Lankford, Loeb and Wyckoff (2002) studied the movement 
patterns in New York City and found that teachers transfer to schools with fewer low 
performing, low income and minority students. Hanushek, Kain, O’Brien and Rivkin 
(2004) reached similar conclusions using data from Texas, and Betts, Rueben, and 
Danenberg (2000) found similar patterns in California. Miller and Rubenstein (2008), 
Clotfelter, Ladd and Vigdor (2005), Ladd (2008), Boyd (2004), Imazeki and Goe 
(2009), and others have written about their concern that experienced teachers (those 
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with greater qualifications) will move away from schools with students requiring more 
support, either due to low achievement or poverty. Teachers may assume that children 
of low-income families will have fewer supports at home and will be less prepared to 
learn (Clotfelter et al., 2007). This will leave vacancies for novice teachers to fill in 
schools populated with the hardest-to-educate students. Based on the research on the 
effectiveness of novice teachers, it is probable that these teachers are less effective 
(Goldhaber, 2008).  
A disturbing finding revealed by a number of researchers is that many teachers 
have a strong aversion to working with minority students. Boyd, Lankford and Loeb 
(2004) report that “both white and minority teachers tend to choose schools with lower 
minority populations” (p. 109). In their analysis, Boyd et al. assume that this choice is 
due to the working conditions of schools with high percentages of minority students, 
rather than direct bias teacher against the minority students themselves. Other 
researchers reach similar findings but do not attribute the preference for non-minority 
students to be tied to other variables such as working conditions. In a major study of 
teacher turnover in Georgia, Stinebrickner, Scafidi, and Sjoquist (2007) used a linear 
probability and competing risks model to separate correlated characteristics of students 
to determine what is driving teacher preferences. They found that teachers are more 
likely to leave schools with higher proportions of minority students, not because of high 
poverty or poor working conditions, but because of the racial characteristics of 
students.     
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There is some discussion in the literature that state and local accountability 
measures also impact teachers’ employment decisions. Accountability systems are 
designed to hold teachers accountable for the performance of their students. Most 
systems look at the achievement of students according to certain standards rather than 
student growth. Teachers who work with students who are struggling and unable to 
reach proficiency targets are more likely to be penalized and less likely to receive 
financial bonuses. For this reason, teachers will be attracted to positions in which they 
would be more likely to have successful students (as defined by the accountability 
scheme). Clotfelter et al. (2007) found this to be the case in North Carolina, where the 
state accountability initiative made it more difficult for low performing schools to hold 
on to their teaching staff and their principals. Interestingly, Boyd et al. (2005) found 
that schools in New York State successfully directed teachers with more experience to 
fourth grade classrooms in which state-required testing was being implemented. It is 
likely that these schools made an intentional effort to enhance teacher quality in 
classrooms in which students would be tested. Currently, efforts to replicate this 
approach at the district level are being made through the use of financial incentives to 
entice effective teachers and administrators to work in hard-to-staff schools (Goertz & 
Levin, 2008).  
Location is a final consideration in choosing employment for teachers, and has 
implications for the larger school districts. Researchers investigating employment 
patterns in New York and Pennsylvania have found that teachers prefer to work close to 
where they grew up. Boyd et al. (2004) report that “over 60 percent of first-year public 
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school teachers in New York take jobs within fifteen miles of where they grew up, with 
85 percent taking jobs within forty miles” (p. 109). Similarly, Strauss, Bowes, Marks, 
and Plesko (2000) reported that on average, 40% of teachers serve in school districts in 
which they were students, and if they are not able to remain in the area in which they 
grew up, prefer to teach in areas that are reminiscent of their hometown. This is 
confirmed by Boyd et al. (2005) in their analysis of New York State data. There is also 
a positive (though somewhat weaker) relationship between where teachers are trained 
and where they work (Imazeki & Goe, 2009). 
These findings reflect a potential concern for urban districts, in that teacher 
candidates from their own schools may be less qualified, given the poor academic 
opportunities available in the district (Boyd et al., 2004; Clotfelter et al., 2007). While 
schools hiring “locals” have the advantage of knowing the candidates better, they may 
not be acting in the best interest of the students in choosing local candidates over more 
qualified outsiders (Goldhaber, 2008). As noted earlier, this may be tempered by the 
fact that students are more successful when they are matched with teachers of a similar 
race (Dee, 2004). In any case, urban districts do not supply nearly enough teachers to 
fill their classrooms, and must therefore compete for non-local teachers who are 
unlikely to choose them over non-urban districts. Given that student demographics are 
unlikely to change, the best way to address the hiring challenges of urban districts 
would be for districts to offer teacher candidates more, in the form of compensation and 
working conditions. New York City has taken this strategic approach in its efforts to 
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ensure that effective teachers are placed in hard-to-staff schools (Goertz & Levin, 
2008).  
 Teacher mobility. While teachers’ preference for working close to where they 
grew up has greater impact in terms of the ultimate distribution of teachers (Boyd et al., 
2008), high turnover in struggling schools is extremely harmful because vacancies are 
filled with novice teachers who are likely to be less effective in the classroom. 
Furthermore, the lack of faculty continuity in schools which must fill many vacancies 
each year is detrimental to the schools as learning communities (Clotfelter et al., 2007). 
That being said, there are contradictory findings as to the effectiveness of teachers who 
transfer out of struggling schools (Boyd et al., 2008; Imazeki & Goe, 2009); a recent 
study by Hanushek (2009) finds that ineffective teachers are the most likely to leave.  
 Weighted Student Funding. The inequitable allocation of resources below the 
district level has led policy makers to consider alternative methods for distributing 
resources to schools. School-based management and budgeting provides an approach to 
financing that moves control of funds from the district central office to the schools, 
closer to where the money is being spent and, presumably, to the knowledge regarding 
the true needs of the students. Moving spending authority to the school allows school 
leaders to budget dollars and hire staff in a more flexible and efficient manner. In return 
for this authority, schools leaders become accountable for student outcomes. According 
to Goertz and Stiefel (1998), school leadership, composed of administrators, teachers, 
parents, and community members, can work together to determine how best to allocate 
dollars among classrooms and programs. However, to be successful, school leadership 
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must have access to, and knowledge of, financial data, as well as clear goals and 
strategic plans in place to achieve those goals.   
As an approach to school-based management and budgeting, weighted student 
funding (WSF) is designed to address not only school-based management, but 
inequities in intra-district resource allocation. In its report, “Fund the Child: Tracking 
Inequality and Antiquity in School Finance,” the Fordham Foundation (2006) offers 
five principles to define weighted student funding (p. 21): 
1. Funding should follow the child, on a per-student basis, to the public school that 
he/she attends. 
2. Per-student funding should vary according to a child’s need and other relevant 
circumstances. 
3. The funds should arrive at the school as real dollars (i.e., not teaching positions, 
ratios, or staffing norms) that can be spent flexibly, with accountability gauged 
by results, not inputs, programs, or activities. 
4. These principles for allocating money to schools should apply to all levels (e.g., 
federal funds going to states, state funds going to districts, districts to schools). 
5. All funding systems should be simplified and made transparent. 
Weighted student funding is attractive to a variety of stakeholders; for those on the 
left of the political spectrum, it provides vertical equity by ensuring that students with 
greater needs are allotted higher per-pupil funding (Rubenstein et al., 2006); for those 
on the right, it moves control away from the school district and closer to the student, 
thereby supporting decentralization to “promote efficiency and foster school choice” 
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(Baker, 2009, p. 2). An additional advantage of WSF is that it is transparent. Dollars, as 
the universal unit of measurement, serve as a metric that allows onlookers to ensure that 
funds are distributed according to predetermined need. 
Weighted student funding encompasses two significant goals for discussions of 
equity: the use of actual teacher salaries in determining budgets, and school control 
over budgets. Examples of WSF to date demonstrate that each of these goals is difficult 
to implement on its own, and that one does not necessarily lead to the other. Edmonton, 
Cincinnati, Seattle, Oakland, San Francisco, New York City and Houston have all 
implemented some aspects of weighted student funding. (Seattle has since ended its 
WSF plan and Philadelphia is in the process of creating a pilot project to test the idea.) 
Of these districts, only Oakland is confronting salary issues. The great advantage of 
including actual teacher salaries, as opposed to average teacher salaries, in the 
budgeting processes is that schools can use their additional funds to assist less 
experienced teachers with professional development or to make other enhancements to 
the school. Through their weighted student funding initiative, Oakland was able to 
balance the distribution of resources across all schools (Hill, 2008); the other 
metropolitan districts that have implemented some version of WSF are limited in their 
control over budgets by teacher contracts and district constraints. Advocating for the 
successful implementation of WSF, Roza (2008) explains that the use of actual budgets 
is necessary, writing: “Allocations that inhibit the power of school leaders to make 
decisions about resource use in their schools can undermine the district’s efforts, and 
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thus the district should avoid allocations managed centrally or according to central staff 
discretion” (p. 26).  
In order for weighted student funding to work, five factors must be firmly in place. 
First, schools must be granted real budgeting and spending authority, including hiring 
of staff. Second, most of the budget should be allocated through WSF. Third, the 
weights must be correct. In 1999, Picus wrote, “Without some kind of system to 
provide support and knowledge about what kinds of programs are available and which 
ones work for children with particular needs … it would be difficult to ensure that 
schools would be capable of meeting these needs” (p. 33). The fact that educators are 
uncertain as to the best approaches to serve students with particular needs raises the 
question of how appropriate weights should be determined. The variation in weights 
from district to district suggests a lack of clarity with regard to the true cost of serving 
certain categories of students. Fourth, the decision-makers at the school level must be 
fully informed and competent to take on the new management and budgeting 
responsibilities. Roza (2008) warns that, “If school leadership is weak, then increasing 
the portion of resources allocated at the school level may not be a viable strategy” (p. 
25). Few schools have the capacity to be successful in these new roles. Fifth and 
finally, school districts must have a plan in place to support schools that are 
unsuccessful. More specifically, districts must determine what authority stays with the 
school and what authority reverts to the district in this instance (Goertz & Hess, 1998).  
Even when all these variables are addressed, it is unclear if a weighted student 
funding system is the answer to the problem of inequitable allocation of resources. 
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Recently completed studies of WSF systems in Texas, California, and Ohio have 
arrived at both positive and negative conclusions. A review of WSF in Houston by 
Miller and Rubenstein (2009) seeking to determine “the effect of the WSF budgeting 
system on the actual distribution of resources across” across schools (p. 3) found that 
the WSF budgeting system did result in more resources being allocated to schools with 
students in need of greater supports. Furthermore, this reallocation did not take place in 
comparison districts working without a WSF budgeting system. Alternatively, 
Chambers, Shambaugh, Levin, Muraki, and Poland (2008) arrived at mixed results in 
their analysis of spending patterns in San Francisco and Oakland to determine the 
impact of their WSF systems on the distribution of resources according to student need. 
They discovered that San Francisco “increased the proportion of total resources 
allocated to high-poverty relative to low-poverty middle and high schools” but that, in 
Oakland, “there did not appear to be a significant difference in [the] relationship 
between per pupil expenditure and student poverty” as a result of having a WSF system 
in place (Chambers et al., 2008, p. xi). In fact, subsidies meant to address tensions in 
schools with high numbers of veteran teachers (to alleviate short-term issues due to the 
use of actual salary numbers in determining budget allocations) seemed to negatively 
impact the relationship between per pupil expenditure and student poverty. Matthew 
Hill, Oakland Unified School district’s Executive Officer for Strategic Project, has 
confirmed these findings, reporting that while Oakland’s weighted student funding 
initiative has resulted in greater equity and transparency in revenues, a subsequent 
increase in equity and transparency has not been seen with expenditures (Hill, 2008). 
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Finally, based on research comparing districts with weighted student funding to 
districts with typical funding processes in Texas and Ohio, Baker (2009) concludes that 
weighted student funding is not necessary for districts to “achieve greater rationality in 
cross school expenditures,” as “districts not using weighted funding appear comparably 
able to target resources to schools with greater student needs” (p. 21).  
Measuring Intradistrict Equity 
 While a significant amount of research has addressed equity concerns at the 
district level (Iatarola & Rubenstein, 2007), there has been limited research on 
intradistrict resource disparities. This research has found great inequities within 
districts, often greater than those among districts (DeAngelis et al., 2005; Lankford et 
al., 2002; Monk & Hussain, 2000). For example, Clotfelter et al. (2005) find that “about 
two-thirds of the overall black-white difference in exposure to novice teachers reflects 
patterns within, rather than across, school districts in North Carolina” (p. 19). However, 
while studies of individual districts have shown significant disparities, there is no 
national or state data that quantifies the extent of the differences among schools in per 
pupil spending.
40
  
 This following section of this dissertation first looks at challenges to studying 
intradistrict resource allocation. It then reviews some of the methods which have been 
employed by researchers to better understand the impact of intradistrict resource 
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 Augenblick, Meyers and Anderson reported this in 1997, and it remains true in 2010. However, this 
may be challenged with the reauthorization of ESEA as one proposal requires the states to collect and 
disseminate data on school-level expenditures (Sawchuk, 2009). 
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allocation. Finally, it presents the findings of the research using the equity principles 
discussed earlier in this chapter. 
 Challenges to studying intradistrict resource allocation.  While there are 
numerous studies examining resource allocation below the district level, “relatively 
little research has focused on the processes and patterns of resource allocation across 
schools within districts” (Rubenstein et al., 2006, p. 2). There are four main reasons for 
this: first, there is a significant lack of accessible data on school level expenditures. 
Second, expenditure data does not tell the whole story and can be misleading. Third, it 
is difficult to allocate shared resources fairly. And fourth, most often districts, not 
schools, control the administration and management of budgets. 
 Lack of data. While districts may report on expenditures by function (such as 
instruction, instructional support, and administration), this information is often not 
helpful to researchers as “accuracy, consistency, and detail of the reported data, as well 
as assumptions made by researchers in creating categories and assigning individual 
expenditures to each” are often in question (Stiefel, Rubenstein, & Berne, 1998, p. 
449). Cohen (1997) argues that a shortage of administrative capacity is responsible for 
the inadequate collection of school-level data. Goertz and Odden (1999) add to this 
assertion, attributing the scarcity of data to a “lack of school-based funding policies” (p. 
x).  
 Expenditure data does not tell the whole story. Even if the school level budget 
data is available, it does not, on its own, accurately represent the total value of 
resources. Dollars for personnel, for example, are often a combination of staff positions 
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and salaries which have not been untangled (Berne & Stiefel, 1994, p. 408). As we will 
see, many studies on intradistrict allocation find that funding directed to schools with 
higher percentages of low-income students appears to be equitable (horizontally and 
even vertically), but closer investigation reveals that teachers serving in schools with 
greater numbers of low-income students are more likely to have lower salaries, 
corresponding to their minimal experience and credentials. Furthermore, it is often the 
case that school budgets use average teacher salaries in place of actual salaries. As 
stated earlier in this paper, the use of average salaries masks discrepancies in actual 
teacher salaries at the school level.  
 Allocation of shared resources. Another way in which expenditure data does 
not reveal the details of resource allocation has to do with the allocation of shared 
resources. According to Miller et al. (2004), “shared resources, including programs, 
staff, and funds managed by the central office for the purpose of educating children, are 
not reported in school budgets despite the fact that they can represent a substantial 
portion of the total resources which benefit any one school” (Abstract). Resources 
allocated to the district central office could include everything from professional 
development, such as support for struggling teachers in schools with more 
disadvantaged students, to music programs, which may disproportionately impact 
schools with higher proportions of high-income students. Fringe benefits and pensions 
may also not be allocated directly to the schools. Stiefel et al. (1998) found that fringe 
benefits and pensions were not allocated to schools in any of the four districts they 
investigated - Chicago, Fort Worth, New York City and Rochester. To measure the 
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impact of this practice, Miller et al. (2004) constructed a cost allocation model for 
Denver Public Schools. It revealed that school-level budgets increased by one-third 
when district budgets were apportioned accurately. This situation is especially 
troublesome because central office budgets can hide such funding inequities. Roza 
(2008) reports that, “Funds doled out through central budgets were less equitable than 
those allocated in school budgets in both districts, as shown by the coefficient of 
variation computed on the total dollars received per pupil” (p. 21). Clearly, studies 
which do not accurately allocate resources may be biasing their results. 
 Methods employed in studying resource allocation. A review of the literature 
reveals 34 studies which examine intradistrict resource allocation. This paper takes a 
new look at these studies in order to synthesize the findings on intradistrict resource 
allocation utilizing an equity framework. A matrix has been developed to help 
categorize the studies in different ways. (See Appendix A.) Information collected in the 
matrix includes: data source; methodology; findings; the relationship between inputs 
and variables of interest; and, the conception of equity being measured (i.e., horizontal 
equity, vertical equity, or adequacy).  
The following discussion first examines how researchers study intradistrict 
resource allocation in these 34 studies. Most investigate the relationships between 
inputs and given variables of interest. Inputs generally include financial and/or human 
capital resources and variables of interest include outcomes such as relative position 
among student subgroups in terms of allotted resources or student performance (e.g., a 
comparison of expenditures among groups of students identified by certain 
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characteristics such as income level or race, an analysis of the relationship between 
student subgroup and student performance).  
One input that has not been used in extant studies of intradistrict resource 
allocation is a measure of teacher effectiveness. This is largely due to the lack of an 
available metric. Given the expansion of the use of value-added methods which link 
teachers to student outcomes, some districts now have access to value-added measures 
for teachers. Other potential inputs that could be considered in an analysis of resource 
allocation are measures of teacher self-efficacy and teacher collective efficacy – as 
these metrics of teacher quality have shown to be related to student outcomes. I suggest 
that teacher value-added measures and teacher efficacy measures be included as teacher 
quality inputs in future studies of intradistrict resource allocation.      
  Inputs. Thirty-three (33) of the 34 studies identified analyze how one or more 
specific inputs provided by the district are allocated among schools and students.
41
 
Most inputs fall into four broad categories: total expenditures per pupil; total 
instructional expenditures per pupil; pupil-teacher ratio; and, teacher quality. Of the 
studies reviewed, 14 investigate total expenditures per pupil, 8 investigate total 
instructional expenditures per pupil, 8 investigate pupil teacher ratio and 18 investigate 
teacher quality.  
 Human capital resources. While there has been debate as to the value of money 
in improving student outcomes (See Burtless, 1996; Ferguson, 1991; Hanushek, 1989; 
Hedges, Lain & Greenwald, 1994), most scholars conclude that money matters, but is 
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 One study, conducted by Baker and Green (2009), was designed to investigate the costs associated 
with black student concentration necessary to ensure adequate outcomes. 
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insufficient to improve outcomes (Grubb, 2009; Picus, 1995). Therefore, in addition to 
looking at money alone, it is necessary to examine what the money buys. Twenty-one 
of the reviewed studies look at various teacher characteristics and/or pupil-teacher 
ratios as a means of quantifying resources. This is consistent with the research on 
improving student academic outcomes as researchers have identified “teacher quality” 
as the input most highly correlated with student achievement (Card & Kreuger, 1992; 
Ferguson, 1991; Rivkin, Hanushek & Kain, 2005; Rockoff, 2004; Sanders & Horn, 
1998; Sanders & Rivers, 1996). Goldhaber (2006) writes, “Education research 
convincingly shows that teacher quality is the most important schooling factor 
influencing student achievement. A very good teacher as opposed to a very bad one can 
make as much as a full year’s difference in learning growth for students. Indeed, the 
effect of increases in teacher quality swamps the impact of any other educational 
investment, such as reductions in class size” (p. 1).  
Researchers have investigated teacher characteristics as proxies for teacher 
quality. The teacher characteristics most often studied are those for which there is data 
readily available (Rice, 2003). Unfortunately, these do not include such important 
teacher characteristics as teachers’ expectations for students, teachers’ efficacy42, 
ability to motivate, and perseverance are less frequently addressed in the literature. 
Lack of readily available data on these characteristics has also resulted in a lack of 
teacher effectiveness measures in studies of resource allocation.  
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 Tournaki & Podell (2005) define teacher efficacy as “a teacher’s belief that teaching can overcome 
factors external to the teacher, such as the home environment” (p. 300). 
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Seven teacher characteristics that have been used on studies of intradistrict 
resource allocation as measures of teacher quality are: experience; credentials; content 
knowledge and pedagogical knowledge; general academic ability and intelligence; 
teacher training; certification status; and, National Board Certification status. Because 
these teacher characteristics have been used by researchers on the input side of their 
equation, it is important to establish the relationship between these characteristics and 
student achievement. 
 Experience. A number of studies have demonstrated the positive impact of 
teacher experience, particularly in the first few years of teaching. In 1998, Roos 
reported, “Although research suggests that there may be a leveling off of teacher 
effectiveness after five to eight years of teaching, a strong body of research as well as 
ample anecdotal evidence reveals that first- and second-year teachers are considerably 
less effective than those who have some experience” (p. 42). An extensive review of 
the literature conducted by Rice (2003) arrives at a similar conclusion. More recent 
research conducted by Rockoff (2004) and Clotfelter, Ladd and Vigdor (2007) is 
consistent with prior work. Using data from two New Jersey school districts, Rockoff 
(2004) finds “evidence that teaching experience significantly raises student test scores, 
particularly in reading subject areas. Reading test scores differ by approximately 0.17 
standard deviations on average between beginning teachers and teachers with ten or 
more years of experience” (p 248). Clotfelter et al. (2007), with access to ten years of 
longitudinal data from North Carolina, also find evidence that “novice teachers in the 
sample are less effective than teachers in the sample with some experience, but beyond 
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the first couple of years, more experienced teachers are no more effective than those 
with a couple of years of experience” (p. 19). As Goldhaber (2008) writes, “all else 
equal, novice teachers tend to be less effective than those with more experience” (p.5). 
Credentials. Research on the relationship between credentials, most often 
thought of as degrees associated with level of education (i.e., master’s degree or 
doctorate), and student achievement provide mixed results. Hanushek (1997) and Monk 
(1994) find that a master’s degree is either uncorrelated or negatively correlated with 
student achievement. Rice’s (2003) review of the literature also finds ambiguous results 
with regard to the impact of advanced degrees at the primary level. However, advanced 
degrees in mathematics and science seem to be linked to positive outcomes for high 
school students studying mathematics and science (Rice, 2003). Betts et al. (2000) 
discovered that the percentage of teachers with a master’s degree is “in some cases … 
positively and significantly related to test scores” and that “a higher percentage of 
teachers with only a bachelor’s degree within a given grade is negatively related to 
student achievement” (p. xxii). Finally, recent research conducted by Clotfelter, Ladd 
and Vigdor (2007) find that weak credentials are associated with large negative effects 
on student achievement, particularly in math education.  
Content knowledge/ pedagogical knowledge. In her review of the literature, 
Darling-Hammonds (2000) reports weak and inconsistent findings on the relationship 
between subject matter knowledge and student achievement. Other researchers have 
arrived at conflicting conclusions regarding content knowledge (Hill, Rowan & Ball, 
2005; Monk, 1994). For example, based on correlations of student achievement and 
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National Teacher Exam (NTE) scores in Pennsylvania, as well as studies outside of 
Pennsylvania, Strauss (2000) finds stronger content knowledge to be associated with 
stronger classroom achievement. As noted above, the effects of teachers with degrees in 
mathematics seem to be associated with student achievement in mathematics (Goe, 
2007). To the extent that degrees in mathematics represent mathematics content 
knowledge, there is evidence that content knowledge in mathematics is associated with 
student achievement in mathematics.  
With regard to pedagogical knowledge, Darling-Hammonds (2000) reports 
stronger and more consistent findings on the relationship between pedagogical 
knowledge and student achievement. Supporting this position, Rice’s literature review 
(2003) concludes that pedagogical coursework seems to contribute to teacher 
effectiveness, and that both pedagogical and content knowledge coursework enhance 
this relationship.  
General academic ability and intelligence. Researchers have studied the impact 
of teachers’ general academic ability and intelligence on student achievement with 
varied results.
43
 In reviewing the earlier literature, Darling-Hammond (2000) found 
small and statistically insignificant correlations between teacher intelligence and 
general academic ability. A more recent study by Harris and Sass (2007) corroborates 
this, finding no evidence that college coursework or scholastic aptitude, as measured by 
college entrance exam scores, impacts student achievement. Other researchers reach 
very different conclusions. Ferguson and Ladd (1996) used data from several Alabama 
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 Measures used by researchers to quantify intelligence include the quality of the teachers’ 
undergraduate institution, teacher test scores, certification test scores, SAT scores and ACT scores. 
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school districts to demonstrative that if teachers of Black children were to have higher 
test scores on the ACT
44
 (by an increase of one standard deviation), about two-thirds of 
the achievement gap in Alabama would be eliminated. Also concerned by the 
inequitable distribution of teachers among students, Clotfelter et al. (2006) analyzed 
administrative data on North Carolina public schools. Looking only at 5
th
 grade, they 
found licensure test scores in mathematics to be strongly associated with student 
achievement. The Goldhaber (2003) review goes further and concludes that measures 
of teacher academic ability are generally the best predictors of student achievement. A 
few years later, Goldhaber (2007) found a positive relationship between teacher 
licensure tests and student achievement and, in 2008, he reported that “stronger records 
of academic proficiency” as measured by “the selectivity of the colleges (teachers) 
graduated from or their performance on tests such as licensure exams or the SAT or 
ACT college-entrance tests” are associated with greater effectiveness in the classroom 
(p.5). Finally, some studies have identified a relationship between teachers’ verbal 
ability and student achievement, especially for certain students (Darling-Hammond, 
2000; Rice, 2003). 
Teacher training. Measuring the impact of specific teacher training programs is 
a relatively new phenomenon. Monk and King (1994) examined the total course credits 
in area of specialization to discern the impact of quantity of courses taken and found a 
positive relationship with student outcomes. This impact was also greater among 
students of teacher training programs with lower pre-test scores, indicating that teacher 
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 The ACT test assesses high school students’ general educational development and their ability to 
complete college-level work. (Retrieved on April 10, 2010 from http://www.act.org/aap/.) 
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training is most helpful to those with fewer skills (as cited in Strauss, 2000, p. 12). 
More recent research differs from these studies, in that it seeks to better understand the 
relative impact of various teacher training programs. Harris and Sass (2007) looked at 
different types of programs in Florida to distinguish those programs that are most 
highly correlated with student achievement. They concluded that teacher training has 
little influence on teacher effectiveness, with the exception of content-focused 
professional development, which seems to have an impact on middle and high school 
math achievement. In an effort to better understand the components of teacher training 
tied to student achievement, Boyd et al. (2008) estimate the effects of features of 
teacher training programs in New York City on teachers’ value-added scores, which 
indicated teachers’ impact on student test scores in mathematics and English language 
arts. Results point to discrepancies across teacher training programs in teacher 
effectiveness.
45
 Other programs have looked more specifically at alternative 
certification routes and, in so doing, consider the associated teacher training required 
(Constantine, Player, Silva, Hallgren, Grider & Deke, 2009).  
Certification status. Teacher certification or licensure provides a means of 
ensuring that teachers reach a certain threshold before being considered competent to 
educate students. Certification varies by state, but generally requires that the teacher 
candidate has completed a state-approved teacher education program, possesses a major 
or minor in the field in which he/she will teach, earned a certain number of education 
credits, passed a test in basic-skills, pedagogy, and subject area, and has had the 
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 The state of Louisiana has taken on a similar research agenda as a means of evaluating and improving 
teacher training programs (citation).  
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opportunity to student teach (Darling-Hammond, 2000). Alternative certificate 
programs are also available in many states for non-traditional teacher candidates. Most 
of the requirements remain, but time frames for entering the classroom may be 
different. Rice’s (2003) review of the literature regarding teacher certification is 
consistent with that for other teacher characteristics: most studies revealed that teacher 
certification in mathematics had a positive effect on high school mathematics 
achievement.  
At the time of Rice’s publication, the studies did not reveal a positive effect of 
emergency or alternative-route certification on high school mathematics achievement. 
One of these studies, conducted by Goldhaber and Brewer (2000), examined the impact 
of different certification status (e.g., probationary certification, emergency certification, 
private school certification, no certification, and standard certification in subject area) 
on 12
th
 grade students. They found that teachers holding a standard certification in 
mathematics had a significant positive impact on student achievement, while teachers 
holding a private school certification or no certification did not. However, teachers 
holding emergency certification had the same impact on student achievement as those 
holding a standard certification (p. 129). More recently, research conducted by 
Clotfelter et al. (2007) finds regular licensure to have a positive effect on student 
achievement, again with larger effects for math than English language arts. Finally, in a 
review of a New York City initiative
46
 to remove uncertified teachers from the 
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 This initiative was dependent upon three policy changes: the virtual elimination of temporary licenses 
for uncertified teachers effective in September, 2003; the creation of alternative certification programs; 
and, the development and the Teaching Fellows program (Boyd et al., 2007). 
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workforce and replace them with teachers certified through an alternative route, Boyd, 
Lankford, Loeb, Rockoff, and Wyckoff (2007) attribute a reduction in the test score gap 
between students in high- and low-poverty schools to the influx of more qualified 
teachers replacing emergency certified teachers in high-poverty schools.    
National Board Certification status. The National Board for Professional 
Teaching Standards (NBPTS) has created a certification system that goes above and 
beyond state certification systems.
47
 Calling for “high and rigorous standards,” National 
Board Certification requires an initial screening, preparation of a portfolio, and 
successful completion of a set of assessment exercises (Harris & Sass, 2008). While the 
impact of National Board Certification is disputed, many states financially support 
teachers’ efforts to become Nationally Board certified, and provide financial incentives 
to those who achieve certification. Citing research conducted by the National Research 
Council (2008) and Goldhaber and Brewer (2007), among others, NBPTS claims that 
“research is consistently positive about the impact of National Board Certification on 
improvement to teacher practice, professional development and areas of school 
improvement that are critical to raising student achievement” (National Board for 
Professional Teaching Standards (NBPTS) website, www.nbpts.org).  
On behalf of the National Research Council, Hakel, Koenig, and Elliot (2008) 
reviewed studies of National Board Certification on student achievement. These studies 
were conducted mainly in North Carolina and Florida, states with excellent databases to 
track teachers and students, as well as a significant numbers of National Board 
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 More than 82,000 teachers have achieved National Board Certification (NBPTS website). 
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Certified teachers. While studies found a relationship between National Board 
Certification and higher student achievement, the effects detected were small and less 
significant in Florida than North Carolina (Hakel et al., 2008).
48
 Goldhaber and 
Anthony (2007) arrived at a slightly different conclusion, finding that teachers who are 
National Board certified are more effective than teacher applicants who do not become 
certified. They also found that the benefits that accrue in terms of student achievement 
vary by grade level and student type. Lastly, they found no evidence that the process of 
becoming certified increases teacher effectiveness (p. 146). A study conducted by 
Harris and Sass (2008) challenges Goldhaber and Anthony’s conclusions, finding 
“relatively little support for NBPTS certification as a signal of teacher effectiveness” 
(p. 25). Only in a few isolated cases did the authors find National Board Certification to 
be associated with student achievement. These associations are small, with the 
exception of future National Board Certified teachers who are middle school math 
teachers. However, Harris and Sass (2008) agree with Goldhaber and Anthony in 
regards to their finding that the process of becoming certified does not increase teacher 
effectiveness.  
Relationship among teacher characteristics. Lankford, Loeb and Wyckoff 
(2002) have found that the seven characteristics listed above (experience; credentials; 
content knowledge and pedagogical knowledge; general academic ability and 
intelligence; teacher training; certification status; and, National Board Certification 
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 One study reviewed, conducted by Sanders, Ashton and Wright (2005), had been commissioned by the 
NBPTS. Using data from two large school districts in North Carolina, the authors compared teachers 
with and without National Board Certification and found no effect of certification on student 
achievement.  
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status), as well as other teacher characteristics, are highly correlated. They explain, 
“Schools that have low quality teachers as measured by one attribute are more likely to 
have low quality teachers based on all other measures” (p. 42). This is not surprising, as 
there is understandable overlap among many of the teacher characteristics. For 
example, it makes sense that credentials, which represent instruction in a specialized 
content area and/or pedagogical skill), is highly correlated with content and 
pedagogical knowledge. 
Value-added measures. A potential human capital resource input that has not yet 
been utilized in studies of intradistrict resource allocation is value-added measures. The 
availability of value-added measures is growing as support and incentives from states 
and the federal government for implementing value-added systems has increased.
49
 
This metric could be used at both the school level and the teacher level if the data were 
available. Value-added models measure teacher and school effectiveness as determined 
by their students’ growth on standardized assessments. The more sophisticated value-
added measures take into account students’ previous test performance, as well as other 
student characteristics, and predict students expected growth. To the extent that growth 
in a given year is greater or less than predicted, the school or teacher is given credit. 
Using several years of data, statisticians can measure the impact that a teacher or school 
has had on student achievement (Hershberg, Simon & Lea-Kruger, 2004).  
                                                 
49
 Most recently, the U.S. Department of Education’s Race to the Top competition required that rigorous 
teacher evaluation be based on student outcomes (Glazerman et. al., 2010; Baker et. al., 2010).    
 
77 
 
There is general agreement among researchers that value-added systems provide 
better measures of teacher effectiveness than achievement scores alone, which take no 
account of student growth. Value-added systems are also thought to provide better 
measures of teacher effectiveness than simple growth measures that do not take into 
consideration student attributes (Baker et. al., 2010). However, there is an extensive 
debate in the research community as to the viability and appropriate use of value-added 
methods. In response to the U.S. Department of Education’s Race to the Top 
competition, the Board on Testing and Assessment of the National Research Council 
(2009) submitted a letter expressing concern with, among other issues, the use of value-
added methods to evaluate teacher effectiveness. They cite experts Henry Braun 
(Educational Testing Service) and Daniel McCaffrey and J. R. Lockwood (Rand) to 
support their argument that, “a great deal is unknown about the potential and the 
limitations of alternative statistical models for evaluating teachers’ value-added 
contributions to student learning” (National Research Council [NRC], 2009, p.8). The 
Economic Policy Institute also issued a report warning against the use of value-added 
methods as a tool for teacher evaluation (Baker et. al., 2010). Concerns regarding 
value-added methods include the accuracy of results derived from using value-added 
methods and the impact of utilizing value-added measures for personnel decisions.
50
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 Some concerns regarding the impact of value-added methods have to do with their potential use by 
administrators. For example, if value-added scores are used to evaluate teachers, some researchers fear 
that teachers will focus only on tested materials, thereby narrowing the curriculum (Baker et. al., 2010). 
This could happen at the class level, where a teacher spends more time on subject matter covered in the 
state assessment, or at the school level, where time spent on courses such as history and art is restricted in 
order to make more time for English Language Arts and Mathematics, tested subjects.  Using value-
added to make high stake decisions could also lead to teacher demoralization and even cheating (Baker 
et. al., 2010). Other concerns include: the political issue of having a metric that is difficult to explain to 
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While questions regarding the impact of the adoption of value-added methods are of 
great importance, only the accuracy of results derived from using value-added methods 
is useful for the purpose of studying inequities in the distribution of human capital 
resources.  
I will briefly address the numerous issues tied to value-added methodology and its 
ability to provide valuable estimates of teacher effectiveness, but for a more 
comprehensive review of the technical subject matter, see Henry Braun’s (2005), 
“Using Student Progress to Evaluate Teachers: A Primer on Value-Added Models.”   
1. Students and teachers are not randomly assigned (Baker et. al., 2010; Braun, 
2005; Harris & Sass, 2009; NRC, 2009). Baker et. al. (2010) explain “teachers’ 
value-added effects can be compared only where teachers have the same mix of 
struggling and successful students, something that almost never occurs, or when 
statistical measures of effectiveness fully adjust for the differing mix of 
students, something that is exceedingly hard to do” (p. 11).   
2. Value-added methods are only as good as the assessments they are built on. For 
the most part, assessments are not perfectly aligned to standards (Baker et. al., 
2010; NRC, 2009). Furthermore, they do not cover all the material for which 
teachers are responsible (e.g., teaching respect, responsibility). Another 
technical issue is that tests have ceilings and floors, which can prevent student 
                                                                                                                                              
teachers as well as the community at large (NRC, 2009); the fact that new teachers and teachers not 
teaching tested material cannot be included in a system-wide evaluation initiative; and, the fact that 
decisions based on value-added methods leading to the removal of teachers do not make sense if 
replacement teachers are no better (Baker et. al., 2010). 
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demonstration of growth or regression (Baker et. al., 2010; NRC, 2009). Finally, 
measurement error exists for all assessments. 
3. Statistical properties of value-added assessment lead to results that may be 
imprecise. Specifically, measurement errors lead to misclassification of some 
teachers (Baker et. al., 2010). The Board on Testing and Assessment (BOTA) of 
the NRC (2009) points out that value-added measures can vary unexpectedly 
from year to year. One cause of this instability can be small class size which 
lessons the power of the analysis for any given teacher. Also, while tests that are 
vertically aligned lend themselves more readily to value-added assessment, 
most assessments used in value-added modeling are not vertically aligned 
(Baker et. al., 2010). Finally, there are a variety of value-added models being 
implemented, and they differ in their sophistication. Glazerman et. al. (2010) 
point out that “any practical application of value-added measures should make 
use of confidence intervals in order to avoid false precision, and should include 
multiple years of value-added data in combination with other sources of 
information to increase reliability and validity” (p.5). 
4. Not all teachers are teaching material that is covered by state assessments. This 
is a significant issue as educators for untested grades and subjects are unable to 
be evaluated through value-added methods. 
5. Positive and negative outside influences on students’ learning may be wrongly 
attributed to teachers.Value-added methods attribute student improvement 
beyond, or less than, that predicted to their teachers. Therefore, outside 
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influences on student learning, other than those controlled for in the value-
added model, are attributed to the teacher. Influence can come from other 
teachers, either in the same grade-level or from a previous years’ instruction. 
When students receive instruction from more than one teacher it is very difficult 
to accurately attribute gains in learning (NRC, 2009). Other influences can 
include summer activities, mobility, and parental support.         
6. Valid value-added results rely on complete data bases and accurate links 
between students and their teachers which are often lacking. Districts are in the 
process of building this infrastructure, but many have a ways to go (NRC, 
2009). Student mobility presents a particular challenge for many districts (Baker 
et. al., 2010).   
While legitimate concerns abound, there is a body of evidence that supports the use 
of value-added methods. Three recently published studies serve as examples: Harris 
and Sass (2009) studied value-added and principal ratings in a mid-sized Florida school 
district and found value-added measures “constructed from multiple years of test score 
data” to do “a much better job at predicting future teacher performance than principal 
ratings” (p. 28). Subsequently, Goldhaber and Hansen (2010) conducted a large study 
using North Carolina data to examine the stability of value-added model estimates and 
their value in predicting student achievement (p.1). They found value-added teacher 
effect estimates to be “better indicators of teacher quality (at least as measured by 
standardized tests) than observable teacher attributes” (p.2). Lastly, the Bill & Melinda 
Gates Foundation (2010) issued a preliminary report of its Measures of Effective 
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Teaching (MET) project. Their analysis reveals, “In every grade and subject, a 
teacher’s past track record of value-added is among the strongest predictors of their 
students’ achievement gains in other classes and academic years. A teacher’s value-
added fluctuates from year-to-year and from class-to-class, as succeeding cohorts of 
students move through their classrooms. However, that volatility is not so large as to 
undercut the usefulness of value-added as an indicator (imperfect, but still informative) 
of future performance” (Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, 2010, p.9). 
The Brookings Brown Center Task Group on Teacher Quality also issued a report 
in 2010 which supports the role of value-added. The authors of the report state:  
If student test achievement is the outcome, value-added is superior to other 
existing methods of classifying teachers. Classification that relies on other 
measurable characteristics of teachers (e.g., scores on licensing tests, routes into 
teaching, nature of certification, National Board certification, teaching 
experience, quality of undergraduate institution, relevance of undergraduate 
coursework, extent and nature of professional development), considered singly 
or in aggregate, is not in the same league in terms of predicting future 
performance as evaluation based on value-added. (Glazerman et. al., 2010, p.9) 
 
Given this finding, it is not surprising that the report advocates for the use of value-
added measures. However, the authors acknowledge that “there is much to be learned 
about how best to use value-added information in human resource decisions” 
(Glazerman et. al., 2010, p.1). This view is consistent with that of the Bill & Melinda 
Gates Foundation, which promotes the use of value-added as a means of adding useful 
information to inform decisions to improve student outcomes (Bill & Melinda Gates 
Foundation, 2010). 
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Many who caution against the use of value-added methods are most uncomfortable 
with its use in high stakes decisions such as compensation and tenure. Despite this 
concern, they remain interested in pursuing a research agenda that augments the 
knowledge base related to the evaluation of educators (Baker et. al., 2010; NRC, 2009). 
Researchers seeking to better understand the distribution of human capital resources 
among schools and students would benefit from the consideration of value-added 
measures of teacher and/or school effectiveness as an input to be equitably allocated.             
 Teacher efficacy measures. Teacher efficacy measures and teacher collective 
efficacy measures are two additional human capital resource inputs that also have not 
yet been utilized in studies of intradistrict resource allocation. Teacher efficacy has 
been defined in the literature as an individual teacher’s attitude and thinking about his 
or her ability to positively impact student outcomes (Skaalvik & Skaalvik, 2010; 
Soodak & Podell, 1996). Tschannen-Moran and Woolfolk Hoy (2001) go further and 
describe the construct as a teacher’s “judgement of his or her capabilities to bring about 
desired outcomes of student engagement and learning, even among those students who 
may be difficult or unmotivated” (p. 783). This definition gets to idea that a teacher’s 
input can serve to override negative influences that a child might bring to the classroom 
given their abilities and/or their family backgrounds. Teacher collective efficacy is a 
similar construct, but rather than being based on an individual teacher’s views of his or 
her potential impact on students, it is individual teachers’ views of the ability of an 
entire group of teachers, to impact students, such as all the teachers in a school 
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(Goddard, Hoy & Hoy, 2000; Henson, 2001; Skaalvik & Skaalvik, 2010).
51
 One 
argument for the relevance of studying efficacy is that self-efficacy informs motivation, 
and people behave in a way that is consistent with their expectations of what their 
actions might facilitate (Bandura, 1986).  
Numerous studies over the years have provided evidence that teachers’ self-
efficacy is related to positive student outcomes, including academic achievement, 
motivation, and student self-efficacy (Henson, 2001; Tschannen-Moran & Woolfolk 
Hoy, 2001). These findings are consistent regardless of the measurement tool 
employed. Not surprisingly, researchers have also found that self-efficacy is strongly 
related to positive impacts on teacher practice and behavior, and that teachers with 
weaker self-efficacy are more controlling and critical of students (Woolfolk Hoy, 
2003). Another interesting finding related to individual teacher efficacy is that, beyond 
pre-service training, it appears to be stable, and not readily subject to change (Henson, 
2001; Tshannen-Moran, Hoy & Hoy, 1998). 
While less research has been conducted on the relationship between collective 
efficacy and student outcomes, the studies which do exist reveal that collective efficacy 
has a positive impact. In fact, in a study by Goddard, Hoy & Hoy (2000), “collective 
teacher efficacy was more predictive of elementary students’ math and reading 
achievement than gender, ethnicity, or socio-economic status” (Henson, 2001).  
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 According to Skaalvik & Skaalvik (2010), while there is little research that evaluates the relationship 
between individual self-efficacy and collective efficacy, the studies which exist point to a positive 
relationship between the two, but the constructs are theoretically different. 
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A concern with considering individual teacher efficacy and teacher collective 
efficacy as teacher and school-level “qualities” or “characteristics” is that measures of 
efficacy (at this point) rely solely on teachers’ self reports, which has implications for 
the validity of the data. Furthermore, this line of research continues to evolve as 
researchers use differing measures to capture these constructs.  
 Outcomes - variables of interest. As researchers consider the implications of 
intradistrict resource allocation, they examine how inputs are differentially related to 
groups of students. The most common variables of interest to researchers and policy 
makers are race, poverty, ELL status, special education status, school size and student 
performance. Of the 34 studies reviewed, 15 investigate differential impact by minority 
status, 26 investigate differential impact by poverty status, 4 investigate differential 
impact by ELL status, 6 investigate differential impact by special education status, 3 
investigate differential impact by school size, and 10 investigate differential impact by 
student performance. Additionally, 3 studies examine measures of equity to determine 
the variation on per-pupil expenditures.   
 Reviewing the research. In their paper, “Rethinking the Intradistrict Distribution 
of School Inputs to Disadvantaged Students,” Rubenstein et al. (2006) provide a review 
of studies that address this topic, dividing them into three categories: those quantifying 
school-level funding disparities; multivariate studies relating school funding to student 
characteristics; and, multivariate teacher characteristic results. Teacher characteristics 
include: experience, salary, education and certification. Pupil-teacher ratios are also 
considered in this group of studies is. Other studies not falling into these categories 
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include those which look at non-fiscal resources, such as class size, course offerings, 
and instructional time (Odden et al., 2008; Betts, Rueben and Dannenberg, 2000; 
Burke, 1999). An example of research into the impact of non-fiscal resources is 
provided by Betts, Rueben and Dannenberg (2000) who investigated both class size and 
course offerings in California schools in 1997-1998.
52
  
Another way to classify the types of studies that address intradistrict resource 
allocation is by the unit of analysis employed by the researcher. Some studies look at 
how resources are allocated among schools within a given school district. For example, 
Summers and Wolfe (1976) looked into resource allocation in Philadelphia; Rubenstein 
(1998) looked into resource allocation in Chicago; Owens and Maiden (1999) looked 
into resource allocation in a large district in Florida; and Berne and Stiefel (1984), 
Iatarola and Stiefel (2003), Lankford, Loeb, and Wyckoff (2002), Boyd, Lankford, 
Loeb, Rockoff, and Wyckoff (2007), Iatarola and Rubenstein (2007) and Schwartz, 
Stiefel, and Rubenstein (2008) looked into resource allocation in New York City.  
Other studies investigate multiple districts and their allocation decisions. 
Focusing on elementary schools, Owens (1972) investigated the distribution of human 
capital resources (teacher salary expenditures, teacher experience, and teacher verbal 
ability) among students by income and racial make-up of neighborhoods in nine large 
cities. Carr (1998) used school-level data from eight large school districts in Texas to 
explore resource allocation and Stiefel, Rubenstein and Berne (1998) conducted school 
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 While Betts et al. (2000) find little variation in average class sizes across schools, they identify 
significant variations in the number of Advanced Placement courses offered as well as the percentage of 
courses that satisfy public university entrance requirements. 
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level equity analyses in Chicago, Fort Worth, New York City and Rochester. More 
recently, Rubenstein, Schwarz and Stiefel (2007) studied resource allocation in New 
York City, Cleveland, and Columbus, and Miller and Rubenstein (2008) examined the 
magnitude of intradistrict resource disparities in four mid-size school districts in New 
York City.  
Yet another group of studies looked at resource allocation across schools in 
separate districts (Rubenstein et al., 2006). Many of these studies focus on districts 
within a given state to avoid misinterpretations due to different policy environments. 
Hertert (1995) and Betts, Rueben and Dannenberg (2000) looked at fiscal and non-
fiscal allocations among students by race, income and performance throughout schools 
in California. DeAngelis et al. (2005) created an index of teacher quality to determine 
how teacher quality is distributed among students by poverty and minority status and 
student performance in Illinois. And, Clotfelter et al. (2006, 2007a, 2007b, 2008) use 
data from North Carolina to evaluate how teachers are distributed among schools 
according to their attributes such as credentials, experience, aptitude (as measured by 
quality of undergraduate institution and licensure test scores) and certification. Finally, 
a set of studies look at the impact of district characteristics on intradistrict resource 
allocation. Monk and Hussein (2000) employed multivariate models to examine the 
influences of school district spending, wealth, poverty, and size on internal decisions 
about how to divide staffing resources across different areas of the curriculum. Taking 
another approach, Pan, Rudo and Smith-Hansen (2003) studied the allocation decisions 
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of high-performing and low-performing districts in an effort to determine how 
successful districts allot resources. 
 Findings - Evaluating Equity in Resource Allocation. None of these 
approaches to categorizing intradistrict resource allocation studies differentiate between 
studies which test the relationship between: (1) inputs, such as funding and staffing, and 
how they are allocated equally among different groups of students based on race, 
poverty level, etc. [horizontal equity]; (2) inputs, such as funding and staffing, and how 
they are allocated differentially among different groups of students based on race, 
poverty level, etc., [vertical equity]; and, (3) inputs, such as funding and staffing, and 
student achievement outcomes [adequacy].  
Certain methodologies are used to address these different conceptions of equity. 
When looking at horizontal equity, researchers often provide descriptive analyses and 
summary statistics that measure the variation in per pupil expenditures, such as the 
range, the restricted range, the coefficient of variation, the Gini coefficient, and the 
McLoone index. (For example, see Clotfelter et al., 2005; DeAngelis et al., 2005; 
Hertert, 1995; Iatarola & Stiefel, 2003, Rubenstein, 1998; and, Stiefel et al., 1998.) 
Horizontal equity can also be tested with a regression analysis, allowing researchers to 
identify the direction, size, and strength of the relationship between resources and 
school characteristics.
53
 If, for example, resources were distributed according to the 
ideal of horizontal equity, one would expect to see, on average, no relationship, either 
positive or negative, between the allocations to schools with different characteristics or 
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 Theoretically, this analysis can be done at the program level or classroom level as well. 
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groups of students with different characteristics (Owens & Maiden, 1999). The 
existence of vertical equity is evaluated with similar techniques, but regression analysis 
is utilized more often. Following the same logic as in our example of horizontal equity, 
according to the principle of vertical equity, one would expect to see a positive 
relationship between school funding and, for example, student poverty. (Examples 
include: Ajwad, 2006; Berne & Stiefel, 1994; Boyd et al., 2007; Clotfelter et al., 2007; 
Owens, 1972; and Schwartz, Stiefel, & Rubenstein, 2008.) Analysis of adequacy 
focuses on the impact of inputs on student outcomes as opposed to the allocation of 
inputs. Researchers investigating adequacy employ similar methodological tools to 
those used when testing for vertical equity, but the relationships being investigated are 
between inputs (funding, teacher quality, etc.) and student achievement. In other words, 
the equation is turned around. Researchers test to see if achievement (as measured by 
assessments) of groups of students (defined by certain characteristics) is equivalent. To 
the extent it is not, the principle of adequacy has not been achieved. (Examples of 
studies of adequacy include Betts et al. (2000) and Iatarola and Rubenstein (2007).)   
 Horizontal equity. Determining whether a study is testing horizontal equity or 
vertical equity is sometime difficult, as it requires the author of the study to articulate 
whether they examine resources distributed equally among all 
schools/classrooms/students, or resources distributed in a way as to compensate for 
disadvantages among all schools/classrooms/students. Summers and Wolfe (1976) 
suggest that certain allocations are “intended to be neutral … unrelated to the 
proportion of disadvantaged” students (p.331). These might include school desks, or 
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books, or nurses. Researchers have investigated the allocation of resources to determine 
if their allotment is indeed neutral.  
Summers and Wolfe (1976) conducted an early study of the equitable allocation 
of resources in Philadelphia. When looking at how funds are allocated to African 
American students in elementary schools, they discovered that “neutrally intended 
resources,” with the exception of “teacher and principal quality characteristics,” were 
distributed equitably (p. 341). They found this not to be the case at the junior high 
school level, where “neutrally intended resources” were allocated disproportionately in 
favor of non-minority students. Again, teachers’ and principals’ quality characteristics 
were unfairly allocated. At the high school level, horizontal equity was found to be 
most prevalent (p. 341). 
More recent studies have led to similar results, finding overall expenditures to 
be distributed according to the principle of horizontal equity (Hertert, 1995; 
Rubenstein, 1998; Stiefel, Rubenstein & Berne, 1998). Findings were less definitive 
when looking at expenditures tied to instruction. For example, Owens and Maiden 
(1999) found that the percentage of African American students in a school and the 
percentage of students on free/reduced lunch programs are negatively associated with 
instructional expenditures while Baker (2003) found that “limited English proficient 
and low-income populations … led to increased allocations to instruction and 
instruction-related staff, including librarians and school counselors, but not to increases 
in classroom teachers” (p. 22).    
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A consistent finding in the literature is that schools with more disadvantaged 
students are more likely to have more teachers with less experience, fewer credentials, 
lower certification status, less content and pedagogical knowledge, and lower academic 
ability and intelligence (Ingersoll, 2002). Research on intradistict teacher distribution 
bears this out. While it is often the case that high-poverty schools have higher teacher 
to student ratios, these teachers also receive lower salaries and are considered to be less 
qualified by measures such as experience and education (Schwartz et al., 2008). This 
finding has been corroborated by Owen (1972), Summers and Wolfe (1976), Stiefel, 
Rubenstein & Berne (1998), Lankford, Loeb & Wyckoff (2002), Iatarola & Stiefel 
(2003), DeAngelis et al. (2005), Clotfelter et al. (2007), and Rubenstein et al. (2007). 
This is also the case for schools with higher percentages of non-white students 
(Clotfelter et al., 2007; DeAngelis et al., 2005; Lankford, Loeb, & Wyckoff, 2002; 
Owen, 1972; Rubenstein et al., 2007; Stiefel, Rubenstein, & Berne, 1998; Summers & 
Wolfe, 1976). Lankford et al. (2002) write, “Low-income, low-achieving and non-white 
students, particularly those in urban areas, find themselves in classes with many of the 
least skilled teachers” (p. 38). 
 Vertical Equity. Vertical equity is a function of the extent to which resources 
are allocated with the intention of being compensatory -- addressing the needs of a 
certain group of students that may have particular hurdles to jump (Summers and 
Wolfe, 1976). Federal funds, such as Title I, have been designed to provide for vertical 
equity by addressing the needs of low-income students. Iatarola and Stiefel (2003) 
write, “In order to measure vertical equity in spending, we include categorical revenue 
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with general education operating revenue and we specify school and student 
characteristics that have been identified with higher costs of learning, such as poverty 
status, limited English proficiency classification, high mobility, and learning disability 
status” (p. 70).  
In their review of the literature on intradistrict resource allocation, Rubenstein et 
al. (2006) find strong evidence that “higher concentrations of student needs, such as 
poverty, are sometimes associated with higher levels of per-pupil spending” (p. 6). My 
own review of the literature confirms this finding. For example, Stiefel, Rubenstein and 
Berne (1998) determined that for general education or total funds, Chicago, New York, 
Rochester and Fort Worth provide mixed results--some positive relationships and some 
weak negative relationships. However, dollar allocations tend to favor schools with 
lower poverty levels. In New York City, Iatarola and Stiefel (2003) found vertical 
equity to be lacking in elementary schools but more recent work by Schwartz, Stiefel 
and Rubenstein (2008) revealed that the relationship between funding and the 
percentage of the low-income students, limited English proficiency students, and 
special education students, is positive, demonstrating vertical equity. Also, Ajwad 
(2006) analyzed the relationship between expenditures per pupil and discretionary 
resources and concluded that “the combined effect of poor students and a poor 
neighborhood is to raise school spending per pupil” (Abstract). One last study that 
looks at the relationship between resources and disadvantaged students in eight school 
districts in Texas reports that resources are disproportionately allocated to schools 
serving high needs students, demonstrating vertical equity. However, there is scarce 
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evidence that this allocation of resources is having an impact on student outcomes 
(Clark, 1998). It is possible that the vertical equity seen in the eight Texas school 
districts does not lead to improvements in student performance because of the way that 
the dollars are spent. As found in the investigation of horizontal equity, researchers 
reveal that schools with more disadvantaged students may have more money allotted to 
them, but their teachers are likely to be less educated (Baker, 2009; Rubenstein et al., 
2007). I was unable to identify any studies that found a positive relationship between 
teacher qualifications and size of the population of disadvantaged students. Goertz and 
Stiefel (1998) acknowledged this contradiction, that the distribution of financial 
resources overall could be allocated in accordance with the ideal of vertical equity 
while the distribution of teacher quality would not.   
 Adequacy. Rubenstein et al. (2004) explain that adequacy can be measured by 
examining the extent to which groups of students with certain similar characteristics, 
such as race or poverty, receive the necessary resources to achieve standards. However, 
this approach is conceptually difficult to grasp – perhaps because of the ambiguous 
relationship between inputs (such as dollars and staffing) and student achievement.  
Of thirty-four studies reviewed on intradistrict allocation of resources, only five 
address adequacy as a form of equity. The earliest of these studies was conducted by 
Betts et al. (2000). The authors ask the question: “Do existing inequalities in school 
resources contribute to unequal student outcomes?” (p. viii). Using regression analysis 
which allows the researchers to control for school and student characteristics, they find 
the level of teacher experience and the percentage of teachers without a full credential 
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to be strongly related to student achievement. They also find teachers’ education level 
to be related to student achievement, but this relationship is weaker. However, the 
strongest relationship is between student achievement and student socioeconomic 
status.   
Pan, Rudo, and Smith-Hansen (2003) looked at the relationship between 
financial and staffing resources and student performance using data from low- and 
high-performing school districts in four states in the Southwest (Arkansas, Louisiana, 
New Mexico, and Texas) and 12 districts with consistent gains in student performance 
in an effort to help determine the necessary resources to achieve success. This study 
found that high-performing districts spent more money and employed more staff in 
certain instructional areas. Clotfelter et al. (2006) also sought to understand what 
resources are necessary for high student performance. They found that teachers with 
more experience and with higher licensure test scores are positively associated with 
students with higher test scores.   
Two final studies that consider adequacy rely on data from New York City. 
Iatarola and Rubenstein (2007) sought to evaluate the impact of a policy change calling 
for more stringent graduation requirements (the outcome in question). They employed a 
regression analysis controlling for unchanging school characteristics through school 
fixed effects and for changes affecting all schools through year effects, and found that 
spending levels and resource allocation changed somewhat in response to the new 
policy. Further research is necessary to determine the impact of the new funds on 
student graduation rates. Finally, Boyd, Lankford, Loeb, Rockoff, and Wyckoff (2007) 
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looked at the relationship between teacher qualifications and student outcomes and 
found that changes in teacher qualifications, such as SAT scores or certification status, 
appear to be related to “a modest improvement in the average achievement of students 
in the poorest schools” (p. 2).54   
Districts might be more likely to address the needs of struggling students in 
response to standards-based reform and state and federal accountability requirements. 
Given the strong correlations between low-performance and student characteristics such 
as income and race, it is reasonable to assume that students considered to be 
disadvantaged would have more resources directed their way (Gross & Goertz, 2005). 
As better data becomes available to quantify student achievement, it is likely that more 
researchers will seek to investigate the relationship between the quantity and quality of 
resources and student outcomes in an attempt to support policy makers in their efforts 
to address all three conceptions of equity: horizontal equity, vertical equity, and 
adequacy. 
Summary 
 This chapter began with a review of four conceptions of equity, spanning 
principles of equivalent inputs to adequate outcomes. I propose a fifth model to serve as 
a framework which I use to evaluate resource allocation in the Allentown School 
District. Following this theoretical discussion of equity, this chapter presents an 
analysis of the current processes which dictate how resources are distributed below the 
district level. This analysis makes clear that there is a complex system in place, shaped 
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 The authors used a measure of student growth derived from value-added analysis to investigate the 
impact of teacher characteristics on student growth. 
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by district allocation policies and the teacher labor market, with multiple forces 
influencing how resources are allocated among schools and programs. The next 
segment of this chapter provides a review of the existing research on intradistrict 
resource allocation. This review discusses the research challenges and then considers 
the methods employed in studying resource allocation. Lastly, findings of intradistrict 
resource allocation studies are presented. 
A synopsis of these findings reveals the following points: 1) overall 
expenditures are often distributed according the principles of horizontal and vertical 
equity, with equivalent or greater financial resources being allocated to schools and 
students with greater needs. However, this is more likely to be the case at the high 
school level than the elementary school level. Furthermore, there is a question as to the 
sufficiency of the additional resources directed to disadvantaged schools and students to 
achieve vertical equity; and, 2) human resources, as opposed to financial resources, are 
less likely to be distributed equitably. Disparities in teacher quality – as defined by 
measurable indicators such as years of experience, certification status, and content and 
pedagogical knowledge – are most often perversely related to school and student 
characteristics (i.e., schools with more disadvantaged students often have more teachers 
with less experience, fewer qualifications, etc.).  
According to the model of comprehensive equity developed earlier in this 
chapter, school districts should be able to demonstrate that resources are distributed 
such that all students are able to participate as citizens and be economically self-
sufficient. Beyond this distribution, public funds should be disbursed in accordance 
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with the principle of vertical equity with additional compensation for disadvantaged 
students. Finally, comprehensive equity requires that resource allocations not favor 
students based on unjustifiable criteria such as race. The review of studies investigating 
intradistrict resource allocation does not produce findings consistent with 
comprehensive equity.         
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CHAPTER 3 – BACKGROUND AND DATA 
Pennsylvania’s Definition of Equity 
Pennsylvania has consistently received low ranks on measures of school 
funding equity. As of 2008, prior to the implementation of a new funding formula, 
Pennsylvania ranked 8
th
 among all states in terms of school finance inequity, based on 
the average percentage difference in per-pupil spending among school districts (Federal 
Education Budget Project). While other states have altered their school funding 
formulas as the result of court-ordered mandates, Pennsylvania’s legislature confronted 
the issue directly, commissioning a costing-out study to establish the actual resources 
necessary to ensure that the students of Pennsylvania receive an adequate education.
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In response to the recommendations of this study, the governor proposed a budget that 
included additional funds to be directed to certain districts. The budget, along with a 
new school funding formula, was enacted by the legislature in the summer of 2008. 
Pennsylvania’s new formula sets an adequacy target determined by the number 
of students in each school district and their educational needs. Specifically, a base cost 
of $8,003 is allotted for each student, and then additional funding is provided based on 
the number of low-income students and English language-learners, the district’s size, 
and regional cost differences (Augenblick, Palaich & Associates, 2007). Districts that 
are unable to raise sufficient funds to meet the adequacy target are provided with state 
funds to cover the gap. Of the 501 districts in the state of Pennsylvania, 471 districts 
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 This work was instigated by a group of business leaders in the Lehigh Valley (Education 2010) who 
had commissioned Augenblick, Palaich & Associates to study the Allentown School District. The 
consultant’s analysis revealed a $2000 per pupil revenue gap which, in part, was the result of the state’s 
funding formula to districts (“Pennsylvania’s Costing-Out Study,” n.d.).  
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had spending below the estimate of what it would take to have their children reach an 
adequate level. 
For the purposes of the costing-out study, an adequate education is defined as 
100% of students achieving proficiency on state reading and mathematics assessments 
and mastering state standards in 12 academic areas by the year 2014 (Augenblick, 
Palaich & Associates, 2007). Per pupil allotments include the cost of educating an 
average student in the Commonwealth to meet state performance expectations plus 
“weights” for certain categories of students (including students in poverty, special 
education students, gifted students, and English language learners) to allow them to 
also meet state performance expectations.  
The authors of the costing-out study used three methods to determine the 
appropriate per pupil allotments: a successful school district approach, which examines 
the spending of high performing school districts as measured against state performance 
expectations; a professional judgment approach, which relies on the expertise and 
experience of educators to specify the resources, staff, and programs that schools need 
to meet performance expectations; and an evidence based approach, which uses 
education research to help provide answers about how resources should be deployed in 
schools so that students can meet performance expectations (Augenblick, Palaich and 
Associates, 2007). Findings of these analyses led Augenblick, Palaich and Associates to 
develop a new state funding formula designed to enable all districts to reach their 
proficiency goals. Table 1 describes the weights tied to student needs used to determine 
the appropriate state funding.   
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Table 1. Value of Formula for Factor Related to Student-Based Need   
Student-Based Need Value or Formula for Factor 
Special Education  1.30 x all students enrolled in special 
education programs 
Poverty 0.43 x number of students eligible for 
free/ reduced-price lunch 
English-Language 
Learners 
((-.023) x (LN of 2005-06 enrollment) 
+3.753) x number of ELL students, with a 
minimum of 1.48 and a maximum of 2.43  
[ASD: 1.4978 x number of ELL students] 
Gifted ((-0.13) x (LN of 2005-06 enrollment) + 
1.482) x number of gifted students, with a 
minimum of .20 and a maximum of .66  
[ASD: 0.2052 x number of gifted students] 
Note. Adapted from Costing-Out the Resources Needed to Meet Pennsylvania’s Public Education Goals 
(p. 30), by Augenblick, Palaich and Associates, Inc., 2007.  
The school funding formula adopted by the state is designed to ensure that 
education funds are distributed among districts to ensure vertical equity. Such an 
approach is intended to provide for an adequate education for all students. This formula 
provides a basis for defining equity in Pennsylvania.  
Governance and Resource Allocation in Allentown School District 
The Allentown School District operates with a $233 million budget and 
employs more than 2,300 educators and support staff (school year 2010-2011), making 
it the sixth largest employer in the Lehigh Valley. The Allentown School Board sets 
policies for the district, guided by the Pennsylvania School Code. It is also engaged in 
long-range planning and formal and informal evaluation of district initiatives. Required 
duties of the Board include levying taxes, electing the superintendent and all district 
employees, approving matters relating to investments and expenditures, and adopting 
the annual budget. Nine school directors are elected by district residents to serve on the 
board for four-year terms. Though locally elected, school directors are considered to be 
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state officials designated by law to administer the school system. The superintendent 
and the administrative team support the board in all educational and financial actions 
(ASD Board Brochure), and the superintendent serves as a non-voting member of the 
board.   
Budgets for the Allentown School District are prepared by the Chief Financial 
Officer in cooperation with district administrators. All budgets are informed by 
contracts with the various public employee unions operating in the district as well as 
state and federal requirements. Procedures for allocating funds among schools and 
programs have evolved over the years but appear to be comparable to the vast majority 
of school districts in the United States. Budgeting is centralized and comprehensive 
school-level budgets are not produced. To satisfy ESEA requirements for Title I 
allotments, the district provides teacher average costs at the school level rather than 
including actual costs. Specific methods for resource allocation are reported in greater 
detail in Chapter V. In school year 2010-2011, the administration in Allentown hired 
the education consulting firm of Cross & Joftus
56
 to conduct a resource assessment, 
providing district personal with detailed information of how and where money was 
being spent in the 2009-2010 school year.  
Data Collection 
All data collection has been approved by the Allentown School District and the 
University of Pennsylvania Institutional Review Board. Data collection took place 
                                                 
56
 Cross & Joftus collaborated with Education Resource Strategies in this work. 
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during the 2010-2011 school year and consists of document analysis and interviews; the 
analysis is based on 2009-2010 data. 
The information used to complete this study includes data on students, teachers, 
and schools. Student data includes student characteristics (i.e., ELL status, poverty, 
race, special education status), student achievement data (i.e., Pennsylvania System of 
School Assessment scores, AYP performance levels), and student behavior data (i.e., 
attendance, disciplinary actions). This data is collected at the district and state level and 
reported by the state.  
Teacher data includes teacher attributes
57
 (i.e., years of experience, credentials), 
teacher compensation, and metrics of professional practice (i.e., evaluation reports, 
value-added scores, teacher self-efficacy measures, teacher collective-efficacy 
measures). Information on teachers’ attributes presents the greatest difficulty in terms 
of data collection. The human resources department has data on teachers’ years of 
experience, credentials (e.g., B.S., M.S.), professional development courses taken, 
teachers’ certification status, and teachers’ college attended and grade point average in 
personnel files in the Administration Building. The department does not keep PRAXIS 
test scores, which could serve as a proxy for content and pedagogical knowledge. 
Unfortunately, teacher data has not yet been transferred to a centralized personnel 
database, so only information on experience and credentials is available for my study. 
Data collected on teacher compensation include salary, benefits, and funding source. 
                                                 
57
 I was unable to attain reliable teacher data on general academic ability, training, or certification status 
– beyond the fact that all teachers in elementary schools and middles schools are “highly qualified” as 
required by No Child Left Behind federal legislation.  
102 
 
Amassing metrics of professional practice required some additional collection 
of data. The district’s only available measure of individual teacher practice is an 
evaluation report that indicates whether teachers are “satisfactory” or “unsatisfactory.” 
Over 98% of teachers were categorized as “satisfactory” in the 2009-2010 school year. 
As this finding does not provide much discrimination for an equity analysis, I have not 
used it in my study. Two district initiatives were implemented in the 2011 to support 
the collection of measures of teacher practice: first, the district contracted with SAS 
EVAAS to provide teacher level value added scores; and second, I administered a 
survey to all the teachers in the district to question their sense of self-efficacy and the 
collective efficacy of the building in which they work.  
As a result of additional data collection, I have four measures of human capital 
resources that have not been included in the literature on intradistrict equity. The first 
metric of professional practice which I use in my analysis is ratings of teachers 
according to their value-added scores. This metric is used to differentiate among 
schools on the basis of the portion of highly effective teachers in each school and the 
portion of highly ineffective teachers in each school. The second metric used in my 
analysis is a calculation of teacher efficacy determined using data from a survey 
administered to all elementary and middle school teachers. Two additional measures 
are similar in that they rely of value-added measures and efficacy measures, but they 
differ in that they offer a view of what the entire school offers to students. The Growth 
Index, provided by the State for each school, is a measure of student progress across the 
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tested grade levels in schools. Teacher collective efficacy measure provides teachers 
perspectives regarding their schools’ faculty, as a whole, to impact student outcomes. 
Value added measurements of low and high teacher effect. Teachers have long 
been acknowledged for their students' accomplishments. Many have pointed out that 
this is unfair, as teachers are only responsible for a portion of student achievement 
outcomes. Value-added models were developed to address this problem. In theory, they 
partition out student growth that is the result of the classroom environment, or teacher 
practice, and the growth that is due to what the student brings to the classroom: her 
prior knowledge, the support of her family, previous teachers, etc. After these factors 
have been separated these models can, essentially, rate teachers based on their 
contribution to student achievement outcomes. 
Value-added models rely on student assessment results and links between 
teachers and students. Data systems have been enhanced in recent years, making the 
application of value-added models possible though approach only offers information on 
teachers that are teaching tested grades and subjects (such as Mathematics and English 
Language Arts). To date, the information generated through the PA Value-added 
assessment system has been primarily used as a tool to aid teachers in their instruction. 
For example, value-added results can identify the type of students (high achieving or 
low achieving) with which the individual teachers are achieving the best results. This 
information can be used to target appropriate supports to teachers. 
The more data that is included in value-added models, the more accurate their 
results. This limits the models' validity in situations with a great deal of missing data. 
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As previously discussed, there are additional technical concerns that must be 
acknowledged when using value-added models to measure teacher effectiveness: one 
such concern is that value-added models generally assume that students are randomly 
assigned to classrooms, which is often not the case. Also, a teachers' influence may go 
beyond his classroom, thereby skewing the results for other teachers. Additionally, not 
all value-added models are the same - and some provide better information than others. 
More practical concerns include the fact that value-added models are complex and 
difficult to explain. 
While the state does not provide teacher level value added scores to school 
districts, it is possible to obtain this information if the district is willing to provide 
teacher level data and student level data, and links between them, to an organization 
with the capacity to conduct the analysis. ASD has contracted with SAS EVAAS to 
provide teacher-level value-added scores for all elementary school teachers in grades 
four through five and middle school teachers teaching mathematics and English 
Language Arts in grades six through eight. Students in these grades must take the 
Pennsylvania System of School Assessment (PSSA), providing the data required to 
conduct value-added analysis.
58
 Using a longitudinal, mixed model approach, SAS 
EVAAS offers a complex statistical model which provides less vulnerable outcomes 
than simple value-added models (McCaffrey, Han & Lockwood, 2008). Furthermore, 
SAS EVAAS methodology has been approved as a viable growth model for states and 
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 SAS EVAAS currently has a contract with the State to provide school- and district-level value added 
data. 
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districts to include in their Teacher Incentive Fund and Race to the Top applications
59
 
(U.S. Department of Education website).  
With data on student PSSA scores, and links to teachers provided by the district, 
SAS EVAAS was able to construct a teacher level value-added measure. This measure 
compares teachers within the district and divides these teachers into quintiles according 
to their effectiveness. Definitions for these quintiles are provided below: 
 Level 1, Least Effective: Teachers whose students are making substantially less 
progress than state growth standard (the teacher’s index is less than -2). 
 Level 2, Approaching Average Effectiveness: Teachers whose students are 
making less progress than the state growth standard (the teacher’s index is less 
than -1 but equal or greater than -2).  
 Level 3, Average Effectiveness: Teachers whose students are making the same 
amount of progress as the state growth standard (the teacher's index is less than 
1 but equal to or greater than -1). 
 Level 4, Above Average Effectiveness: Teachers whose students are making 
more progress than the state growth standard (the teacher's index is less than 2 
but equal to or greater than 1); 
 Level 5, Most Effective: Teachers whose students are making substantially 
more progress than the state growth standard (the teacher's index is 2 or 
greater). 
                                                 
59
 The first two growth model pilots awarded by the U.S. Department of Education were awarded to 
Tennessee and North Carolina, each engaging SAS EVAAS to provide value-added analysis.  
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For my equity analysis, I look at how teachers are dispersed among schools 
according to their effectiveness as defined above. More specifically, I consider schools 
in two ways: 1) by percentage of teachers
60
 in bottom two quintiles of effectiveness 
(least effective and approaching average effectiveness); and 2) by percentage of 
teachers
61
 in top two quintiles of effectiveness (above average effectiveness and most 
effective). 
Three-hundred-forty-one (341) value-added measures were provided for elementary 
and middle schools. There are 819 teachers in elementary and middle school. This 
represents only 31% of all teachers. This is due to a number of reasons: 1) in 
elementary schools, the majority of scored teachers get rankings for both reading and 
mathematics; 2) in elementary schools, only teachers in grades four and five are 
included in the calculus; and 3) value-added scores were only provided for teachers 
with two years of data available. Table 2 provides school level data. 
  
                                                 
60
 This is calculated only for teachers with value-added scores.  
61
 This is calculated only for teachers with value-added scores.  
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Table 2. Number and Percentage of Teacher-Level Value Added Scores by School   
School 
Number of 
Teachers 
included in 
Analysis 
Total Number 
of Teachers in 
the Building 
% of all 
Teachers 
included in 
Analysis 
McKinley ES 4 18.4 22% 
Lehigh Parkway ES 1 18.1 6% 
Cleveland ES 5 18.5 27% 
Jackson ES 5 18.4 27% 
Ritter ES 8 32.4 25% 
Washington ES 9 39.2 23% 
Muhlenberg ES 7 34.8 20% 
Sheridan ES 7 42.2 17% 
Jefferson ES 7 50.1 14% 
Roosevelt ES 4 36.5 11% 
Mosser ES 4 46.2 9% 
Hiram Dodd ES 7 46.2 15% 
Union Terrace ES 9 43.2 21% 
Central ES 10 50.3 20% 
    
Harrison-Morton MS 42 56.0 75% 
Raub MS 42 67.1 63% 
Trexler MS 47 68.3 69% 
South Mountain MS 36 84.6 43% 
 
Given the small sample size of teachers with value-added scores, especially in 
elementary schools, this data should be considered with great caution. Also, while this 
metric may be more useful in middle schools where a greater number of teachers are 
included in the analysis, there is still an issue stemming from the variation among 
schools in the percent of all teachers included in the analysis. As demonstrated in the 
table above, Harrison-Morton Middle School has scores for 75% of its teachers while 
South Mountain Middle School has scores for only 43% of its teachers.  
 Growth Index. Just as teacher effectiveness is determined through an analysis 
of what “value” teachers add, the Growth Index similarly provides a measure of what 
“value” an entire school adds. According to an informational document provided by 
108 
 
one of the state’s Intermediate Units (IU5), “the index is a value based on the average 
growth across grade levels and its relationship to the standard error so that comparison 
among schools is meaningful” (IU5, 2011, p.4) A growth index of fifty indicates that, 
on average, students in the school achieved a year’s worth of academic growth in a 
year.
62
 A growth index greater than fifty indicates that, on average, students in the 
school achieved more than a year’s worth of academic growth in a year and a growth 
index less than fifty indicates that, on average, students in the school achieved less than 
a year’s worth of academic growth in a year (IU5, 2011). In my equity analysis, I 
consider how the State’s calculated growth index for each school varies by school.  
Teacher efficacy. An additional input that has not been included in research on 
intradistrict equity is that of teacher efficacy. As noted earlier, both teacher self-
efficacy and teacher collective efficacy have shown to be related to student outcomes. 
As such, it is worthwhile to include these metrics as measures of teacher quality, 
resources which are potentially differentially distributed across schools. In order to 
evaluate teacher efficacy, I administered a survey to all teachers in ASD. (The email 
sent to principals requesting that they have the teachers in their building respond to an 
email survey is included in Appendix D.) The survey presented to teachers included 25 
responses: the first response required was to indicate in which building the respondents’ 
primary teaching responsibilities lay. The following twelve items measured teacher 
self-efficacy, and the final twelve questions measured teacher collective efficacy. 
Survey response was high. Assuming that all teachers, and only teachers, received the 
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 The Growth Index provided by the State uses zero to indicate a year’s worth of growth in a year. I have 
transformed their numbers in order to accurately apply my equity statistics. 
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request to complete the survey, 79% (429) elementary school teachers responded and 
91% (251) middle school teachers responded.
63
 
My dissertation uses the Teacher Beliefs Scale – short form (TBS), originally 
called the Teacher Sense of Efficacy Scale, to measure teacher self-efficacy.
64
 This 
instrument, developed by Tschannen-Moran and Woolfolk Hoy (1998), uses a 9 point 
likert scale with anchors at 1– Nothing, 3 – Very Little, 5 – Some Influence, 7 – Quite a 
Bit, and 9 – A Great Deal. Items in this survey include: “How much can you do to 
motivate students who show low interest in school work?” and “How much can you do 
to get students to believe they can do well in school work?”  (See Appendix D.) A 
confirmatory factor analysis of responses reveals three constructs: efficacy in classroom 
management, efficacy in student engagement, and efficacy in instructional strategies. 
(See Appendix D for Promax-rotated Standardized Regression Coefficients.) These 
constructs were also found by the survey creators in their own research.
65
  
The following table and figures provide survey results. Figure 1 demonstrates 
the average of all schools- by school level. Figures 2 and 3 provide responses from 
middle school teachers and elementary school teachers. Next, Table 3 presents the 
means and standard deviations of the average school response for elementary and 
middle schools. As can be seen, there is slightly greater variation among elementary 
                                                 
63
 I was unable to confirm that principals sent the email request to only teachers in their building – and 
the only identifier requested was “In which school did you teach for the majority of last year (September 
2009-June 2010).   
64
 The Teacher Efficacy Scale is available for use by researchers on the website of Wayne K. Hoy, 
professor in educational administration in the School of Educational Policy and Leadership at Ohio State 
University. 
65
 Alpha reliabilities for the constructs encompassed in the TBS are .86 for Classroom Management, .81 
for Student Engagement, and .86 for Instructional Strategies (Tschanen-Moran & Woolfolk Hoy, 2001). 
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schools than middle schools. Horizontal equity statistics provided in Chapter 5 
corroborate this finding. 
 
Figure 1. School Level Comparison of Teacher Responses to Self-Efficacy Survey  
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Figure 2. Elementary School Teacher Responses to Self-Efficacy Survey, by School 
 
Figure 3. Middle School Teacher Responses to Self-Efficacy Survey, by School 
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Table 3. Mean and Standard Deviation for School Average Response to Teacher 
Self-Efficacy Survey 
 Elementary Schools 
Mean(SD) 
Middle Schools 
Mean(SD) 
Classroom Management  7.52(.38) 6.96(.26) 
Student Engagement 7.18(.40) 6.04(.22) 
Instructional Strategies 7.61(.41) 7.58(.10) 
 
For my equity analysis, I use scores for each construct determined by computing 
the unweighted means of the items that loaded onto each factor.
66
  
In order to examine how the ‘input’ – collective efficacy – is distributed across 
schools, I included the Collective Teacher Efficacy Scale (CES) in my survey to 
teachers.
67
 Developed by Goddard (2002), this tool measures “the shared perceptions of 
teachers in a school that the faculty as a whole will have positive effects on students” 
(Hoy, n.d.) This instrument uses a 6 point likert scale with anchors at 1- Strongly 
Disagree, 2 – Disagree, 3 – Somewhat Disagree, 4 – Somewhat Agree, 5 – Agree, and 6 
– Strongly Agree. Items in this survey include: “If a child doesn’t want to learn teachers 
here give up” and “Teachers here don’t have the skills needed to produce meaningful 
student learning.” Goddard reports that the validity and the reliability of this form are 
strong (Goddard, 2002). However, Henson (2001) points out that this tool has not been 
tested across multiple samples. 
The Ohio State University website which posts the Collective Efficacy Scale 
also provides a scoring key. First, half of the items are scored in reverse. (For 6 items, 
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 These groupings are items 1, 3, 6, and 8 for Efficacy in Classroom Management; items 2, 4, 7, and 11 
for Efficacy in Student Engagement; and, items 5, 9, 10, and 12 for Efficacy in Instructional Strategies. 
67
 The Collective Efficacy Scale is available for use by researchers on the website of Wayne K. Hoy, 
professor in educational administration in the School of Educational Policy and Leadership at Ohio State 
University. 
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Strongly Disagree becomes a “6” rather than a “1.”) Second, an average school score is 
computed for each item through the averaging of responses of each teacher in a given 
building. Finally, the sum of the average item scores for all 12 items is divided by 12. 
The result is a number between 1 and 6. (The average of all elementary schools is 4.3 
and the average of all middle schools is 3.6) Information is provided to standardize 
these scores based on normative data provided in a representative Ohio sample.
68
 Four 
elementary schools are “below average” and ten elementary schools are “above 
average” with their average score being 526. All middle schools are “below average” 
with their average score being 416. My equity analysis uses this information to look at 
how collective efficacy is distributed across schools.  
  
                                                 
68
 With the standardized score, “500” indicates average. 
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Table 4. Teacher Collective Efficacy, by School 
 
Standardized Scores 
Lehigh Parkway ES 612 
Washington ES 579 
Muhlenberg ES 579 
Ritter ES 569 
Jefferson ES 536 
Jackson ES 533 
Hiram Dodd ES 510 
Union Terrace ES 508 
Cleveland ES 506 
Sheridan ES 503 
Mosser ES 499 
McKinley ES 497 
Roosevelt ES 477 
Central ES 462 
  South Mountain MS 450 
Harrison-Morton MS 449 
Francis D. Raub MS 389 
Trexler MS 379 
Note: Survey conducted in April, 2011. Responses were to address SY2010 
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Figure 4. Teacher Collective Efficacy, by School 
Note: This is a standardized scale. A score of 500 represents the average score in a representative sample 
of teachers/schools from Ohio. A score of 400 would be lower than 84% of all schools in the sample. 
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total teacher compensation
69
, average teacher salary, allocation of funds, source of 
funds). I pay particular attention to Title I and other funding sources coming from 
outside the district.  
Data was collected from the Pennsylvania Department of Education (Office of 
Elementary and Secondary Education and Bureau of Budget and Fiscal Management) 
and the Allentown School District (Business Office - budget and payroll, the Human 
Resources Office, and the Assessment and Accountability Office). To help in this 
effort, ASD engaged the consulting firm, Cross & Joftus, to conduct a basic review of 
how resources are deployed in the district. Cross & Joftus collected data on both 
allocated and non-allocated operating costs, and accounted for all grants and funding 
sources (i.e., Title I, School Improvement Grants, IDEA). Alternative schools were not 
included in their data collection efforts. Cross & Joftus awarded a sub-contract to 
Education Resource Strategies (ERS), an education consulting firm partnering with 
large urban districts (i.e., Atlanta, Baltimore, Boston, Chicago, Duval County, Los 
Angeles, New York City, Oakland, Philadelphia, St. Paul) to reconfigure how people, 
time and money are used in urban education. Cross & Joftus tailored ERS materials and 
approaches to support the needs of a smaller district.  
  
                                                 
69
 Compensation data will be collected such that average teacher salaries, as well as total teacher 
compensation, can be determined at the school level. 
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Table 5. Data Used in ASD Resource Allocation Study 
Data Source  Year Use of Data 
District Data    
Overall funds ASD SY2010 Context 
State funds PDE/ASD SY2010 Context 
PA-Pact funds PDE SY2010 Context 
Title I funds ASD SY2010 Context 
School Data    
Enrollment ASD-SIS SY2010 Determine school 
need(CE,VE) 
#(%) students receiving free 
lunch  
ASD-SIS SY2010 Determine school 
need(CE,VE) 
#(%) students receiving reduced 
price lunch 
ASD-SIS SY2010 Determine school 
need(CE,VE) 
#(%) special education students ASD-SIS SY2010 Determine school 
need(CE,VE) 
#(%) ELL students ASD-SIS SY2010 Determine school 
need(CE,VE) 
#(%) gifted students ASD-SIS SY2010 Determine school 
need(CE,VE) 
AYP reading (total, by 
subgroup) 
ASD-
Account-
ability 
SY2010 Measure adequacy 
AYP math (total, by subgroup) ASD-
Account-
ability 
SY2010 Measure adequacy 
% proficient reading (total, by 
subgroup) 
ASD-
Account-
ability 
SY2009 Determine school need(CE) 
% proficient math (total, by 
subgroup) 
ASD-
Account-
ability 
SY2009 Determine school need(CE) 
% below proficient 
reading(total, by subgroup) 
ASD-
Account-
ability 
SY2009 Determine school need(CE) 
% below proficient math (total, 
by subgroup) 
ASD-
Account-
ability 
SY2009 Determine school need(CE) 
% proficient reading (total, by 
subgroup) 
ASD-
Account-
ability 
SY2010 Measure adequacy (academic) 
% proficient math (total, by 
subgroup) 
ASD-
Account-
ability 
SY2010 Measure adequacy (academic) 
% below proficient reading 
(total, by subgroup) 
ASD-
Account-
ability 
SY2010 Measure adequacy (academic) 
% below proficient math (total, 
by subgroup) 
ASD-
Account-
ability 
SY2010 Measure adequacy (academic) 
% attendance ASD-SIS SY2010 Measure adequacy (non-
academic) 
% in-school and out-of-school 
suspensions 
ASD-SIS SY2010 Measure adequacy (non-
academic) 
Total operating budget ASD-
Budget 
SY2010 Measure HE, VE, and CE 
Poverty spending ASD-
Budget 
SY2010 Measure HE, VE, and CE 
ELL spending ASD-
Budget 
SY2010 Measure HE, VE, and CE 
Special education spending ASD-
Budget 
SY2010 Measure HE, VE, and CE 
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Professional development 
spending 
ASD-
Budget 
SY2010 Measure HE, VE, and CE 
Total teachers ASD-Human 
Resources 
SY2010 Measure HE, VE, and CE 
Total paraprofessionals ASD-Human 
Resources 
SY2010 Measure HE, VE, and CE 
Total administrators ASD-Human 
Resources 
SY2010 Measure HE, VE, and CE 
Average teacher salary ASD-
Budget 
SY2010 Measure HE, VE, and CE 
Average class size ASD - 
SIS 
SY2010 Measure HE, VE, and CE 
Average teaching experience ASD-Human 
Resources 
SY2010 Measure HE, VE, and CE 
% teachers < 3yrs of teaching 
experience 
ASD-Human 
Resources 
SY2010 Measure HE, VE, and CE 
Teacher evaluation (Sat/Unsat) ASD-Human 
Resources 
SY2010 Measure HE, VE, and CE 
% of highly effective teachers ASD-
Account-
ability 
SY2010 Measure HE, VE, and CE 
% of ineffective teachers ASD-
Account-
ability 
SY2010 Measure HE, VE, and CE 
Teacher self-efficacy ASD-Stud 
services 
SY2010 Measure HE, VE, and CE 
Teacher collective efficacy ASD-Stud 
services 
SY2010 Measure HE, VE, and CE 
Student Data    
AYP reading ASD-
Account-
ability 
SY2010 Look at variation in 
student outcomes 
AYP math ASD-
Account-
ability 
SY2010 Look at variation in 
student outcomes 
    
 
Additional information was amassed in interviews with key stakeholders, including 
central office administrators, building administrators, and School Board members. The 
following chapter provides greater detail on qualitative and quantitative methods.     
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CHAPTER 4 – METHODOLOGY 
This case study employs both quantitative and qualitative methods to examine 
intra-district resource allocation. This research was composed of three stages: the first 
stage entailed the development of an equity framework to serve as the theoretical basis 
for analysis of district practices with regard to the distribution of resources among its 
schools. The second stage, described in greater detail in this chapter, involves the use of 
a variety of tools (i.e., statistical analysis, in-depth interviews) to examine the current 
practice of one mid-size, urban, school district.  Finally, using district data, a simulation 
is conducted whereby alternative practices for the distribution of resources are tested.      
The Case Study 
The case study method allows for thorough examination of a single entity: in 
this instance, the Allentown School District (ASD) (Merriam, 1998). This approach 
lends itself to a deep understanding of intradistrict resource allocation, including the 
rationale(s) behind procedures and methods utilized to disburse funds and human 
capital across schools. While not considered to be statistically generalizable, a case 
study can offer analytic generalization, given an appropriately developed study design 
as offered in this research (Yin, 2004). Furthermore, information obtained from 
interviews with key stakeholders as well as financial data, enrollment data, and student 
outcomes data, provides for a robust analysis (Yin, 2003).     
 Site Selection. I chose ASD because of its participation in the University of 
Pennsylvania - Institute of Education Sciences (IES) Pre-doctoral Program. ASD 
maintains a collaborative relationship with the University of Pennsylvania such that 
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fellows intern in the Superintendent’s office, provide research support to the district, 
and are given access to data in order to conduct evaluations leading to improved student 
outcomes. Given my interest in school finance and district policy, I had the opportunity 
to fulfill my IES Pre-doctoral Fellowship requirements in Allentown during the 2010-
2011 school year.  
The Allentown School District provides an excellent source of data for 
investigating resource allocation and equity. First, as a mid-sized, urban school district, 
ASD is similar in size and composition to many other districts. In 2008-2009, 366 out 
of 13,365 school districts in the U.S. had between 8,000 and 35,000 students and were 
classified as being in an urbanized area. This represents 13.2% of all students (National 
Center for Education Statistics, Common Core of Data: School Year 2008-2009). 
Further investigation reveals that 200 of these school districts have greater than 40% of 
its population reporting as African American and Hispanic (National Center for 
Education Statistics, Common Core of Data: School Year 2008-2009). To date, a great 
deal of research has focused on very large school districts. For example, of the 
published research that investigates resource allocation by studying single districts, the 
earliest published study on intradistrict resource allocation used data from Philadelphia 
(Summers and Wolfe, 1976); Rubenstein (1998) did an analysis of intradistrict resource 
allocation in Chicago; and six major studies look only at resource allocation in New 
York City (Berne & Stiefel, 1994; Boyd, Lankford, Loeb, Rockoff, and Wyckoff, 2007; 
Iatarola & Rubenstein, 2007; Iatarola and Stiefel, 2003; Lankford, Loeb, and Wyckoff, 
2002; and Schwartz, Stiefel, and Rubenstein, 2008). My literature review revealed only 
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one study that focused on mid-sized districts (Miller and Rubenstein, 2008). Given the 
large number of similarly situated districts, examining a mid-size urban district offers 
the potential of adding new information to existing literature. Second, the smaller size 
of the district makes it possible for thorough assessment in a manageable time period.  
Additionally, while ASD is considerably smaller than other districts studied, it 
shares many other characteristics with these districts, including a diverse population 
with a high percentage of students in poverty. This variation in the socio-economic and 
racial composition of the schools allows for an in-depth analysis of differential resource 
allocation. And although it is only mid-sized, the district is large enough to make 
inferences about the association between allocation patterns and student characteristics.   
Research Questions  
As stated in the introduction, this study will address the following research 
questions: 
1. How are resources allocated among schools?  
2. What is the rationale for resource allocation patterns among schools? 
3. Using a comprehensive equity framework which encompasses adequacy and 
vertical equity, what are the implications of resource allocation patterns? 
4. What would be the financial impact of an alternative approach to resource 
allocation aligned with the comprehensive equity framework?
70
  
 Resources. As this research is based on the evaluation of how various resources 
are distributed among schools, I first describe these “inputs” in greater detail. 
                                                 
70
 School-year 2009-2010 data is used answer these research questions.  
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Resources considered include: overall expenditures (i.e., operating funds, poverty 
spending, ELL spending, discretionary building funds, professional development 
funds); expenditures related to human capital (i.e., total salaries, instruction salaries
71
, 
instruction support and professional development salaries, leadership salaries, 
operations and maintenance salaries, pupil services salaries); full time equivalents (i.e., 
students per staff, students per teacher, students per administrator, students per 
paraprofessional) and class size; individual measures of teacher quality (i.e., teacher 
salary
72
, teacher effectiveness
73
, teacher efficacy
74
, average years of teaching 
experience, percentage of teachers with less than three years of experience, the 
percentage of personnel with a masters degree or above); and school-wide measures of 
teacher quality (i.e., growth index in reading
75
, growth index in math, collective 
efficacy
76
). As stated earlier, my analysis focuses on the elementary and middle school 
levels. 
                                                 
71
 Instruction salaries are comprised of teacher compensation, aide compensation and substitute 
compensation. 
72
 Average teacher salaries are reported in the following categories: all teachers; core teachers 
(Elementary, English, Mathematics, Reading, Science, Social Studies); non-core teachers (Art, Music, 
PE, French, German, Spanish, Business, Home Economics, Industrial Arts, Junior ROTC, Other); and, 
special population teachers (ESOL, IST, Special Ed, Itinerant Gifted). 
73
 Teacher effectiveness measures rely on value-added scores calculated for the ASD by SAS EVAAS. 
Low teacher effect represents the percentage of teachers in a school in the bottom two quintiles of teacher 
effectiveness relative to other teachers in the district.  High teacher effect represents the percentage of 
teachers in a school in the top two quintiles of teacher effectiveness relative to other teachers in the 
district. 
74
 Three categories of teacher efficacy are considered: classroom management, student engagement, and 
instructional strategies. 
75
 Growth indices are provided by the state in their efforts to determine the “value-add” for each school 
to student learning.  
76
 Collective efficacy is calculated by taking the average of all teacher collective efficacy scores in each 
building.  
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 Question #1. How are resources allocated among schools? My first research 
question seeks to understand the current resource allocation pattern and how this 
impacts the variation of resources among schools. To answer this question I use 
descriptive statistics along with graphs to represent the variations in resources among 
schools. Univariate measures of dispersion quantify relationships between inputs and 
demonstrate how they are distributed among students. At this point, the composition of 
the student body of each school is not taken into account, just the size. To provide 
additional context as to the variation among schools in terms of student achievement, I 
offer a measure of equivalent outcomes to describe what portion of student test scores 
are a result of being from a particular school as opposed to other inputs.  
 Question #2. What is the rationale for resource allocation patterns among 
schools?  To answer this question, key informants were interviewed.  Using purposive 
sampling, as described below, eleven interviewees were chosen based on their 
knowledge of resource allocation strategies in the district and/or their role in impacting 
these decisions. Open-ended questions were posed to elicit detailed information on the 
budget process and the specific procedures in place which account for the disbursal of 
funds across schools.  
 Question #3. Using a comprehensive equity framework which encompasses 
adequacy and vertical equity, what are the implications of resource allocation 
patterns? My third research question analyzes resource allocation patterns in terms of 
the equity framework established earlier in this paper. Vertical equity, equal 
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opportunity and adequacy are examined using statistical techniques to test relationships 
among resources, student characteristics, and student outcomes.  
 Question #4. What would be the financial impact of an alternative 
approach to resource allocation aligned with the comprehensive equity 
framework? My fourth and final research question is designed to test an alternative 
approach to resource allocation. I conduct two simulations to test scenarios in which 
first vertical equity, and then comprehensive equity, are sought. Modeling vertically 
equitable resource allocation relies on weights included in Pennsylvania’s basic 
education formula and modeling comprehensive equitable resource allocation relies on 
weights included in Pennsylvania’s basic education formula plus weights used to 
compensate for prior performance. Results are compared with the 2009-2010 allocation 
of resources in ASD.  
Qualitative Research  
Qualitative research methods, composed of key informant interviews, are used 
to tackle research question two: What is the rationale for resource allocation patterns 
among schools? This question seeks to understand the motivations for decision-making 
at the district level. 
 Sampling. I conducted eleven interviews with administrators in the ASD, 
identified through purposive sampling. According to Patton (2002), purposive sampling 
is a powerful sampling method for qualitative research if it is used to select 
information-rich cases, “from which one can learn a great deal about issues of central 
importance to the purpose of the inquiry,… yield[ing] insights and in-depth 
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understanding rather than empirical generalizations” (p. 230). Those interviewed 
include: School Board President, Deputy Superintendent, Chief Financial Officer, 
Executive Director of Planning and External Funding, Executive Director of 
Elementary Education, Director of Special Education, Director of Language 
Acquisition, and four building principals. Speaking with administrators serving in a 
variety of roles in the district serves to triangulate the information attained. A sample 
size of eleven provides ample coverage given the intent of the study (Merriam, 1998). 
 Interview Strategies and Protocol. I developed guiding interview questions 
for key informant interviews using interview strategies recommended by Patton (2002).  
Such strategies include carefully avoiding dichotomous questions which can result in 
short answers which interrupt the flow of the interview, and asking one question at a 
time to allow the respondents to answer all questions fully so that information is more 
likely to be consistent across interviews. Guiding interview questions include possible 
probes with many questions to be pursued if additional clarification is needed. 
Additionally, during the interview process I conveyed professionalism, developed 
rapport with the respondents, and, when necessary, redirected subjects who veered off 
topic or focused for too long on a particular topic (Merriam, 1998).    
Yin (2003) explains that using a case study protocol and following similar 
procedures for all interactions ensures reliability of data in qualitative research. Using 
consistent and well-documented data collection procedures helps to minimize bias and 
ensure that information collected is accurate. To ensure reliability, I developed a 
detailed interview protocol for key informant interviews, which includes the specific 
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questions and probes covered in the interviews and procedures for the interview. For 
example, I skipped around the interview question topics to follow subjects that 
naturally came up in the interviews, rather than sticking rigidly to a particular topic or 
order, to enhance the flow of the interview. As I was the only data collector, lack of 
reliability due to multiple interviewers was not an issue. The interview protocol is 
included in Appendix C. 
 Analysis Methods. All interviews have been digitally recorded and transcribed 
to ensure preservation of the discussions for analysis (Merriam, 1998). Following 
transcription, I wrote up reports of each interview, summarizing key points and 
recording my insights (Yin, 2003). The reports followed a specific template and 
included details of the budget process, perceived motivations for actions, and other 
issues raised by the respondents. I devised a coding matrix to indicate how each 
informant understood the process whereby funds are allocated to various schools and 
programs (Miles & Huberman, 1994). 
Prior to conducting interviews with identified key informants, I conducted a 
pilot with an alternative ASD administrator to test the interview protocol. Based on this 
pilot, slight modifications were made to ensure the validity of the instrument. Each 
interview lasted approximately one hour. Interviews were conducted over a span of six 
weeks during June and July 2011. 
Quantitative Research 
I have used quantitative research methods to tackle research questions one, three 
and four. I assigned measures to the various conceptions of equity outlined in Chapter 
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II: horizontal equity, equivalent outcomes, vertical equity, and adequacy. I also used a 
measure of horizontal equity post vertical equity to illustrate the variation in resources 
among schools after accounting for student need. Lastly, I measured comprehensive 
equity, my own approach to a socially just representation of equity.  
 Horizontal Equity. Horizontal equity statistics are used to describe the 
district’s allocation of resources in school year 2009-2010. Horizontal equity statistics 
are univariate measures of dispersion which quantify relationships between inputs and 
demonstrate how they are distributed among students. These measures include range, 
coefficient of variation and the McCloone Index. The coefficient of variation is 
calculated by dividing the standard deviation by the mean of all observations. A finding 
of zero (0) indicates that perfect horizontal equity is achieved. Odden and Picus (2008) 
define the standard as being 0.1. The McLoone Index is calculated by determining the 
ratio of the sum of the values of all observations below the median to the sum of these 
observations if they all had the value of the median.  A finding of one (1) indicates that 
perfect horizontal equity is achieved. Odden and Picus (2008) define the standard as 
being 0.95. (0.7 - 0.9 are often found in districts.) 
 Equivalent Outcomes. Equivalent Outcomes (EO) are achieved if resources are 
allocated to students such that their outcomes are equivalent. (As described above, this 
notion of equity is theoretically and practically difficult, as it neither ensures a 
minimum level of achievement nor accounts for differences in student motivation, 
ability, etc. However, it does provide necessary information to evaluate equity.) 
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Measure of EO: The Interclass Correlation Coefficient (ICC) represents the 
proportion of the variance in outcomes between schools. The ICC is derived from the 
unconditional 2-level model, which allows the total variation in outcome to be clearly 
divided between variation over students and variance on a school level (Raudenbush & 
Bryk, 2002). 
The Intercept Only (Unconditional Model):  
Level 1 (student): Yij = 0j + ij,  ij ~ N(0,
2
) 
Level 2 (school): 0j = 00 + 0j,  0j ~ N(0,00) 
Combined: Yij = 00 + 0j + ij       
Yij = student outcome measure for student i in school j (PSSA 
scores will be used as a proxy for proficiency) 
0j = mean student outcome for each school 
ij  = the residual for student i in school j  
00 = mean student outcome across schools (i.e., grand mean) 
0j = the residual for the 0j equation (representing the difference 
between 0j and 00 
Interclass Correlation:   
 = 00 / (00  +  
2
)      
2 = total variance in outcomes within school that can be 
explained by a level-1 model   
00 = total explainable variation at level-2 (schools)  
 
 Vertical Equity. Vertical Equity is achieved if resources are allocated to 
students based on their differing needs. To measure vertical equity in my study, I have 
developed a construct with one variable to represent the four variables which the State 
uses to determine appropriate weights for funding schools: English language learner 
status, economic disadvantage, and special education, and gifted education.
77
 This is 
consistent with my quest to measure overall equity, rather than equity specifically 
                                                 
77
 The state had deemed it worthy to provide additional resources through the state funding formula to 
districts with students who fall into these categories as researchers have found that these students are 
more likely to require additional resources to achieve at proficient levels (Hannaway, 2005).   
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related to certain subgroups of students. Given that I have the student composition of 
each school, I created a new variable to represent need due to various student 
characteristics. The new variable, “NEEDVE,” is derived at each school as follows:   
NEEDVE i = {[Enrollmenti + (State’s Weight for ELL students * number of ELL 
students i) + (State’s Weight for economically disadvantaged students * number 
of economically disadvantaged students i) + (State’s Weight for special 
education students * number of special education students i) + (State’s Weight 
for gifted education students * number of gifted education students i)] / 
Enrollmenti} 
NEEDVE in the i
th
 school is a “per student” measure to allow for consistent scaling.78 79 
The following weights, based on Pennsylvania’s Costing-Out Study, are used in this 
formula: 
Table 6. Value or Formula for Factor Related to Student-Based Need  
Student-Based Need Value or Formula for Factor 
Special Education  1.30 x all students enrolled in special 
education programs 
Poverty 0.43 x number of students eligible for 
free/ reduced-price lunch 
English-Language 
Learners 
1.4978 x number of ELL students 
Gifted 0.2052 x number of gifted students 
 
My aim in measuring vertical equity is to understand the relationship between inputs 
and need. I consider a range of financial inputs in this analysis as well as human capital 
inputs. (These resources are described earlier in this chapter.) I also consider the 
                                                 
78
 This variable will also account for school size, to address cost differences due to economies of scale. 
79
 The weights used in this formula are the exact weights used by the state of Pennsylvania in its funding 
formula to districts. 
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relationship between poverty expenditures and the number of students in poverty, ELL 
expenditures and the number of ELL students, and special education expenditures and 
the number of special education students.  Lastly, I consider the allocation among 
schools of specific funding streams such as Title I.  
The measure I use for vertical equity is the correlation coefficient which 
represents the relationship between school need (as defined above) and various school 
resources (i.e., per-pupil operating costs, per-pupil school salaries, average teacher 
salary, percentage of teachers with less than 3 years experience, percentage of 
personnel with masters or above, students per teacher, percentage of teachers in bottom 
2 quintiles of effectiveness as measured by PVAAS, percentage of teachers in top 2 
quintiles of effectiveness as measured by PVAAS, school effectiveness as measured by 
PVAAS, measures of teacher efficacy).  
 Horizontal equity post vertical equity. Horizontal equity post vertical equity 
is a measure I use to describe the unexplained variance after vertical equity is taken into 
account. This measure can be used to illustrate the variation in resources (e.g., per-pupil 
expenditures, human capital inputs) among schools after accounting for student need as 
defined by the State. Horizontal Equity post Vertical Equity (HEVE) is achieved if there 
is no variation in resources (e.g., per-pupil expenditures, human capital inputs) among 
schools after accounting for student need. The definition follows: 
HEVE = (1 - R
2
) x 100%                                        
 HEVE = horizontal equity and R
2
 = coefficient of determination. If R
2 
decreases, horizontal equity worsens, as there is more unexplained 
variability in the funding of schools. Likewise, if R
2 
increases, overall 
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horizontal equity improves, as there is less unexplained variability in the 
funding of schools. Using the equation above, when HE = 0% then 
horizontal equity has been achieved (See Toutkoushian and Michael, 
2007).  
 The R2 is derived from the regression equation, Yi = b0 + b1 NEED + ei , 
where Y is the input (resources) per student in the i
th
 school; b0 
represents the estimated intercept; NEED represents a measure of need 
within the student body of the school; and b1 represents how funding is 
weighted according to the student NEED. 
Toutkoushian and Michael (2009) use this approach to identify discrepancies of 
resource allocation among similarly situated students. (This assumes that weights 
included to test vertical equity encompass all differences among students that are tied to 
higher costs.)  
 Adequacy. Adequacy is achieved if resources are allocated to students so that 
all students attain a certain similar goal such as proficiency on assessments. Measuring 
adequacy only requires looking at outcomes. If we are interested in district level 
adequacy or school level adequacy, we can look at the portion of students who test as 
proficient on an assessment.
80
  
                                                 
80
 Odden and Picus (2008) have proposed an “educational adequacy” statistic, the Odden-Picus 
Adequacy Index (OPAI) (p.76). This statistic, however, is more aptly expressed as a measure of adequate 
funding. The OPAI measures how far a school finance system is from achieving adequate funding. It is 
similar to the McLoone Index used to measure horizontal equity, but uses an “adequate” spending level 
rather than the median (Odden & Picus, 2008; Rubenstein, Ballab, Stiefel, & Schwarz, 2008). The OPAI 
takes into account the needs of schools not achieving adequacy and provides a ratio representing the 
portion of need met. It adds to this the portion of schools, or school systems, meeting adequacy. The end 
result is a measure that indicates how close the entire system is to providing an adequate level of funding 
for all schools. An OPAI of 100 indicates that all schools were spending at or above the adequacy 
benchmark. As no schools in ASD are adequately funded (using the adequacy benchmark determined in 
Pennsylvania’s costing-out study prepared by Augenblick, Palaich and Associates), in ASD the OPAI is 
a ratio of the total spending in the district to the total funds necessary to achieve adequacy. My 
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 Relative Adequacy (or Relative Adequacy Deficit). Given my desire to look at 
the variation among schools, I needed a measure of the relative adequacy of schools in 
Allentown. I use the variable “distance from proficiency” (1 - % proficient or above) to 
represent the adequacy deficit in each school. The disparities among schools’ adequacy 
deficit tells us how the district is doing in terms of equivalent outcomes – but the goal is 
a specific outcome, or standard, which the state has determined that all students should 
meet.  
A simple way to express these disparities is with the coefficient of variation 
(CV) statistic. The CV is calculated by taking the square root of the variance of the 
adequacy deficit divided by the mean adequacy deficit. The CV describes the 
dispersion of the variable or, in this case, the dispersion of the adequacy deficit in the 
district by school. As the CV increases, the dispersion of the variable is greater 
(Rubenstein et. al., 2008). 
 Comprehensive Equity. Comprehensive Equity is the final construct used to 
evaluate equity in the Allentown School District. Comprehensive Equity is achieved if 
resources are allocated to students based on their differing needs. The measure used to 
test comprehensive equity is methodologically similar to the vertical equity measure. 
The difference is in the definition of student need. In addition to the four categories of 
students (ELL students, economically disadvantaged students, and special education, 
and gifted education students) given weights in the Needs Index, additional weights are 
                                                                                                                                              
simulation, which will specify the gaps between spending and adequacy, is consistent to this approach to 
measuring adequate funding.  
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given to students based on prior performance. The new variable, “NEEDCE,” is derived 
at each school as follows:   
NEEDCE i = {[Enrollmenti + (State’s Weight for ELL students * number of ELL 
students i) + (State’s Weight for economically disadvantaged students * number 
of economically disadvantaged students i) + (State’s Weight for special 
education students * number of special education students i) + (State’s Weight 
for gifted education students * number of gifted education students i)+(Weight 
for percentage of students scoring “basic” on PSSA* number of students scoring 
“basic” on PSSA)+(Weight for percentage of students scoring  “below basic” on 
PSSA* number of students scoring  “below basic” on PSSA)] / Enrollmenti} 
NEEDCE in the i
th
 school is a “per student” measure to allow for consistent scaling.81, 82 
The following weights, based on Pennsylvania’s Costing-Out Study and New York 
City’s weighted funding formula for schools, are used in this formula: 
Table 7. Value or Formula for Factor Related to Student-Based Need 
Student-Based Need Value or Formula for Factor 
Special Education  1.30 x all students enrolled in special 
education programs 
Poverty 0.43 x number of students eligible for 
free/ reduced-price lunch 
English-Language 
Learners 
1.4978 x number of ELL students 
Poor Prior 
Performance– 
“basic”  
Poor Prior 
Performance– 
“below basic”  
0.35 x number of students scoring “basic” 
on PSSA 
 
0.50 x number of students scoring “below 
basic” on PSSA 
 
                                                 
81
 This variable will also account for school size, to address cost differences due to economies of scale. 
82
 The weights used in this formula are the exact weights used by the state of Pennsylvania in its funding 
formula to districts. 
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As with my vertical equity measure, in measuring comprehensive equity I evaluate the 
relationship between inputs and need. I consider a range of financial inputs in this 
analysis as well as human capital inputs.  
The measure I use for comprehensive equity is the correlation coefficient. The 
correlation coefficient represents the relationship between school need (as defined 
above) and various school resources (i.e., per-pupil operating costs, per-pupil school 
salaries, average teacher salary, percentage of teachers with less than 3 years 
experience, percentage of personnel with masters or above, students per teacher, 
percentage of teachers in bottom 2 quintiles of effectiveness as measured by PVAAS, 
percentage of teachers in top 2 quintiles of effectiveness as measured by PVAAS, 
school effectiveness as measured by PVAAS, measures of teacher efficacy). 
 Constructions of School Budgets. The analyses of horizontal equity, vertical 
equity, and comprehensive equity rely on an accounting of resources within each 
school. In order to have a complete picture of the variation among schools’ financial 
resources, I constructed individual school budgets based on operating costs encumbered 
in school year 2009-2010. These school budgets include funds from federal, state, and 
local revenues (i.e., Title I, IDEA, Title III) but exclude capital expenses and other debt 
services. Constructing school budgets required two steps: tracking all expenditure data 
by building code in order to determine spending at each school
83
; and, tracking items 
which had been allocated to the central office but were servicing individual schools, or 
addressing individual school needs, back to these schools.  
                                                 
83
 The financial analysis provided by Cross & Joftus, Inc. included a review of expenditures by school. 
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Figure 5 presents a view of the district’s expenditures for school year 2009-
2010 broken out by central and school-reported expenditures.
84
 While the numbers 
differ from those provided in my school level analyses because they include ASD high 
schools and alternative schools in ASD schools, the presentation makes it clear that 
almost half of all dollars spent in the school district are budgeted centrally, and over 
half of those funds are estimated as being spent at schools. Without further 
investigation, it is not possible to know the true dollars being spent at each school. 
 
Figure 5. ASD Central and School-Related Expenditures (Total $212.6m), 
SY2009-2010 
Source. Allentown SD, Revenue and Expenditure File, FY09-10 YTD Activity, Cross 
& Joftus, Inc. 
                                                 
84
 The portion allotted to schools includes high schools and alternative schools in addition to elementary 
and middle schools. 
Central Office, 
$14.7M, 7% 
ASD Schools, 
$109.4M, 51% 
Estimated 
spending at 
Schools from 
Central, $55.3M,  
26% 
Debt Service 
and Payments 
to Non-ASD 
Schools, 
$33.3M,  
16% 
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Through an analysis of the central budget, I am able to allocate additional dollars to 
each school. Appendix B provides a table of specific revenues that fund programs in 
schools. Program area directors worked with me to allocate total dollars to various 
schools. Thus, operating funds are a mix of dollars coded to schools and dollars coded 
centrally.
85
 
In addition to an adjustment to the operating budget, I adjusted school budgets 
for poverty and ELL spending, to include spending which had not been coded at the 
school level though funds were flowing through to schools and supporting children at 
schools. Poverty spending at the school includes school dollars spent on poverty, 
including Title I, as well as centrally budgeted Title I dollars and centrally budgeted 
Student Services dollars tied to specific state and federal grants (e.g., Safe Schools/ 
Healthy Students). ELL spending includes school dollars spent on poverty and Title III 
funds that are budgeted centrally.   
 Simulation. The final piece of my analysis is a simulation to answer the 
research question: What would be the financial impact of an alternative approach to 
resource allocation aligned with the comprehensive equity framework? To conduct this 
simulation, I model two potential changes to the district’s resource allocation policies. 
The first policy change entails a systematic distribution of resources similar to that of 
the State - and is consistent with the vertical equity model. Specifically, weights are 
assigned to students according to the identified needs (i.e., low income, ELL), similar 
to the new State funding formula. The second policy change entails a systematic 
                                                 
85
 I do not have information on salaries or positions broken out for the centrally coded dollars.   
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distribution of resources like that of the State, but with the addition of assigning 
weights to students based on their prior performance on State assessments. 
I describe the impacts of the new resource allocation policies at the school level 
– identifying the schools that would gain resources and the schools that would lose 
resources. Unfortunately, I am unable to model the potential impact of a change in 
resource allocation policies to the district’s ability to achieve adequacy. 
 Data Constraints. Although the data amassed from the district and the state, 
and the methods employed to analyze this data, are helpful in evaluating resource 
allocation among schools, there are a number of ways in which the data and methods 
used in this study are insufficient. These include the sample size of the district in which 
I conducted my analysis, lack of data on students within schools, and lack of data on 
human capital resources. 
Due to the small number of schools in the Allentown School District, it is not 
possible to conduct the type of analysis most commonly used in the evaluation of 
vertical equity in larger districts, whereby the impact of individual student needs (e.g., 
poverty, ELL status, and special education status) can be considered separately as 
coefficients in a multiple regression equation. Because of this, as described earlier in 
this chapter, I calculate an index of need to evaluate the relationship between resource 
allocation and school need. This provides a useful measure of overall school need, but 
it does not allow for a disaggregation of particular needs. A related concern, tied to the 
use of a needs index in the context of ASD, is that there is not enough variation among 
138 
 
the school need to identify strong relationships between resource allocation and school 
need.  
Another constraint on my data is that the information I have about individual 
students within schools is very broad. This is true for both student need and student 
outcomes. First, my analysis would be enhanced if I could better understand student 
need. A prime example of this is my data on school poverty. I use free and reduced 
price lunch status as a proxy for poverty. This measure does not necessarily capture the 
range of disadvantages (e.g., poor health care, less educated parents) related to low 
family income.
86
 I have no detail on the range of needs and associated costs of special 
education students, making special education another area of data deficiency. While I 
was able to acquire data on the intensity of need of special education students at the 
district level, I did not acquire this information at the school level. I also lack sufficient 
indicators of student outcomes. My analysis would be greatly enhanced if I had 
stronger measures of academic achievement, beyond PSSA scores, and better measures 
of positive outcomes for students, beyond attendance and suspensions.        
  Additional data on human capital resources would also inform this study, but 
are not readily available. Better data on teachers’ impact on students would be 
extremely useful.
87
 Unfortunately, my teacher level value-added measures only capture 
a portion of the teachers in any school. Therefore, this measure should be considered 
with caution. Another useful measure which is not readily available would be a 
                                                 
86
 There is little variation among schools in terms of the percentage of students in free and reduced price 
lunch status that receive a reduced price lunch.   
87
 This could take numerous forms, such as an in depth review of student work. 
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measure of principal effectiveness beyond the school-wide growth index. One final 
measure of teacher effectiveness that is missing from this analysis is a student review of 
teacher quality.
88
   
Although enhanced data would make for a more robust analysis, the findings I 
present in the following chapter are compelling, and provide a template for school 
districts to use in considering how various financial and human capital resources are 
distributed among schools and students.  
 
  
                                                 
88
 The Student Perceptions of Teacher Effectiveness (SPTE) survey, developed by Ronald Ferguson of 
the Civil Rights Project, has been shown to be highly correlated with teacher value-added scores 
(Ferguson, 2010).   
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CHAPTER 5 – DISTRICT CONTEXT AND QUALITATIVE FINDINGS 
Overview 
I begin this chapter by describing the Allentown School District to provide 
context to the description and analysis of resource allocation. Overall findings present a 
complicated picture within the district and it is helpful to understand how this 
complexity fits into the larger landscape. I first identify how Allentown struggles due to 
financial and societal disadvantages and how the school district has changed over the 
last decade. This is followed by a review of the structure of ASD’s budget, including 
funding sources and expenditures. I complete this section with an explanation of 
resource allocations in the 2009-2010 school year which relies on an analysis of 
horizontal equity statistics to describe the variability among schools. The second 
section of is chapter relies on qualitative findings to examine how the budgeting 
process and resulting resource allocations are perceived by district and school 
administrators. 
Context 
 The Allentown School District Has Great Needs. While the Allentown school 
district has numerous strengths (e.g., diversity, committed staff), it struggles with 
challenges that inhibit successful outcomes for children. The district is significantly 
underfunded as a result of the State’s funding structure, which relies heavily on local 
support. The map below indicates that Allentown stands out as a distressed area in the 
state.  
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Figure 6. Regional Analysis of Need 
Source: Education Needs Index
89
  
The Educational Needs Index (ENI) identifies the regions in a state that are 
undereducated, facing economic challenges, and facing robust population growth and 
shifting demographics in categories of youth, young adults, or at-risk minority groups. 
Allentown stands out as “most critical.” Poverty indicators support this label.90  
  
                                                 
89
 The ENI project is a joint initiative of the Tennessee Higher Education Commission, the Oklahoma 
State Regents for Higher Education, the West Virginia Higher Education Policy Commission, the 
National Center for Higher Education Management Systems, and Austin Peay State University.  
90
 The Educational Needs Index (ENI) is a regional-level study of educational, economic, and population 
pressures that influence educational policy and planning at local, regional, and state levels. Regional 
indices are based on data from the US Census Bureau’s 2005 Public Use Microdata Areas (PUMAs).  
Three factors make up the ENI: education (i.e., percent 18-64 year olds with a high school diploma, 
percent 25-64 year olds with an associate’s degree, percent 25-64 year olds with a bachelor’s degree or 
higher, difference in college attainment between young (25-35) and older (45-64)); economy (i.e., 
unemployment rate, percent of population under 65 in poverty, median family income, per capita income, 
and percent employment in manufacturing and extractions industries); and, population (i.e., percent of 
population ages 0 to 19, percent of population ages 20 to 44, rate of population growth 64 and under, 
percent at-risk minority).  
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Table 8. Poverty Level, SY2005   
 
Allentown Pennsylvania National 
Percent of population under 
65 at or below poverty 
level (2005) 
24.0 16.9 18.5 
Source: Educational Needs Index 
Poverty may be tied to employment prospects for Allentown residents, which are, in 
turn, influenced by the education level of the population. Relative to the state and 
nation, Allentown has a less educated and less skilled workforce.   
 
Table 9. College Attainment, SY2005   
 Allentown Pennsylvania National 
Percent of 18 to 64 year 
olds with a High School 
Diploma (2005) 77.3 89.5 85.8 
Percent of 25 to 64 year 
olds with an Associate’s 
Degree (2005) 7.4 8.2 8.2 
Percent of 25 to 64 year 
olds with a Bachelor’s 
Degree (2005) 17.4 28.5 28.6 
 
Prospects for college attainment are constrained by high school graduation rates. 
ASD’s graduation rate is lower than both state and national averages. To compound 
this, of those students who graduate high school, a smaller percentage of students from 
the ASD than from neighboring districts plan to further their education. 
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Table 10. Graduation Rate (SY2008) and Percent of Students Planning to Further 
their Education (SY2007, SY2010)  
 Allentown Pennsylvania National 
Graduation Rate
91
 (2008) 59.2 77.7 71.7 
Percent of students 
planning to further 
their education (2007, 
2010) 39.4 68.3 75.0* 
Source: Ed Week Diplomas Count 2011; Pennsylvania Department of Education; The 
MetLife Survey of the American Teacher, 2010 
Note. The percent of students planning to further their education reported for the nation is based on the 
2010 MetLife Survey. Numbers for Allentown and Pennsylvania are provided for 2007 by the 
Pennsylvania Department of Education. 
 
 Change over time. ASD has changed along with the demographics of the local 
community, and a reduced tax base from which to raise school revenues has influenced 
the district’s transformation. This section describes how aspects of the entire district 
have adjusted over the past ten years.  
Demographic changes. The profile of the Allentown School District has 
changed immensely in the past 20 years, increasing in both poverty and racial/language 
diversity. For example, between 1990 and 2008, there was a 9.2% increase in the 
number of renter-occupied units and a 13.4% decrease in the number of owner-
occupied units in the ASD catchment area. There was a parallel shift in the population 
of the student body: in 2004, 71% of students were at, or below, the poverty level. The 
number has increased to 85% in 2009. 
  
                                                 
91
 The Cumulative Promotion Index (CPI) method is used to calculate graduation rates. CPI2008 = (10
th
 
gradersfall2008/9
th
 gradersfall2007 x 11
th
 gradersfall2008/10
th
 gradersfall2007 x 12
th
 gradersfall2008/11
th
 gradersfall2007 
x Diploma recipientsspring2008/12
th
 gradersfall2007 
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Table 11. Change in Population in Renter-Occupied Units, 1990-2008   
 1990 2000 2008 
Percent of Households in 
Renter-Occupied Units 43% 47% 49% 
Renter-Occupied Units 18,545 19,748 20,248 
Owner-Occupied Units 24,230 22,284 20,973 
Source: U.S. Census  
 
 
 
Figure 7. Changes in Poverty: Percentage of Students in the ASD Eligible for Free 
and Reduced-Price Lunch, SY2002-2010 
Source: PDE: National School Lunch Program. Retrieved from 
http://www.education.state.pa.us/portal/server.pt/gateway/PTARGS_6_2_121936_7487
_509210_43/ 
 
In the past four years, the special education population has remained relatively 
flat, between 14 and 15%.
92
 However, in the 1999-2000 school year, the percentage of 
students identified as need special education services was 10.7%.
93
 There has been a 
                                                 
92
 Historical data is not available for most years.  
93
 Source: Pennsylvania Department of Education Report, Finances_SEF9900. 
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34% increase in the percentage of special education students served in the ASD 
between school year 2000 and 2010. 
Table 12. Special Education in ASD, SY2008-2011   
  
# of 
special 
education 
students 
% of all 
students 
identified 
as 
requiring 
special 
educ. 
services 
% of 
special 
educ. 
students 
diagnosed 
with Autism 
% of 
special 
educ. 
students 
diagnosed 
with a 
learning 
disability 
2007-2008 2,562 14.3% 5.0% 57.6% 
2008-2009 2,524 14.2% 6.3% 56.9% 
2009-2010 2,545 14.3% 6.8% 55.8% 
2010-2011 2,581 14.8% 7.9% 55.4% 
Source. PDE: Pennsylvania State Data Center; Special Education Data Report School 
Years 2007-2008, 2008-2009, 2009-2010, 2010-2011 (Retrieved from 
http://penndata.hbg.psu.edu/BSEReports/Data%20Preview/2010_2011/PDF_Document
s/Speced_Quick_Report_SD392_Final.pdf) 
 
 Enrollment. The size of the district has changed along with the demographic 
profile. In the 2001-2002 school year, enrollment was just over 16,000 students. It 
reached a peak five years later with over 18,000 students and, as of the 2009-2010 
school year, was approximately 17,500 students.  
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Figure 8. ASD Student Enrollment, SY2002-2010 
Source. ASD Enrollment Report 
 Changes in human capital. The number of professional personnel in the district 
also increased. This is largely driven by the increase in classroom teachers. State 
reports indicate that the number of students per classroom teacher has decreased from 
18.8 in 2001-2002 to 15.7 in 2009-2010.   
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Figure 9. ASD Professional Personnel, SY2005-2010  
Source: Pennsylvania Department of Education – Professional Personnel Summary of 
Public Schools. 
Note. Professional personnel include administrators, classroom teachers, coordinators, and others, as 
reported by district to the state. Breakdown of personnel is provided for SY2007-2008-2009-2010: in 
SY2007-2008, 72% of full-time professional personnel were classroom teachers; in SY2008-2009, 79% 
of full-time professional personnel were classroom teachers; and, in SY2008-2009, 77% of full-time 
professional personnel were classroom teachers. 
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Figure 10. ASD Total Full-Time Equivalent Teachers, SY2000-2010  
Source. U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics, 
Common Core of Data (CCD), Local Education Agency Finance Survey (F-33), FY 
2007, Version 1a., U.S. Bureau of the Census, American Community Survey (2005, 
2006, 2007, and 2008). 
 
Teacher average salary has also increased between 2004-2005 and 2009-2010. 
The increase in number of staff in the 2007-2008 year included the addition of less 
experienced (and less-paid) teachers, resulting in a lower average salary for the district 
for a short time.  
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Figure 11. ASD Average Years of Teacher Experience, SY2005-2010 
Source: Pennsylvania Department of Education – Professional Personnel Summary of 
Public Schools. 
 
 
Figure 12. ASD Average Salary for Professional Personnel, SY2005-2010   
Source. Pennsylvania Department of Education – Professional Personnel Summary of 
Public Schools. 
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 Student outcomes. The data available on student outcomes is limited, but 
information on proficiency in math and reading (as measured by student test scores on 
the PSSA’s) and graduation rates, provide some insight as to how students in the 
district have fared over the past ten years.    
PSSA Results (District-Wide) 
 
 
Figure 13. Percent Proficient and Above on PSSA (Mathematics), SY2001-2010 
Source. Pennsylvania Department of Education – District Report Cards. 
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Figure 14. Percent Proficient and Above on PSSA (Reading), SY2002-2010 
Source. Pennsylvania Department of Education – District Report Cards. 
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Graduation Rates 
 
Figure 15. ASD Graduation Rates, SY2002-2009 
Source. Pennsylvania Department of Education – District Report Cards. 
As seen in the previous figures, test scores and graduation rates have improved 
overall, but at the district level ASD still struggles to make adequate yearly progress. 
As targets have risen, Allentown’s designation as a failing district has held since 2006-
2007. 
Table 13. District Adequate Yearly Progress (AYP) Status, SY2003-2010  
YEAR District AYP Status 
2009-2010 Corrective Action 2(third year) 
2008-2009 Corrective Action 2(second year) 
2007-2008 Corrective Action 2(first year) 
2006-2007 Corrective Action 1 
2005-2006 Making Progress 
2004-2005 School Improvement 2 
2003-2004 School Improvement 1 
2002-2003 Warning 
 
40% 
45% 
50% 
55% 
60% 
65% 
70% 
75% 
Allen High School Dieruff High School District 
ASD Graduation Rates 
153 
 
 ASD budget. This section provides an overview of the ASD budget. I begin 
with a review of expenditures and revenues. I then briefly describe the budgeting 
process for school year 2009-2010 based on document analysis and information from 
my interviews with the district’s Chief Financial Officer and the Executive Director of 
Planning and External Funding. I focus on the resource allocation process in 2009-2010 
so that my qualitative and quantitative data analysis is consistent. This is followed with 
a review of the funding gap between the district’s financial resources and the resources 
it would need to prepare all students to meet proficiency standards according to the 
State’s analysis.   
 Expenditures. As seen earlier in this chapter, there have been increases in 
personnel and average salaries over the past decade. Taken together, these changes 
explain the rise in personnel services expenditures over time. As funding for personnel 
has increased, so have the district’s total expenditures. Figure 16 indicates an overall 
increase of 175%, with non-instructional expenses growing at an even faster rate (214% 
total increase) than instructional expenses (162% total increase).     
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Figure 16. ASD Instructional and Non-Instructional Expenditures, SY2002-2010 
Source. Pennsylvania Department of Education Reports: Finances AIE 9495-0910; 
Finances AFR ExpDetail 0102-0910. 
Note. As defined by PDE, Instruction includes all those activities dealing directly with the interaction 
between teachers and students and related costs
94
, which can be directly attributed to a program of 
instruction. Teaching may be provided for students in a school classroom, in another location such as a 
home or hospital, and in other learning situations such as those involving co-curricular activities. It may 
also be provided through some other approved medium such as television, radio, telephone and 
correspondence. Included here are the activities of aides or classroom assistance of any type (clerks, 
graders, teaching machines, etc.) that assist in the instructional process. Do not record administrative 
instructional support costs here.  
 
In 2001-2002, personnel services (salaries and benefits) made up 75% of the 
entire district budget. This had decreased to 66% in 2009-2010. Interestingly, benefits, 
made up 19% of the personnel services expenditures in 2001-2002, increased to 26% in 
2006-2007 and 2007-2008, and moved back down to 23% in 2009-2010. 
                                                 
94
 PDE describes related costs as including instructional expenditures for salaries, contracted services, 
travel expenses, equipment rental, supplies, books, maintenance costs directly attributable to instructional 
equipment and other expenses such as sabbatical leaves. 
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Figure 17. ASD Salaries, Employee Benefits, and Non-Personnel Expenses, 
SY2002-2010 
Source. Pennsylvania Department of Education Report: Finances AFR ExpDetail 0102-
0910. 
Note. Non-personnel expenses include purchased professional and technical services, purchased property 
services, supplies, property, other objects, and other uses of funds.  
 
State allocations for special and gifted education services have also grown over 
the last decade, with a 220% increase in expenditures from 2001-2002 to 2009-2010. In 
2001-2001, special education expenditures made up approximately 12% of the budget. 
In 2009-2010, special education expenditures crept up to 15% of the budget. Additional 
local funds also contribute to special and gifted education expenditures.
95
  
                                                 
95
 Local expenditures on special education expenditures are not reported – or readily available. 
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Figure 18. ASD Special and Gifted Education Expenditures, SY2002-2010 
Source: Pennsylvania Department of Education reports: Finances SEF0102; Finances 
SEF0203; Finances SEF0304; Finances SEF0405; Finances SEF0506; Finances 
SEF0607; Finances SEF0708; Finances SEF0809-0910-1011 
 
 Funding sources. Revenues to the district are a mix of local tax levy, and state 
and federal grants and entitlements. For the 2009-2010 school year, the district raised 
over $211 million in revenues: 35.6% in local revenues, 53.2% in state revenues, and 
10.7% in federal revenues.
96
 Figure 19 below provides an overview of revenues to the 
district between school year 2004-2005 and school year 2009-2010, divided by local, 
state and federal dollars. 
                                                 
96
 PDE website. 
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Figure 19. Local, State and Federal Revenues, SY2005-2010 
Source: ASD Annual Financial Reports 
 
Figure 20. Percent of Total Revenues, by Source, SY2005-2010    
Source: ASD Annual Financial Reports 
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Local revenues have no requirements attached, and are referred to as general 
fund dollars. State and federal revenues often do have requirements as to how grant 
funds should be used. There are two types of grants: categorical grants or formula-
driven grants, such as Federal Title I and Pennsylvania’s Accountability Block Grant, 
to which the district is entitled to if they meet certain criteria (e.g., serving students 
living in poverty) and fill out the applications correctly, and competitive grants for 
which the district must compete (e.g., the Federal School Improvement Grant). 
The district receives the greatest portion of its total budget from the 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (53.2% in SY2010). These funds are the result of 
appropriations enacted by the Pennsylvania Legislature and signed into law by the 
Governor. They include both subsidies and grants. The district saw a significant 
increase in funds beginning in 2008-2009 as the result of a change in the State’s 
funding formula providing additional state funds to under-funded districts. As a result 
of this change, state allocations to school districts began being referred to as 
“Accountability to Commonwealth Taxpayers” (ACT) funds. There was a 13.47% 
increase in State funding for the Allentown School District in 2009-2010. Three major 
programs come under the umbrella of PA-ACT funds: the state’s Basic Education Fund 
(BEF) - the major allocation of state funds to districts; the Accountability Block Grant 
(ABG); and, the Educational Assistance Program (EAP). The ABG program is 
available to school districts to support “proven programs to improve educational 
achievement of students” (PDE website). School districts may use the ABG funds for 
pre-kindergarten, full-day kindergarten programs, and/or reduced class size in grades 
159 
 
kindergarten through grade three. The EAP funds tutoring programs for at-risk students. 
The Pennsylvania Department of Education (PDE) oversees additional state funding of 
programs for which school districts may be reimbursed.
97
 
The state’s Basic Education Fund (BEF), a categorical grant tied to student 
enrollment and student need, makes up the largest share of state revenue in the district 
(76% of state revenues to ASD in SY2010). This revenue is designed to help districts 
meet their adequacy and equity goals and its use, for the most part, is unrestricted. The 
BEF allocation to ASD more than doubled between the 2003-2004 and 2010-2011 
school years. While the annual increases began when Governor Rendell took office, 
they grew at a larger rate beginning in the 2008-2009 school year, after the PA General 
Assembly passed a state budget that increased all basic education funding by $275 
million and included a new state funding formula based on the recommendations of the 
PA legislature’s costing-out study.  
                                                 
97
 These programs include: facilities improvement, transportation services, career and technical 
instruction, health services, and migratory children. 
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Figure 21. Basic Education Funding, SY2004-2010   
Source: ASD Annual Financial Reports 
 
Table 14. Basic Education Funds, SY2004-2011   
Year 
BEF 
State 
Funded 
BEF 
Stimulus 
Funded 
BEF 
Total 
Amount 
BEF 
Increase % Incr. 
SY2004 37,491,079 0 37,491,079   
SY2005 42,844,964 0 42,844,964 5,353,885 14.28% 
SY2006 46,158,463 0 46,158,463 3,313,499 7.73% 
SY2007 55,592,389 0 55,592,389 9,433,926 20.44% 
SY2008 62,658,329 0 62,658,329 7,065,940 12.71% 
SY2009 74,839,643 0 74,839,643 12,181,314 19.44% 
SY2010 74,857,792 10,061,554 84,919,346 10,079,703 13.47% 
SY2011 76,408,137 9,869,732 86,277,869 1,358,523 1.60% 
 
The Pennsylvania Department of Education (PDE) places the following 
restrictions on yearly increases in BEFs: at least 80% of funds must be dedicated to 
newly created, eligible programs or to expand eligible programs that are already in 
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existence in the school district. Also, districts such as Allentown, with schools in school 
improvement and/or corrective action, must submit plans which spell out the intended 
uses of all new state dollars. Table 15 lists all the areas in which districts could allocate 
resources, and describes how the ASD spent their new ACT dollars in 2008-2009. A 
review of spending initiatives of other large districts in the state (excluding 
Philadelphia) revealed great variation in the choices districts made in allocating ACT 
funds in terms of focus. Unlike Allentown, other districts invested more in literacy and 
math coaching, intensive instruction for struggling students during the school day, and 
early education. Districts were consistent, however, to the extent that much of the new 
funding went to cover salaries and benefits.  
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Table 15. ASD Allocation of PA-PACT Funds, SY2009    
Allentown School District's Allocation of New State Funds: 
(ACT Funded Initiatives: 2008-2009 ACT funding =$531 per pupil) 
Evidence-based supports and 
one-time costs (20.0%) 
1.Assistant principals (elementary school) 
2.Psychology interns 
3.Technology and textbooks 
Other educational support 
services (3.3%) 
1.Home school visitor 
2.Psychologist 
3.Parent coaches 
4.Parent scholars 
  5.School health services chairperson 
Full day kindergarten  1.Teachers 
(5.6%) 2.Paraprofessionals 
  3.Supplies and materials 
  4.Off-site rental 
High school reform (7.5%) 1.Teacher salaries 
  2.Online dual enrollment, college level program 
  3.Textbooks  
  4.Educational software 
  5.PSAT costs 
  6.Statistics curriculum development and staff training 
  7.Professional development consultants 
  8.Technology supplies to facilitate teacher online 
learning 
Intensive instruction for 
struggling students 
1.Special education co-teachers 
2.Modular classroom 
3.Read 180 technological support 
Literacy and math coaching 
(7.8%) 
1.Literacy and math coaches 
Other new curricula/course 
offerings (28.1%) 
1.ESL, elementary support, gifted support teacher 
2.Textbooks, materials 
3.District curriculum evaluation/development; reading 
edge start-up 
  4.College and career coaches 
Other professional 
development (10.0%) 
1.Education and behavior coaches 
2.PD consultation 
3.PD travel expenses 
Teacher Training (4.8%) 1.Training in math, reading, writing and tech 
  2.RtI consulting (with resources) 
  3.Professional development tracking 
  4.Materials, books, copying, travel, rentals 
  5.Professional memberships 
Tutoring before/after school, 
weekends (2.7%) 
1.Tutors 
2.Materials 
School library services 
(1.1%) 
1.School library media specialist, paraprofessionals 
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During the periods when new resources were invested in Allentown, the district 
began to show gains in student outcomes; graduation rates began to increase, as did 
student results on the Pennsylvania System of School Assessment (PSSA) scores. 
However, it is important to note that the infusion of new funds from the state was 
offset, in part, by a reduction in local revenue.
98
 
Federal revenues make up the smallest portion of the district’s budget. The 
largest federal categorical grant program to school districts is Title I, designed to 
improve academic achievement of disadvantaged
99
 children. Other federal dollars, 
which provide support for numerous programs, include: 21
st
 Century Schools (i.e., Safe 
and Drug Free Schools and Communities, 21
st
 Century Learning Communities); Title 
III (language instruction for limited English proficient and immigrant students); 
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) (to cover costs incurred in 
educating children in accordance with the IDEA); Child Nutrition Projects; and, 
Medical Assistance reimbursements.   
The Title I program is intended to support disadvantaged children in meeting 
state standards in reading and mathematics. Schools with 50% or more of students 
identified as living in poverty may use the Title I dollars school-wide to improve 
educational programs; all schools in ASD meet this criterion. Title I grant dollars cover 
expenses at both the schools and the district level, with approximately 80% of the 
                                                 
98
 In SY2001, local taxes made up 53.2% of all revenue; in SY2010, local taxes made up 32.4% of all 
revenue. 
99
 Title I of the Elementary & Secondary Education Act describes disadvantaged children as “low-
achieving children in our Nation's highest-poverty schools, limited English proficient children, migratory 
children, children with disabilities, Indian children, neglected or delinquent children, and young children 
in need of reading assistance.” 
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dollars being spent in schools.
100
 School principals have primary responsibility for 
spending Title I dollars in their building. Title I dollars, however, are less flexible than 
school budget dollars as they must be divided among staff development, parental 
involvement, and academic improvement. The allocations devoted to each of these 
areas are mandated by federal formula, and dollars cannot be moved from one area to 
another. Within these designated areas, however, the school principals usually have 
control.  
In addition to categorical grants, the district applies for, and has been successful 
in winning, competitive grants. The Executive Director for Grants and External 
Funding submits grant proposals on behalf of the district, with the stated intention to go 
after grants that are consistent with the district’s mission. Certain grants are likely to be 
tied to specific buildings (written to address the needs of certain buildings - i.e., 
security), but buildings generally have little control of how these grant dollars are spent. 
The Executive Director explained, “[Program Directors] don’t take their grants and say, 
‘Hey, Central [Elementary School], you get $100,000. You can figure out what you 
want to do with it.’ They … plan for those grants district-wide.” 
School Improvement grants have brought federal dollars to the Allentown 
School District. In the 2009-2010 school year, the district applied for and was awarded 
over $3 million due to poor student achievement at three elementary schools (Mosser, 
                                                 
100
 Title I allocations to schools are derived from formulas based on student poverty. 
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Sheridan, and Union Terrace) and one middle school (South Mountain).
101
 These grants 
are based on a school’s performance on state assessments (AYP status) and, therefore, 
fluctuate from year to year. As a result, this money cannot be used for ongoing 
expenses, such as staff. Dollars from school improvement grants must be consistent 
with the student improvement plan. Also, although the building principal is involved in 
determining how these dollars are spent, the district must sign off on his/her allocations. 
The state is also required to sign off on these plans, but the building principals I 
interviewed were unaware of this requirement. A great deal of volatility is built into the 
budget because of these grants. For example, one school that made Adequate Yearly 
Progress this year will lose $80,000 because it is no longer in “student improvement.” 
The Executive Director described some smaller grants with which her office had been 
involved. “We worked with [the ESOL Director's] office [on a refugee grant]. It was for 
about $51,000, which is really small for us. But it was, I’d say, a little bit of a passion 
for a couple of us that we really wanted to do it. Which is what happens in the schools, 
you know, when teachers have a passion for something.” 
 Structure of budget. Funds that support school buildings within the Allentown 
School District can be thought of as coming from three pots. The largest pot of 
financial resources (at 67.3% of entire district budget) covers the expenses of teachers 
and support staff. The second pot of money comes from program areas in the central 
office and funds some staff, services, and materials in buildings, including students 
services (e.g., cameras), curriculum (e.g., coaches, books, training materials), English 
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 The district received $15 million in School Improvement grants in school year 2010-2011. 
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as a Second Language (ESOL) (e.g., training, teachers), and most special education 
services.
102
 These program area budgets are composed of grants and general revenues. 
The final pot of money is a small allotment of dollars to school principals to spend in 
their schools. These dollars can be used for any number of items including books and 
professional development. These discretionary school budget dollars are from general 
revenues.  
 Personnel budget. Although the personnel budget makes up the largest portion 
of funds to individual school buildings, principals have very little influence over 
staffing issues. The technical work of determining the size of the workforce in each 
school is carried out by the human resources department. Principals are neither 
responsible for staffing budgets nor determining the numbers of teachers and support 
staff in their building. (Even when site-based management was in effect in Allentown 
in the 1990’s, principals had no control over personnel.) Staffing formulas are based on 
a district-wide policy on pupil/teacher ratio approved by the School Board, which the 
human resources office uses to generate the number of staff to be added or subtracted at 
each school, based on the projected enrollment for the coming year.
103
  Currently, the 
ratio for elementary schools is 25 students per teacher, but it can go up to 27. Once that 
limit is reached, another teacher is added. In elementary school, the most prevalent 
staffing issue is usually excessively large class sizes; in high school, the problem is 
instead whether or not classes should be held if there only a few students sign up – such 
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 Additional funds that address the needs of special education students come out of principals’ 
discretionary budgets. 
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 Staffing formulas vary by school level (elementary vs. middle school vs. high school). 
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as an AP Chemistry class with four students. Since the district policy is that the number 
of teachers in each building is based on student enrollment, any additional teachers 
beyond the prescribed ratios are most likely tied to a grant or special education. 
A central office administrator provided details on how staffing budgets are 
prepared: “It used to be pretty academic. Let's say we anticipate salaries go up four 
percent. So, whatever we spent on payroll last year, let's add four percent to it. That’s 
our new budget.” Staffing normally remains the same from year to year unless there is a 
new program, or there is new grant money available. Then you add staff “on top of 
what you’ve been doing”, which may require hiring new staff. Ratios are also used to 
determine how ELL teachers are allocated to schools. This is a difficult task, as there 
are students in different grades, with different competencies, that must be served. The 
result is that some schools end up with higher pupil/teacher ratios than others. Finally, 
staffing budgets also include the associated benefits: health insurance, workman’s 
compensation, retirement benefits and Social Security. All costs are based on staffing 
numbers.   
 Program area budgets. Program area budgets, often funded primarily through 
grants, are not presented (or conceived of) at the school level. Generally, program area 
directors make their purchases for the entire district, and do not consider school-level 
allocations. Every department (i.e., special education, student services, curriculum) puts 
together their own budget reflecting their needs. At times though, building principals 
negotiate with program area directors to get more support for their buildings, but this is 
only true of some principals. One principal interviewed discussed how she would seek 
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central funds. She offered an example of how she would deal with the need for a school 
camera:  
“School safety would be something where, if I had the money, I could try to 
purchase another camera. But, I certainly would go to [the Director of Student 
Services] first and say: ‘Hey, for the safety of our students, really could use 
another monitor and camera in the back of the building.’” 
 
 Principals’ “discretionary” budgets. The final portion of school-level funding 
is a mix of discretionary dollars allocated to each building and Title I funds, which have 
strict requirements for use attached. The discretionary school budget is small, 
approximately $135 per student, and covered by general funds. The Title I budget is 
covered by federal funds.  
Funding for individual school budgets is determined each year by the Chief 
Financial Officer (CFO) and the Superintendent. In the 2008-2009 school year and 
prior, dollars were allocated to schools solely based on student enrollment in each 
school, regardless of need of student body or level of schooling (e.g., middle school or 
elementary school). In the 2009-2010 school year (the year in which data is used for the 
quantitative analysis) all building principals were asked to build their entire budget.
104
 
The school budgeting process begins early in the year. Schools are given their 
allocation in early-mid October and must determine how the dollars will be spent by the 
end of the month. Developing this budget for the following year in two weeks is 
                                                 
104
 In school year 2010-2011, under a new administration, the district allocated resources based on a 
weighted formula that took into account student needs including poverty, ELL status, and special 
education status. Principals were then required to develop a budget based on their allotted dollars. 
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difficult for principals given many unknown elements, the largest of which is student 
enrollment. 
The Federal Title I grant dollars cover expenses at both the schools and the 
district level, with approximately 80% of the dollars being spent in schools.
105
 School 
principals have primary responsibility for spending Title I dollars in their building. Title 
I dollars, however, are less flexible than school budget dollars as they must be divided 
among staff development, parental involvement, and academic improvement. The 
allocations to each of these areas are mandated by federal formula, and there can be no 
movement of dollars from one area to another. Within these designated areas, however, 
the school principals usually have control.  
 The funding gap. The Allentown School District is severely underfunded. This 
is aggravated by inadequate resources available to address the needs of disadvantaged 
students. ASD has the largest gap in terms of adequate resources compared to the vast 
majority of other schools district in the State. According to the PA Legislature’s 2007 
Costing-Out Study, in 2005-06 the average cost to educate a student in ASD and reach 
proficiency was $13,741. At the time, ASD was spending $8,291, and these numbers 
have changed very little since then. As can be seen in Table 16 and Figure 22, the gap 
between “adequate funding” and total expenditures is large.  
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 Title I allocations to schools are derived from formulas based on student poverty. 
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Table 16. General Fund Fiscal Gap Analysis, SY2009-2011   
 
Actual 
Expenditures 
Adequacy 
Target Difference 
2008-2009 $202,399,473 $234,147,093 $31,747,620 
2009-2010 $212,752,983 $250,506,435 $37,753,452 
2010-2011 $233,136,794 $261,204,964 $28,068,170 
Source: ASD Financial Report 
 
Figure 22. General Fund Fiscal Gap, SY2009-2011   
Source: Allentown School District Financial Reports 2010-2011, 2009-2010, 2008-
2009 
 
This context is provided to make clear that all students in the ASD, regardless of which 
school they attend, are not being provided with adequate resources.   
 Current resource allocation in Allentown. With support from the consulting 
firm Cross & Joftus, I was able to obtain district and school level expenditure and 
personnel data for the ASD. Because my interest lies in school level data, I focused my 
efforts on determining the magnitude of various resources going to schools. As 
mentioned earlier, due to the district’s small size, only elementary and middle schools 
are considered in the analysis.  
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To conduct this analysis, I have identified a range of measurable resources that 
are likely to influence student learning. These resources can be categorized into 
expenditures and human capital resources. Expenditures include total operating funds, 
operating funds intended to be directed to address the needs of students in poverty, and 
operating funds intended to be directed to address the needs of ELL students. 
Expenditures also include salaries, including aggregate and specific responsibilities 
(i.e., instruction, support and professional development, leadership, operations and 
maintenance, and pupil services). Human capital resources include various measures of, 
or proxies for, teaching quality. The indicators identified for this study include average 
salaries for core, non-core, and special population teachers
 106
, professional 
development, FTEs (with measures of students per staff, students per teacher, students 
per administrator, and students per paraprofessional). Closely tied to the review of 
FTEs at the school level is a review of average class size at each school. Additional 
measures of teaching quality include teacher effect (based on teacher-level value added 
scores), teacher self-efficacy (for classroom management, student engagement, and 
instructional strategies), average years of teaching experience, the percentage of 
teachers in a building with less than three years of experience, the percentage of 
teachers in a building with more than four years of experience, and the percentage of 
teachers with a masters or above. Finally, three school-wide measures of teaching 
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 Core teachers include elementary, English, mathematics, reading, science, and social studies teachers; 
non-core teachers include art, music, physical education, French, German, Spanish, business, home 
economic, industrial arts, JROTC, and other teachers; and, special populations teachers include ESOL, 
IST, special education, and itinerant gifted teachers. 
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quality are also considered: the schools growth indices for math and reading and 
collective efficacy. 
Table 17 provides horizontal equity statistics (i.e., means, standard deviation, 
range, coefficient of variation, and McLoone index) for the resources studied. 
Highlighting indicates that the results fall outside the Odden-Picus standard for 
horizontal equity (Odden & Picus, 2008).  
Table 17. Horizontal Equity Statistics for Elementary Schools in ASD, SY2010  
  Elementary Schools 
  Mean SD Range 
Coef 
of Var 
McLoone 
Index 
Financial Resources 
    
 
Operating Funds (PPE)    7,947   921  2,970    0.12  0.92 
Poverty Spending (PPE) 916 271 1,099 0.30 0.84 
ELL Spending (PPE)      427   215   804   0.50  0.63 
Discretionary Bldg Funds 
(PPE)  
             
132  
            
12  
       
56  0.09  0.95 
Federal Title I (PPE)     587   210  798  0.36  0.85 
Teacher Support 
    
 
Professional Development 
PPE) 259 59 194 0.23 0.82 
Human Capital Salaries 
    
 
Total Salaries (PPE) 5,084 608 2,034 0.12 0.89 
Instruction Salaries (PPE) 4,043 492 1,827 0.12 0.90 
Instruction Support/PD 
Salaries (PPE) 186 51 180  0.28 0.81 
Leadership Salaries (PPE) 404 105 367 0.26 0.86 
Operations/Maintenance 
Salaries (PPE) 210 67 283 0.32 0.83 
Pupil Services Salaries 
(PPE) 240 80 276 0.33 0.89 
Average Teacher Salaries 
    
 
Core Teachers 63,795 5,354 17,910 0.08 0.94 
Non-Core Teachers 63,843 10,484 29,286 0.16 0.89 
Special Populations 
Teachers 60,835 4,248 13,129 0.07 0.94 
All Teachers 63,029 4,198 13,899 0.07 0.94 
Full Time Equivalents 
(FTEs)          
Students per staff 9.7 1.2 5.1 0.13 0.90 
Students per teacher 15.9 1.7 5.2 0.11 0.94 
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Students per administrator 309.8 57.1 207.5 0.18 0.86 
Students per 
paraprofessional 75.0 33.8 110.6 0.45 0.71 
Average class size (w/o 
100% SPED) 23.6 1.7 5.8 0.07 0.93 
Individual measures of Teacher Quality 
Low teacher effect 
(district gain) 28% 19% 70% 0.67 0.74 
High teacher effect 
(district gain) 40% 24% 100% 0.61 0.53 
Teacher Efficacy-Classroom 
Mgmt 7.5 0.4 1.4 0.05 0.95 
Teacher Efficacy-Student 
Engagement 7.2 0.4 1.2 0.06 0.95 
Teacher Efficacy-
Instructional Strategies 7.6 0.4 1.5 0.05 0.96 
Avg. years of teaching exp. 11.1 2.7 8.9 0.24 0.83 
% of teachers w/ less than 
3 yrs exp. 10% 4% 11% 0.39 0.81 
% of personnel w/ Masters 
or above 43% 11% 44% 0.25 0.88 
School-wide Measures of Teacher Quality 
Growth Index (Math) 10.9 3.6 13.4 0.33 0.72 
Growth Index (Reading) 8.9 4.1 12.5 0.46 0.61 
Collective Efficacy 526 43 150 0.08 0.97 
Note: Shading in yellow indicates near horizontal equity; shading in purple indicates horizontal inequity; 
and, shading in red indicates extreme horizontal inequity. 
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Table 18. Horizontal Equity Statistics for Middle Schools in ASD, SY2010  
  Middle Schools 
  Mean SD Range 
Coef 
of Var 
McLoone 
Index 
Financial Resources 
    
 
Operating Funds (PPE)  8,940  403 872 0.05  0.96 
Poverty Spending (PPE) 1,088 204 435 0.19 0.82 
ELL Spending (PPE)  269 82   194  0.31  0.75 
Discretionary Bldg Funds 
(PPE)  
     
158  
        
15  
              
37  0.10  0.93 
Federal Title I (PPE) 747 127 264 0.17 0.84 
Teacher Support 
    
 
Professional Development 
(PPE) 113 21 49 0.18 0.92 
Human Capital Salaries 
    
 
Total Salary (PPE) 5,712 374 862 0.07 0.94 
Instruction Salaries (PPE) 4,686 406 876 0.09 0.91 
Leadership Salaries (PPE) 361 70 168 0.19 0.85 
Operations/Maintenance 
Salaries (PPE) 283 21 51 0.07 0.95 
Pupil Services Salaries 
(PPE) 382 26 57 0.07 0.97 
Average Teacher Salaries 
    
 
Core Teachers 60,831 2,785 6,410 0.05 0.97 
Non-Core Teachers 58,635 5,610 13,384 0.10 0.92 
Special Populations Teachers 60,349 3,641 7,857 0.06 0.94 
All Teachers 60,293 3,163 6,634 0.05 0.95 
Full Time Equivalents (FTEs)          
Students per staff 8.4 0.5 1.3 0.07 0.96 
Students per teacher 13.6 1.0 2.1 0.07 0.98 
Students per administrator 276.7 42.1 90.3 0.15 0.85 
Students per 
paraprofessional 92.4 24.3 56.7 0.26 0.80 
Average class size (w/o 100% 
SPED) 20.1 0.6 1.5 0.03 0.97 
Individual measures of Teacher Quality 
Low teacher effect (district 
gain) 20% 11% 27% 0.57 0.70 
High teacher effect 
(district gain) 31% 17% 39% 0.56 0.73 
Teacher Efficacy-Classroom 
Mgmt 7.0 0.3 0.6 0.04 0.96 
Teacher Efficacy-Student 
Engagement 6.0 0.2 0.4 0.04 0.97 
Teacher Efficacy-
Instructional Strategies 7.6 0.1 0.2 0.01 0.99 
Avg. years of teaching exp. 9.6 1.8 3.9 0.19 0.82 
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% of teachers w/ less than 3 
yrs exp. 18% 6% 14% 0.31 0.83 
School-wide Measures of Teacher Quality 
Growth Index (Math) 8.6 1.5 3.5 0.18 0.84 
Growth Index (Reading) 10.9 3.7 7.8 0.34 0.74 
Collective Efficacy 416 38 71 0.09 0.92 
Note: Shading in yellow indicates near horizontal equity; shading in purple indicates horizontal inequity; 
and, shading in red indicates extreme horizontal inequity. 
 
Equity statistics, described in chapter four, provide a means of measuring how 
resources are distributed among schools. Equity statistics are provided for elementary 
schools (n=14) and middle schools (n=4) where available. Odden and Picus (2008) 
provide standards against which to evaluate these equity statistics
107
. Using these 
standards, resources are seen as either horizontally equitable, meaning resources are 
distributed equivalently among schools, or horizontally inequitable, meaning resources 
are not distributed equivalently among schools. Given the small sample of schools in 
the ASD, I have expanded upon this definition for the purpose of my analysis. All those 
resources with a coefficient of variation which falls between 0.1 and 0.2 and a 
McLoone Index which falls between 0.8 and 0.9 are considered to be close enough to 
be considered as horizontally equitably distributed. Differentiations are also made 
between horizontal inequity and extreme horizontal inequity. Equity statistics are 
highlighted accordingly in the tables 17 and 18.  
In considering horizontal equity statistics it is important to note that one would 
not expect certain resources, such as expenditures to address the needs of students in 
poverty or expenditures to address the needs of ELL students, to be allocated on a 
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 Odden and Picus (2008) have determined that a coefficient of variation of 0.1 or less, and a McLoone 
Index of 0.9 or greater indicates horizontal equity. 
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strictly per pupil basis. Rather, these expenditures, by definition, are intended to 
provide compensatory funds for specific students with higher needs. This point is 
considered further in Chapter 6, in which vertical equity is measured (as part of the 
equity framework discussed earlier in this paper) to determine how resources are 
distributed to each school according to the needs of the students in the school. 
Many of the resources considered in my analysis of the ASD fall within the 
range, or just outside the range, defined by Odden and Picus (2008) as equitably 
distributed based on horizontal equity statistics. These resources include: operating 
funds, poverty spending and Federal Title I (middle school only), building discretionary 
funds, professional development funds (middle school only), total salary, instructional 
salary, salary for instructional support, leadership, operations/maintenance, and pupil 
services (middle school only), average salaries (for all categories of staff), students per 
staff, students per teacher, students per administrator, class size, average years of 
teacher experience (middle school only), teacher self-efficacy and collective efficacy, 
the Growth Index, representing the school’s “value-add” (middle school only). 
Resources that were not found to be equivalently distributed among schools on a per 
pupil basis include: expenditures dedicated to address the needs of students in poverty 
(elementary school only), Federal Title I (elementary school only), expenditures 
dedicated to address the needs of ELL students, professional development (elementary 
school only), salaries tied to instructional support (elementary school only), leadership 
salaries (elementary school only), operations and maintenance salaries (elementary 
schools only), pupil services salaries (elementary schools only), students per para-
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professional, teacher effectiveness, average years of teaching experience(elementary 
schools only), the percentage of teachers with less than three years of experience 
(elementary schools only), the percentage of personnel with a masters degree or above 
(elementary schools only), and the Growth Index. 
These findings are consistent with much of the literature on horizontal equity, 
whereby overall operating funds and salaries are equivalent among schools on a per 
pupil basis, but mask inequities such as considerable variations among schools on a 
range of teaching quality measures, including the percentage of inexperienced teachers 
in a school and educator effectiveness, measured both at the individual teacher level as 
well as the school level.  
 Variability among school outcomes. Another measure of district equity 
described in Chapters 2 and 4 is equivalent outcomes. As stated, equivalent outcomes 
are achieved if resources are allocated to students such that their outcomes are 
equivalent. This construct is included to provide more information about variability 
among schools. Conducting an analysis using an unconditional 2-level model provides 
a means of determining the variation in student test scores which is the result of 
attending a particular school. In my analysis of equivalent outcomes among ASD 
elementary schools, I find that the large majority of variability in student outcomes is 
not the result of attending a particular school. Rather, it is due to variability among 
students. This finding is consistent with the literature on the impact of schools on 
student outcomes (Konstantopoulos, 2006). 
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Table 19. Measure of Equivalent Outcomes for ASD Elementary Schools, SY2010   
 
Allentown School District – Grades 3, 4, 5 
PSSA 
Math 
PSSA 
Reading 
Percent of variability that lies among 
schools 7% 5% 
Percent of variability that lies within 
schools 93% 95% 
   
 Describing the process of resource allocation in Allentown  
The discussion above broadly describes how school budgets are understood by 
administrators in the district. While there is generally consensus as to how dollars flow 
to schools and what funding sources provide the revenues to the district, there is less 
agreement on, and understanding of, the decision-making processes around resource 
allocation and the resulting distribution of resources to schools. Interviews with school 
district administrators yielded insights into the implementation of the distribution of 
resources among schools and shed light onto the variability in resources at the school 
level. Six major findings are presented and discussed based on this research:  
 Resource allocation in the ASD is a black box – decisions are not transparent to 
school officials and administrators;  
 Communication among central office administrators and school level 
administrators is deficient;  
 No overarching mission or vision to guides resource allocation policy; 4) at the 
district level, teachers are not considered to be a resource;  
 The need to augment resources drives school funding decisions; and,  
 There is little focus on discrepancies in inputs among schools.  
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 The first two findings address the lack of knowledge and understanding around 
district resource allocation and subsequent findings address the district’s focus 
on resource allocation.  
 Lack of transparency. Resource allocation among schools appears to be a 
black box to many administrators in the ASD. Among the building principals, there is a 
lack of transparency as to how much each school has – and what influenced these 
numbers. This lack of knowledge is shared by central office staff, including the Chief 
Financial Officer and the Director of Human Resources.
108
 A common sentiment was 
expressed by a senior central office administrator: 
“I’d just like more transparency with - I don’t mean the general fund. I get that, 
it's very transparent. I’m talking about Title, SIG, School Improvement. We've 
got too many people controlling budgets right now. And I don’t, I’m not saying 
that I should even know. I’m saying that, I just, I don’t get it. And if I don’t get 
it, who does? I don’t mean that, I’m just saying in my position I don’t get it, 
then who really is understanding this?” 
 
Lack of transparency seems to exist for multiple reasons. First, people seem to 
accept the status quo and do not question how business is conducted. During my tenure 
at the ASD, I saw that new employees were discouraged from changing protocols to 
increase transparency. Second, district policies are often vague or non-existent – and 
decisions are made on an ad hoc basis. For example, no one in the district, including the 
Chief Financial Officer, seemed to know how large categories of support staff (e.g., 
secretaries, nurses, or paraprofessionals) are allocated to schools. Finally, neither 
human resource data, nor financial data, is readily available. Obtaining an accurate 
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 Most likely, this is true of teachers and students as well. 
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count of all employees, and their locations, was extremely difficult for the 2009-2010 
school year.
109
 Also, information on overall spending at the school level is neither 
collected nor reviewed by the school district on a regular basis and, for the most part, 
expenditures are consolidated and only available for review at the district level. The 
budget is extremely convoluted, making it difficult to understand where money is being 
spent. A number of district personnel echoed this assessment.
110
  
A result of the “black box” of resource allocation is that stakeholders are 
unaware of inequities. For example, the School Board President assumes that schools 
get equivalent resources, and that budgetary differences arise only because principals 
choose to allocate these resources in different ways. He provided an illustration: 
“At one point, the funds for high school graduation had to be taken out of the 
high school budgets, and Allen High School [had] always spent more money. 
They were the first to … introduce videos and …other things. And people 
noticed the inequality. But it wasn't really inequality. It was how the principals, 
how innovative they are, how they chose to spend that money. Well now, 
graduation has converted to a central office expense. So, and I’m sure … that 
the services are all pretty much the same.”  
 
This assumption of equitable resource allocation is likely shared by other 
School Board members, as district administrators, including the CFO, could provide no 
examples of School Board members lobbying for specific schools. And, when 
intradistrict equity issues arise in the community, they are most often about the two 
high schools, and how they compare – as demonstrated above. 
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 My own efforts at trying to determine the buildings in which teachers and support staff are working 
bear this out. Staff reductions, primarily due to changes in state policy, required an intensive review and 
reconciliation of payroll and human resource documents. There is a movement in the district to change 
this, beginning with greater position control. 
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 This was born out by my struggles in creating holistic budgets for each elementary and middle school. 
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 Poor communication between central office and schools. The lack of 
information among stakeholders in the district is reinforced by poor communications 
among the various players in the district. There are few systems in place to disclose 
information, so details are often shared informally. As a result, central office decisions 
are not always translated accurately to the schools. Additionally, there are limited 
means by which principals can provide feedback and influence budgetary decisions. 
My interviews provide considerable evidence of poor communications between the 
central office and schools, as similar questions elicited very different responses 
particularly about the role of district administrators in grant development and the 
principals’ discretionary budget.  
One reason that principals do not understand resource allocation is that they 
have not been involved in the decision-making process to any meaningful extent. 
Principals perceive that there is little consultation between themselves and the different 
program areas.
111
 One principal said, “People in central office make these decisions and 
you wonder, how did you make that decision? You know … they just kind of live in 
their own little rose-colored world. A lot of them…were never principals. So they don’t 
really understand a building.” Another principal provided this example:  
“Title I spent money on these laptop cards. [They] never talked to us. Maybe 
three years ago. They arrived and I'm like ‘OK. What do I do with these? Where 
do I put them?’ We figured that out, where to put them. The laptops are 
outdated. Most of them don't hold a charge.  Tons of money was spent on that. I 
don't think it should have been. I wanted computers for the one room that didn't 
have any. We could have used laptops in there. But no one talked to us. Smart 
boards arrived; gigantic smart boards. We don’t have a library. Ours is sitting 
down in the custodian's office; nowhere to put it.” 
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 Principals also questioned the extent to which central office staff communicated with each other. 
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The former Director of Elementary Education agreed with the principals, 
explaining that her position did not entail advocating on behalf of the principals or 
getting involved in the development and allocation of various grants. She explained that 
program area budgets are driven by program areas, such as curriculum. Principals are 
involved only to the extent that they have participated in conversations over the year, 
and so their concerns may or may not have been heard. 
Central office administrators acknowledged the principals’ concerns but 
expressed somewhat different views. The Executive Director explained that some 
grants, such as the technology grants, did not “get communicated as well as they should 
have.” But she also suggested that the blame should be shared. “So some of that is us 
and some of it is … principals are involved and busy [with]… the day to day 
management. So they might say, ‘Ah, go ahead, that's sounds good.’ … and then all of 
a sudden, OK, well here come your … smart boards.” This problem was highlighted by 
the principals interviewed.  
Although they account for only a small portion of school budgets, principals 
brought up their discretionary funds to illustrate the central office’s control. The 
process for allocating these funds among school programs begins with the preparation 
of school budgets based on the allotted dollars presented to each school. Then there is 
some back and forth with requests from central office to make changes or justify plans. 
While everyone agreed on the first steps, principals have a different understanding than 
central office administrators as to what happens after budget requests are submitted. 
One principal interviewed did not appreciate the level of scrutiny proffered by the CFO.  
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“It does bother me that I have to ask a financial officer permission to transfer 
money from one code to another in order to purchase more trade books. … That 
does bother me. I think I should just be able to do it. He doesn't know anything 
about education. But you have to ask him permission. It wasn't always like that. 
You just filled out a transfer form and send it down.” 
 
There is consensus among the principals interviewed that central office 
maintains control over line items. As stated by one principal: “The bottom line is that 
the downtown people decide what that budget item will be. It could be near what we 
put in. It could be a lot less. It could be more.” 
This view was not corroborated by central office administrators, who explained 
that once building budget dollars are allocated to schools, principals have discretion 
with regard to determining how dollars are spent within the school. Only one 
administrator mentioned an exception to the policy of principal discretion over school 
budgets: 
“The only time in the last couple of years that I got involved with the school 
budgets was when we knew were getting cut back in our basic education 
funding. And we took a look at some of the school budgets to see if there was 
any way that a grant might be able out with some of the areas of the school 
budgets. A perfect example is one year, when we had PA-Pact
112
 money, we 
could use that for some textbooks. So [we did that] instead of using the school 
budget money,” 
 
The CFO is often caught between principals and the central office during the 
budgeting process. When asked about the role of the business office in oversight of 
school budgets, the CFO explained that he went through the school budgets and looked 
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 PA-Pact funds were allocated from the State to districts as the result of a change in the State funding 
formula. Under funded districts were the recipients of new funds tied to their students’ needs. It was 
required that 80% of all new funds be used on “new” initiatives developed to improve student outcomes.  
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though everything. He also went to other central district administrators to ask for their 
recommendations, asking, “Is this a worthy expenditure?” He did acknowledge that he 
can be critical, but that he is not in the buildings enough to know what the best 
allocations are. The CFO pointed out that the review was not detailed. “You know, so 
there was still a lot of things in play that we're working on, so we didn’t get caught up 
in the minutia of the 2 million dollars that were spread out.” Furthermore, the CFO 
shared his opinion that principals should control how the dollars in their schools are 
spent. “I think the schools need some ability to say, hey, I’m going to spend it this way.  
…. Give them some latitude with how they’re going to run their building. So it's just 
not, we had bigger fish to fry.”  
As noted earlier, there is concern among some central office administrators that 
the principals are not up to the task of budgeting. One interviewee made the allegation 
that, prior to the implementation of the zero-based budget process, “secretaries … 
would do those budgets.” Principals disagreed with this characterization. One principal 
described the following process: “They gave us a number and then we can divide that 
up among different budget codes as we believe it will fit for our school. Like I can 
decide how much I'm putting in textbooks, how much I'm putting in technology, how 
much I'm putting into art.”  
The allocation of PA-Pact funds provides another vivid example of the 
dysfunction in the relationship between school level administrators and central office 
administrators. None of the principals interviewed were involved in decisions regarding 
the allocation of these funds. They were also unaware of the link between benefits 
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and/or resources directed to their schools and the new PA-Pact dollars; one principal 
said that she thought the dollars might be tied to district-wide initiatives, like literacy 
and math coaches. Contrary to these reports, the CFO said that it had been necessary to 
involve the principals because of the strict requirements tied to the new funds. “A year 
ago we went through and met with every principal over their budget. So principals … 
had a voice.” The conclusions that can be drawn from the interviews with both district 
administration, principals, and program leaders is that the former Superintendent and 
the Executive Director of Grants had the most authority in determining how PA-PACT 
funds were spent, but that there seemed to be no systematic process to involve people in 
decisions regarding their use. One district administrators said, “It depended on the day.”    
 No district agenda to guide resource allocation policies beyond horizontal 
equity. The default for resource allocation in the ASD is horizontal equity as staffing 
ratios drive funds and staff to schools. However, beyond this, the district does not have 
a clear focus to guide resource allocation. Additionally, human capital (e.g., teacher 
efficacy) is not allocated among schools with any sense of a need to provide all schools 
with either equivalent resources or resources tied to the needs of the school. Without a 
district agenda to guide their thinking and action, there is a sense of haphazardness 
among administrators when discussing financial and human resources planning. 
Beyond staffing ratios to address class size, and requirements built into Title I grants, 
there are no district-wide policies designed to address resource allocation. Also, while 
many decisions are made with the general intention of serving all students, evaluation 
of expenditure data for confirmation is rare. As discussed, many of the dollars that are 
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spent in specific schools are not tracked to these schools, making it difficult to have a 
true sense of school operating funds. Furthermore, new grants that come to the district 
are piled on top of existing budgets. These grants may be disbursed to address specific 
needs and/or to address deficits. When funding dries up, the district often continues to 
fund the program. There is also a lack of data on human capital resources at each 
school. Information on teachers, administrators, and support staff are not readily 
available for review, making it difficult to address the deficiencies in teacher quality 
among schools.  
 A central office administrator described the district as being myopic at times, 
driven by the immediate crisis. “[We] throw money at it, do this. Get this teacher over 
there, get this extra person.” The result is “[mission] creep.” With no clear district-wide 
mission to address resource allocation, some principals are able to fill the void by 
successfully advocating for their schools – and some are better at it than others.  
“And some of it is about principals and how good a politician they are, and 
campaigners they are, for things. Because that's the way I saw my role as a 
principal… It's my job to get resources [for my school] just like it is the 
superintendent's job to get resources in this district. You get everything you can 
get coming this way. I mean, you just do as long as it's not … unethical or 
immoral or illegal. You do everything you can do to make a favorable situation 
for your distinct or your building.” 
 
Examples of how district policies (or, at times, lack of district policies) impact 
school-level resource allocation include: how principals spend their discretionary funds; 
how special education funds are allocated to schools; how professional development is 
allocated to schools; and, how teachers are hired in the district.   
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 Principal budgets. There is no district requirement that schools spend their 
budget equivalently in any area, such as books, on the theory that the principal is in the 
best position to know what is needed in the school. Because of this, the manner in 
which principals allocate their school budget dollars, and what priorities drive these 
allocations, vary. One principal mentioned that he tried to put as much money into 
student materials and professional development as possible. Another principal 
explained how she worked with her staff to come up with a budget: 
“First and foremost, I look at what does my data tell me about the needs of my 
children? What is the district asking me to do curricula-wise? What are the 
needs of my staff to implement that curriculum? So I have this and then it 
becomes a meeting with teachers and saying, ‘OK. Look at your needs as a 
teacher in order for you to run a highly effective classroom.’ And then I go to 
my specialized areas and say the same things, ‘what are your needs?’ And then I 
go into the classroom area, then I go to … my literacy coach, … and that's how 
we develop it. Making sure that everybody understands that this is driven by 
kids' needs and the mission of where we want this building to go.” 
 
Some of the principals expressed a sense of inequity with regard to how school budget 
dollars could be spent. A female principal provided an example of one way in which 
principal autonomy seemed to vary by school. She explained:  
“It might be a little different when you meet with some of the guys. You know, 
they have like flat screens in their office and it's quite interesting. ... Yeah. I 
don't know that I could get that. Well, first of all, maintenance wouldn’t even 
come hang it for me. ... It's a very macho world out there; very male oriented; 
gender-biased. Definitely.” 
 
 Special education. Another area of the budget not guided by a strong district 
vision is the provision of special education services. Part of the confusion is due to the 
structure of the special education program, whereby principals are responsible for 
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some, but not all, services. One principal reported that the central office determined 
what special education would look like in his/her building. He explained, however, that 
if a teacher needed something, “I certainly find the place in the budget to take it out of.” 
According to the Director of Special Education, special education is an area for which 
principals seem to go to central office to lobby for more resources. Special education 
services are funded by a mix of school and special education area budgets; 
approximately three-quarters or more of the special education staff is paid for out for 
the general fund. In addition to lobbying for special education grant dollars, principals 
can use their school budgets to purchase materials for their special education students 
without the oversight of the district’s special education director.113 “Sometimes they are 
not the best of programs, but some salesman came by and gave them a sample. And 
they don’t know enough about that field ….” The Director of Special Education also 
pointed out that principals can allocate dollars in their school budgets to special 
education; but they also have the authority to move these dollars out of special 
education to other areas. The Special Education Director explained that district 
personnel, including building principals, are often unsupportive of special education 
students regardless of legal requirements. She provided an example: no one from the 
Special Education office had been included in building renovation discussions even 
though the special needs students would be heavily impacted and those making 
decisions were ill-informed regarding the special education students’ needs. 
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 A few years ago there was discussion of setting up a centralized system were all special education 
budget requests would have to get approval from the Special Education Director. Although favored by 
the Special Education Director, it never went into operation.  
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 Professional Development. Professional development is another area that is 
difficult to track to schools, or personnel within schools, because some of the funding 
comes from “school budgets” and some comes from central office. The central office 
generally funds a larger portion of all professional development offered. The magnitude 
of professional development provided by the central office has varied from year to year. 
One principal explained: “Central office has discretion regarding certain professional 
development. For example, they choose a program, like an Ohio State system on guided 
reading, and then they debit the (school) account.” Schools also have some control over 
professional development to the extent they use their discretionary funds. As with 
special education, principals are able to choose professional development programs. 
This adds to the variability among schools. There is no sense among principals or 
central office administrators of how professional development is tied to the district’s 
larger mission, and therefore, principals are left to their own devices.   
 Teacher hiring. The teacher assignment process provides an excellent example 
of district level policies working against equitable resource allocation. In the 2009-2010 
school year, the principal was responsible for identifying potential candidates, 
conducting all interviews, and checking references. Human Resources Department 
(HR) would send principals a long list of candidates from which to choose. 
Alternatively, teacher candidates could send resumes directly to the principal of the 
school in which they wanted to work, or the principal could choose from candidates 
attending a job fair. Although these practices seemed to represent general practice, 
there were times over the years when teachers were transferred between schools. One 
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principal explained that over the course of his career, “sometimes HR just put people in 
there. Also, if there was only one candidate for a position [during the school year], you 
had to take that person.” Another principal felt that the unions had a great deal of 
control over the process because they could work with the central office to insist upon 
seniority privileges. Conversely, another principal interviewed said that principals had a 
great deal of discretion. They could interview as many or as few people for a position 
as they liked. Then they made a decision and the school board, and central office, 
rubber stamped it.
114, 115
 
 Teachers are not considered a resource. While schools may recognize 
teachers as individuals with different abilities in the classroom, the district approaches 
them in a different way. Hiring practices, professional development, and teacher 
evaluation requirements treat teachers as interchangeable rather than as resources which 
can differentially impact student outcomes. Additionally, as with school level budgets, 
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 At no time were principals involved in discussing salaries with teachers. Salary negotiation has always 
been conducted with the HR department. Furthermore, principals never consider the financial impacts of 
a new hire when determining to whom an offer should be made. One principal explained, “I want the best 
person for the job and if they won't take it [due to financial considerations], then I’ll find somebody 
else.” Central office administrators echoed this point made by principals, that hires were based on “best 
fit” rather than financial impact. One central office administrator dismissed this approach. He said, “I 
don’t think you could find a strategy that if we can get rid more quickly of our older teachers and get 
younger ones that save us a bunch of money. I will say that when I was negotiating with the teachers this 
year because of the economic condition, we did build in retirement incentives with that in mind. When 
you see retirement incentives built in, that's usually the motivation. But from an instructional point of 
view, from a missional point of view, from an effectiveness point of view, [this is the wrong tack to 
take.]” 
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 The teacher assignment process changed in the 2010-2011 school year, moving to a centralized 
system designed to ensure that well-qualified candidates are hired at all schools. The current system 
includes an initial centralized screening process conducted by the Department of Human Resources. The 
Deputy Superintendent explained that candidates are awarded points “for various criteria that research 
demonstrates can make you a strong teacher.” This new screening process includes a writing test and an 
interview conducted by a team of administrators. The Department ranks candidates for each position and 
provides principals with a short list of candidates (usually three) from which to choose. Principals can 
then conduct interviews with these eligible candidates.  
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little information is available on teachers and their effectiveness, making it difficult to 
study and address the variability in teacher characteristics among schools.  
As discussed earlier in this chapter, teacher hiring practices in the 2009-2010 
school year are not consistent with a district mission to ensure the equitable distribution 
of teachers. The fact that principals had a great deal of discretion in hiring allows for 
large differences in teaching quality among school faculties.
116
 It is important to note 
that district policies are not solely responsible for the allocation of teachers among 
schools or students among schools. Teachers often choose to work in environments in 
which they feel they might be most successful, however they personally define that 
success. The district has no policies in place, such as incentives for working in hard-to-
staff schools, to address teacher choice.   
Professional development is another area in which the district could exert some 
influence in ensuring the equitable distribution of teachers. However, there is no effort 
on behalf of the district to provide professional development to teachers to address 
inequities in teacher effectiveness. Most often it is at the teachers’ discretion as to 
whether or not to participate and any particular professional development program. To 
the extent it exists, mandatory, district-wide, professional development is usually 
unrelated to improving classroom practice.  
With regard to staffing, the CFO acknowledged that there were significant 
differences in human resources costs among the schools, primarily as a result of high 
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 A move to a more centralized hiring system, with specific requirement for all candidates, helps to 
level the playing field. New hiring practices in the 2010-2011 school year does begin to support a more 
equitable distribution of teachers. 
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turnover in certain schools leading to a younger, lower paid staff. He explained, 
“You're hiring all those new teachers at 45,000 dollars. Some schools, they've just been 
there every year, clicking, making their way up to the 70,000 dollars.” Interestingly, 
district administrators do not consider staffing costs to be strictly related to teacher 
quality. In fact, the allocation of teacher quality was not considered to be an issue of 
concern in the district, the assumption being that all hires were of an appropriate level 
of quality. The possibility that some teachers are more effective than others was not 
addressed.  
 The need to augment resources drives school funding decisions. The ASD is 
severely underfunded and the need to augment resources drives many school funding 
decisions. School budgets are composed of a patchwork of funding streams, generally 
tied to state and federal programs, and each designed to accomplish a certain goal. The 
goals for the various programs which may overlap, but are often not totally aligned. 
The range of (often extensive) requirements attached to the use of various funds is a 
manifestation of this misalignment. These requirements are in place to ensure that 
policy objectives are attained. However, as the district and the schools within the 
district may have different aims, the requirements of funding streams often seem 
arbitrary to school administrators.  
  The best example of this is Title I, a major revenue stream to schools. This 
funding source carries strict mandates that hamper the efforts of the school principals to 
meet their particular goals. This is not surprising, as Title I requires specific set asides 
for spending (i.e., staff development, parental involvement, and academic 
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improvement), which often frustrate principals as they may see a greater need in a 
certain area (e.g., professional development rather than parental engagement) or they 
wish to spend dollars to support children on staff. One principal remarked: 
“So, I must spend 3,100 dollars on parent involvement, even if I don’t need it. 
And the same with PD; then, academic improvement. I can add to …[parental 
involvement and professional development], but I can't take away from those 
two. So that's a lot of money for staff development unless you're hiring an 
expensive consultant, which we don't do here. You know, we have a lot of 
expertise right here.” 
 
Another principal said, “I would give up all these books that are here for a good 
teacher who can take or find the resources and work miracles with them. OK? And 
sometimes that’s the problem with funding because they're categorical and you can't 
necessarily use them for human resources.”  
A third principal, at first frustrated with the requirement to spend a certain amount 
of dollars on professional development, used her Title I dollars to provide staff 
development in the summer when it did not interfere with teachers’ classroom 
responsibilities. While this principal was strategic in her use of Title I dollars, her 
solution is unique as each individual school comes up with a different plan on how to 
spend their Title I professional development money. The capacity of school principals 
to use Title I funds most effectively to improve student outcomes seems to vary. In fact, 
when discussing the impact of Title I across the district, one District Administrator said, 
“I do think too much independence breeds inconsistency [in] what's being done.” 
Another example of financial resources driving district decision making is the 
design of a plan to spend new state funds. In the 2009-2010 school year, new state 
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revenues were to be disbursed among schools. These additional funds, a result of the 
new state funding formula, were intended to supplement existing resources to “improve 
outcomes for students.” The district was given authority to devise an acceptable plan 
for spending the money, guided by specific criteria. The Executive Director of Grants 
& External Funding explained that the use of PA-Pact funds “was determined by a 
committee. … Our superintendent pulled a whole bunch of us in and we studied the 
rules. We did what we were allowed to do very carefully. … funds were supposed to be 
directed to new initiatives.” According the district’s Chief Financial Officer, it was 
ultimately decided that the money be used “to make the district whole.” The new 
dollars served to “even things out – to make up for the grants that were just going to 
some buildings.” Another district administrator was frustrated with the focus of the new 
funds on the secondary schools. Since the elementary schools had received new 
resources over the past few years, both were likely speaking of the same issue. Despite 
the result, the process was guided by the objective of spending the money in 
compliance with the grant’s requirements. 
Patchwork funding makes for a messy budget, as the budget office and the external 
grants and development office must evaluate the district’s revenues and determine how 
to fit the pieces together so that schools have the necessary resources. This requires a 
great deal of maneuvering to integrate outside grants into the larger budget. Sometimes, 
for example, grants cover teachers’ base rate and the district picks up the differential. In 
other instances, federal and state grants are used in any number of ways to fill holes 
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when possible; for example, the district figured out how to use State EAP money to pay 
for extended day kindergarten and tutoring.  
The physical and demographic realities of the district also drive decisions regarding 
the allocation of grant funds. For example, extended day kindergarten programs were 
placed in buildings with the capacity to hold the additional classrooms, and ESL 
programs are situated in schools with larger non-English speaking student populations. 
The Deputy Superintendent explained that the requirements of the grant dictate how the 
dollars are allocated. "Some of that is not because people are hoarding or trying to 
control as much ‘cause they understood the guidelines and limitations of the money, 
what the intent is…. And it is the grant people who understand the parameters of the 
grants.” The final result presents a complicated picture that leaves little room for the 
principals’ agendas.  
A senior central office administrator had an additional insight: the Superintendent 
can drive the agenda for seeking funds and allocating them among schools and 
programs. In Allentown, this influence superseded a pre-determined structured process 
that included district personnel or a decision-making process based on evidence – from 
inside and outside the district. 
 There is little focus on discrepancies in inputs among schools. Allentown is 
similar to many school districts in that its goals clearly address overall student 
outcomes (adequacy), but do not speak to how resources can be used to impact these 
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outcomes.
117
 This focus on student outcomes is felt throughout the district, while there 
is no focus on equitable resource allocation.     
The early findings of my resource assessment conducted of 2009-2010 expenditures 
revealed discrepancies among schools in both overall budgets and staffing. Central 
office administrators were neither alarmed nor surprised by these findings; in fact, they 
seemed to expect them.
118
 They were also quick to explain that the reason for the 
inequities was the “system” rather than individual players. The Deputy Superintendent 
elaborated this point:  
“I think there's an intent to be as fair as possible. But I think there are so many, 
such a variety of sources of funding and conditions: some schools having the 
benefit of receiving [certain] grants, other schools having the benefit of 
[receiving] other grants. Different size[d] grants compounds that and makes it 
so that it's close to impossible. …. Theoretically you should do it in some 
equitable fashion. But … even then you say, ‘you know what? We could give 
this school over here with no grant a dollar more because this one has a grant. 
And they'd still be fat and happy and this would be a little better off.’ So it's 
very complicated.” 
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 ASD Board Goals are available on the school district’s website, at www.allentownsd.org. 
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 Administrators were able to identify a number of programs and services that were unequally 
distributed across the schools. For the most part, administrators were able to provide explanations for the 
disparities. The CFO suggested that technology was unevenly distributed because the district was 
“putting on band-aids here and there.” Another central office administrator explained that specific 
programs, such as Safe Schools, Healthy Students, have a greater presence in some schools than others 
because the district was trying to address specific needs of the students. Administrators also spoke about 
staff professional development and as a resource that is not distributed by formula (e.g., number of 
teachers) or student need. Rather, most professional development is offered to teachers and only those 
who choose to participate receive the benefit. The Director of ESOL spoke about how she offered 
training to all teachers in best practices for dealing with English language learners, but many did not 
participate. 
 Further questioning let to the acknowledgement of additional resources that are not allocated to 
schools based on any system of equity. A number of titled positions, including paraprofessionals, 
secretaries, custodians, and security guards, fell within this category. An administrator said that while the 
numbers of teachers were equitably distributed among schools, the experience level of teachers is not 
exactly fairly distributed. She remarked, “I think that [at] some of our poorer performing schools … 
there's constant teacher turnover.” 
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The principals had mixed reactions to questions about the distribution of resources in 
the district. Two principals had no idea how resources were allocated among schools – 
and claimed to be unaware of what resources other schools got. One admitted, “I never 
really thought about it, to be honest with you.” Another principal was quick to point out 
the uneven distribution of resources, especially support staff. She gave the following 
examples:  
“This is a school of … 575 kids and I was told I would have one and a half 
special education teachers. Leigh Parkway has about 250 kids and they're 
getting one full-time. We're over twice as big. And I'm only getting 50% more? 
It makes no sense to me. Title I Reading, we only ever had one. Some of the 
schools had two and no one could ever, ever, ever give me an answer why…. 
Some schools have had two literacy coaches. We’ve only ever had one. Some 
around our size or a little bigger. But we’ve only ever had one.” 
 
This principal had the sense that she was penalized because her teachers were doing 
great work and her students were doing well. Another school principal was not 
bothered by the fact that schools got more resources based on their AYP status 
(meaning failing schools got more support); she felt this to be an appropriate allocation 
of resources. 
Yet another principal said that he had an advantage because his school has a strong 
Parent Teacher Association (PTA).  
“Personally I do not have an issue because I know how lucky I am at this 
school. I have a PTA with a very nice budget that helps us out because they 
don’t have Title I funds, so don’t have the grant money. I do have the benefit of 
the PTA and they help pay for programming  you know to bring you know, 
musical programs or art programs in that other schools might have had grant 
money to do.” 
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When pushed, all principals pointed to one elementary school as receiving a larger 
share of resources than the others. (Opinions on whether this was a fair allocation were 
mixed.) Other administrators in the district, however, felt that this elementary school 
was considerably under-funded, given the large number of high-need students attending 
this school relative to other elementary schools in the district. One administrator 
recalled this school’s principal screaming, “‘Wait a minute! I know I’m the poorest 
performing and I don’t have the same staffing that other schools do. So how is that 
right? And how can you hold me accountable when … [I don’t have the resources].’” 
When asked if they received adequate funds to run their schools, the principals 
interviewed offered a variety of views. One principal was satisfied with the resources 
allotted to his school. Also, he believed that he had the authority to use the resources as 
he saw fit to benefit his students.  
“I try to look at the big picture. And Allentown being an urban district with … 
poverty [at] 77%, whatever it is. I believe that funds are allocated fairly because 
the schools that need it the most should get it. What I get is adequate for our 
school. Would I like more? Yes, all right [INAUDIBLE] but basically 
everything is good. Because of the state budget and the Allentown and the 
federal budget[s], we are going to have less support, there's less, I won't have 
the Title I teachers like I had last year. And everybody is going to say the same 
thing to you. Those are the ones who can take the small groups, do the intensive 
instruction. We're not going to have those. That's going to impact scores.” 
 
Another principal reiterated her view that allocations among schools are fair.  
“I mean I really do. I just have to be honest that I don’t worry about what other 
buildings are getting or not getting. I just trust that everybody is getting what 
they need. I've always looked at the process as fair. I look at people as fair. I 
don’t look at the business office or the supervisors as being unfair or supporting 
one school over another. If they do, I don't feel it. I’m not aware of it. Maybe 
they do, I don't know. … I don’t have time to really worry about that, to be 
honest. But I've always looked at … [central office administrators], people in 
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charge of grants and money as being fair. I've never [had a] reason to think they 
weren't.” 
 
Other principals interviewed were less generous towards the central office and its 
support of the schools. One commented, “Don’t cut our resources because we've done 
well -- and you're going to put them somewhere else. Which is what they did. They cut 
our reading teachers. My reading teacher gave all my kids, who were barely on grade 
level or a little below, an additional guided reading lesson every day. Now I don't have 
her.”  
Only two central office administrators, the Director of Special Education and the 
Director of ESOL and World Languages, expressed strong distress over inequities in 
the district. Their focus, however, is on individual students and not schools. The 
Director of Special Education feels that resources allocated to serve special education 
students are not adequate to address their needs. Similarly, the Director of ESOL and 
World Languages expressed her disappointment that appropriate resources are not 
directed to ELL students. She was especially frustrated that district officials come to 
her for assistance in justifying the district’s need for grants based on the percentage of 
Latino students in the district, but then funnel this money into programs that do not 
support Latino students. She complained,  
“Often [the ELL students] got the leftover biology books or whatever was left 
that no one wanted instead of saying, ‘this is our demographic. We need to buy 
biology books which are helpful for ELLs. And then, if we need AP materials, 
buy those too - but the majority of our money should go to building the kids up 
who need a language boost rather than just throwing our resources where we 
feel like.”  
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In my interviews with principals, none expressed the feeling that the amount of 
their (building budget) allocation was unfair or inadequate relative to other schools. 
Interestingly, the CFO reported that principals do not ask for larger budgets, perhaps 
because “people just learn to live with what they get.” The principals corroborated this 
point; one principal was typical in saying, “I just get a number.” It also seems that 
principals do not discuss their budget allotments amongst themselves. The CFO thought 
that this was due to the culture of the school district. Another principal remarked, 
however, that she felt that sharing this information might put her at a disadvantage.  
 Community involvement. Another factor that greatly impacts the focus on 
equity is the lack of community input and control. The public discourse around funding 
schools in Allentown is barely evident. This is true for the greater Allentown 
community as well as for the parents of students in the district.  
The majority of Allentown residents, including parents, play a very small role in 
the governance of the school district. This leaves power in the hands of those less 
sympathetic to public education and to the needs of district students. In the election of 
school board members, for example, “you're lucky [if] you have enough people to fill 
the slots.” An interviewee described the electorate as “older, often without children, and 
concerned about taxes and [maybe] whether there are enough books [in the schools] if 
they're concerned about anything.” He went on to say that “the level or scrutiny for 
school board candidates is rather low.” One administrator pointed out that, “If you look 
at the composition of the school board versus the demographic in this school, it's very 
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interesting. …. I would hesitate to say that …if our board represented our community, 
the system would run differently. ….”  
Many of the families with children in the Allentown School District do not play an 
active role in school governance. One central office administrator said,  
“[All parents], and …  I think the ELL parents particularly, are very accepting 
and they don't question- which is a problem. …   If some of the things happened 
to my child that happened to these kids, I mean just financially, I mean let's not 
even go into individual differences, I’d be at board members screaming. But 
they feel that they don't speak the language and to get up in a public forum…, 
they just don't complain. And they don't vote.”119  
Only one area program director mentioned soliciting community input for decisions 
regarding district resources. The ESOL Director said, “We always meet with our parent 
group…. we discuss what we're doing with them. And if they have any suggestions, of 
course we take it in.” Since there is generally a very limited amount of discretionary 
money, the true impact of such suggestions is similarly limited.  
 Summary of qualitative findings. The findings presented above present a 
picture of how resource allocation decisions are made in Allentown. This picture is, 
overall, complicated and somewhat haphazard. Firstly, resource allocation can be 
likened to a black box, in that the district lacks standard practices to disseminate and 
explain information regarding resource allocation, resulting in a lack of transparency in 
the budgeting process and leaving stakeholders with no ability to react to funding 
decisions. There is also an unproductive relationship between the central office and 
                                                 
119
 This was the first year (2010-2011) that the community got involved with school budgeting. 
Committees were set up to provide input as to what programs should be cut or reduced to deal with the 
large budget shortfall. This was designed to address community unrest related to impending cuts. [It was 
a political move that did not protect the Superintendent.] 
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school-level administrators, which thwarts cooperative practices that build on the 
strengths and knowledge of all participants in the budgeting process. The district seems 
to lack a clear equity goal to guide resource allocation beyond per pupil staffing ratios– 
though stakeholders, administration, program directors, and principals may have their 
own. Even with a clearly stated equity goal, numerous external and internal problems 
would prevent its realization. Also, the district does not consider teachers to be a 
resource that is differentially allocated to schools. Another important finding is that the 
district is driven by the need to raise revenue, and the availability of funds and 
restrictions on their use guide school funding decisions. Finally, very few stakeholders 
in the district pay attention to discrepancies among schools as there is a much greater 
focus on outcomes that inputs. This is reinforced by a lack of community involvement 
meaning that there is little political support to ensure that students are getting what they 
need to succeed. All this leads to real discrepancies among schools within the district. 
This chapter begins with an overview of the ASD, and describes resource 
allocation in terms of horizontal equity. Although horizontal equity appears to be the 
predominant framework for allocating resources in the district, there are numerous 
instances in which horizontal equity is not achieved among elementary and middle 
schools (i.e., leadership salaries, FTEs for administrators and paraprofessionals, teacher 
effectiveness, average years of teaching, novice teachers, school-wide value added). A 
review of student outcomes by school provides additional perspective, revealing that 
much of the variability in student outcomes is due to variability among students rather 
than attending a particular school.  
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Following this analysis, a review of interviews with district and building 
administrators brings to light a number of constraints which hamper district 
administrators. First and foremost, there is a severe lack of resources to distribute 
across the entire district. Beyond this large hurdle, district policy is not designed to 
address student needs when allocating resources. This has meant that funding decisions 
are often made based on a desire to augment the budget, putting grant compliance at the 
center of the district’s agenda for resource allocation. In addition, district policies 
related to human capital management are at odds with an equitable distribution of 
resources. Furthermore, lack of transparency and a weak relationship between building 
and central office administrators impede progress towards greater equity. Finally, few 
stakeholders inside or outside the district focus their attention on discrepancies among 
schools. All this plays a part in the inequity of the district’s resource allocation. 
The following chapter draws from a wealth of data on expenditures and human 
capital resources gathered from the district’s budget, human resources, accountability, 
student services, and grants offices. In it, I add to the description of resource allocation 
in Allentown presented above to consider intradistrict equity using both the vertical 
equity framework and the comprehensive equity framework presented in Chapter Two. 
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CHAPTER 6 – QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
Overview 
This chapter provides an analysis of equity within the ASD. This analysis builds 
on the equity frameworks set forth earlier in this dissertation, presenting evaluations of 
adequacy, vertical equity and, lastly, comprehensive equity, which incorporates 
concepts of adequacy and vertical equity. In order to further test measures of equity, I 
conduct a simulation of resource allocation to study the school-level implications of a 
change in resource allocation consistent with both vertical equity and comprehensive 
equity. Finally, the impact of the 2009-2010 ASD resource allocation is reviewed, with 
additional analysis provided to clarify the relationships among school resources, school 
need, school-level student outcomes.   
Equity Findings  
Comprehensive equity integrates both adequacy and vertical equity to ensure 
that all students obtain the skills and competencies required to participate in a 
democracy and be economically and socially self-sufficient and to ascertain that, 
beyond the minimum standards attained, all students are similarly situated to progress 
according to their competencies and desires. Though the focus of this dissertation is at 
the district level, this framework can be used as a tool for evaluating resource allocation 
at various levels – federal, state, district, and school. The following section considers 
equity among schools within the Allentown School District using the comprehensive 
equity framework.  
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The description of resource allocation in Allentown earlier in the previous 
chapter presents findings on horizontal equity in ASD. While horizontal equity appears 
to be the predominant framework for allocating resources in the district, there are 
numerous instances at the elementary and middle schools in which this goal is not 
achieved (i.e., leadership salaries, FTEs for administrators and paraprofessionals, 
teacher effectiveness, average years of teaching, novice teachers, school-wide value 
added). Comprehensive equity requires that resource distribution meet a higher 
standard than horizontal equity, which calls for having all schools receive equivalent 
resources based on census alone. My analysis looks at three distinct measures of equity: 
adequacy (and relative adequacy), vertical equity, and comprehensive equity - a 
combined measure that assumes that resources should be allocated to ensure that all 
students reach a minimum threshold of competency and to address student needs that 
are morally arbitrary (e.g., poverty and ELL status).  
 Adequacy. Adequacy is achieved when all students meet a predetermined 
threshold. For this analysis, I compare schools against use the definition of adequacy 
embraced by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. A limitation of this approach is that 
the data available provides proxies for “adequacy” that may not tell the whole story of a 
students’ achievements and ability to be successful economically, socially, and function 
as a successful citizen. In lieu of the perfect measure, I use what is readily quantifiable 
and collectable, including a number of outcome measures that are available from the 
school district and/or state. The first of these outcome measures is test score results on 
the state assessment. As this assessment has been designed to measure student 
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competency as predetermined by the state, it serves as a viable proxy for academic 
achievement, and is intended to be a rough stand-in for economic success. The design 
of No Child Left Behind legislation further supports my contention that the state 
assessment is an appropriate measure, as the state and districts use the assessment to 
support the identification of students who are not “proficient” – or “not meeting 
adequacy requirements.”  
Additional measures of adequacy include measures that are designed to fulfill 
other goals of public education, such as ensuring social success. Three pieces of data 
are readily available to provide measures of social success: in-school suspensions, out-
of-school suspensions and attendance. Although these data are insufficient to address 
the complete range of outcomes related to the goals of public education, they do 
provide a starting place. Additional data on student outcomes regarding social success 
and citizenship would be more difficult to gather, but could be collected through 
student surveys and other qualitative measures.     
 Academic Achievement. For the purposes of this study, the primary measure of 
adequacy is the proportion of students who meet a pre-determined standard, such as 
scoring “proficient or above” on an assessment. The following figures provide data on 
elementary and middle schools and the percentage of their students deemed adequate. 
Figures 24 and 25 identify students by poverty, ELL, and special education status.  
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Figure 23. Percentage Proficient and Above on PSSA (Math and Reading), by 
School, SY2010   
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Figure 24. Percentage Proficient and Above on PSSA (Math), by School and 
Subgroup, SY2010 
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Figure 25. Percentage Proficient and Above on PSSA (Reading), by School and 
Subgroup, SY2010 
 
Clearly, there is much variation among schools with regard to the academic success of 
their students. There is also variation among different subgroups of students within the 
school district. There could be many reasons for these inequities, some related to 
student characteristics (e.g., preparation, parental support) and some related to school 
inputs. Adequacy requires that the school address all the needs of the children to ensure 
that they attain proficiency. 
Another way to measure adequacy is to take into consideration “relative 
adequacy.” Relative adequacy is achieved if the adequacy deficit in each school 
(average distance from proficiency) is equivalent. Measures of relative adequacy 
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include range - the difference between the value of the smallest and the largest 
adequacy deficit - and the Coefficient of Variation (CV) - the standard deviation 
divided by the mean of all adequacy deficits. This measure would be a useful tool in 
evaluating and comparing multiple school districts. 
Table 20. Adequacy Deficit for ASD Academic Achievement, SY2010   
 Academic Achievement Adequacy Deficit – Math 
(2009-2010) 
 All 
students   
Spec. 
Educ.     ELL        
    Econ.  
Disadvantage   
Elementary Schools 
Range 38.70  65.00    66.70  56.00  
CV  0.30   0.26     0.26  0.40  
Middle Schools 
Range 11.50  31.40  25.90  23.30  
CV  0.11   0.18   0.16      0.23   
 
 
 Academic Achievement Adequacy Deficit – Reading 
(2009-2010) 
 
 
All 
students   
Spec. 
Educ.   ELL   
   Econ. 
Disadvantage  
Elementary Schools 
Range  32.80  28.60  33.30  29.50 
CV   0.21   0.10   0.11   0.18 
Middle Schools 
Range   7.90  15.20  39.70  19.10 
CV   0.07   0.08   0.24   0.17 
 
An analysis of how the adequacy deficit is distributed among schools reveals a 
large difference between the percentage of students reaching proficiency in the school 
closest to and furthest from meeting the adequacy target. Also, the gap between current 
proficiency levels and the adequacy target is differentially distributed among schools. 
Further, when looking at subgroups of students, achievement of Hispanic students and 
ELL students stand out as being most uneven across schools. Differential outcomes 
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may be driven by purposeful grouping of students (e.g., IEP). Further research could 
address this concern.  
The following figure provides another measure of adequacy which is calculated 
by the state. Adequate Yearly Progress (AYP) is a measure of the number of the 
students in each school who meet a predetermined benchmark which the state has 
deemed to represent an adequate level of academic proficiency. This figure may be 
misleading, however, as the larger elementary schools, due to their size, are more likely 
to be required to report on subgroups of students that are prone to struggle with the 
state assessment (e.g., ELL students). 
 
Figure 26. AYP Status, SY2010   
Note. Level 1 = Making AYP; Level 2 = Making Progress; Level 3 = Warning; Level 4 
= Corrective Action 
 
 Additional outcome measures considered for adequacy. Schools are expected 
to serve purposes beyond ensuring academic achievement, including preparing children 
for their adult lives as political, economic, and social beings. It is useful to consider 
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such purposes when determining adequacy, but this is difficult in most districts, as the 
available data is sparse. The only reliable outcomes data that the ASD collects is 
attendance and suspensions. The following table provides measures of dispersion to 
demonstrate the variation among schools, most notably with in-school and out-of-
school suspensions.  
Table 21. Adequacy Deficit for ASD Non-Academic Achievement, SY2010 
 Non-Academic Achievement Adequacy Deficit(2009-2010) 
 AYP status  
(1-4) 
In-school 
suspensions 
Out-of-School 
Suspensions 
% absences  
(ADA/ ADM) 
Elementary Schools 
Mean (SD) 1.71(1.14) 9.29(13.57) 35.86(41.46) 0.94(0.01) 
Range 3.00 45.00 150.00 0.03 
CV 0.66 1.46 1.16 0.01 
Middle Schools 
Mean (SD) 4.00(0.00) 1018.75(417.77) 479.50(359.07) 0.93(0.00) 
Range 0.00 1010.00 703.00 0.01 
CV 0.00 0.41 0.75 0.00 
 
Additional adequacy measures provide a means of evaluating student outcomes 
that go beyond academic achievement. The outcomes measures collected by the ASD 
that do not directly tie to academic achievement are suspensions and absences. Figures 
28 and 29 depict the how these outcomes measures vary by school. In the 2009-2010 
school year, Central Elementary School had a much higher percentage of suspensions 
than other elementary schools and Harrison-Morton Middle School had a much higher 
percentage of suspensions than other middle schools. Alone, this data does not explain 
what is happening in the school. For example, it is not possible to discern from this data 
if the children in the school are more prone to serious behavior problems or if the 
school’s discipline policy is more severe. It is also impossible to know the impact of 
suspending these students without looking at previous and future data. On the other 
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hand, the data does provide an initial indication of a potential problem that deserves 
investigation.  
 
Figure 27. In-School and Out-of-School Suspensions as a Percent of Enrollment 
Days (Elementary Schools), SY2010 
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Figure 28. In-School and Out-of-School Suspensions as a Percent of Enrollment 
Days (Middle Schools), SY2010 
 
School absences provide another means of evaluating schools. Students are 
much more likely to be successful, academically and socially, if they attend school 
regularly. There may be legitimate reasons for differences in absences among schools 
but, in instances where the variation is large, further investigation is warranted. 
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Figure 29. In-School and Out-of-School Suspensions as a Percent of Enrollment 
Days (Elementary Schools), SY2010 
 
 Vertical Equity. Allentown achieves vertical equity if resources are allocated to 
schools based on the differing needs of the students in the school. As described in 
Chapter 3, vertical equity is evaluated through the creation of an index of needs at each 
school. An index for each building was created to account for the number of students in 
poverty (as determined by Free and Reduced Price Lunch status), the number of ELL 
students, and the number of students with disabilities. I identify these particular needs – 
poverty, ELL status, and special education status –because they are considered by the 
Pennsylvania Department of Education in allocating funds to all districts within the 
state. In fact, this index is derived from the same weights that the state had used to 
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allocated public dollars.
120
 This needs index is correlated with various school resources 
to elucidate the relationship between a school’s need (as determined by the composition 
of the student body) and the quantity and/or quality of inputs into the child’s education. 
I consider the same resources when establishing the extent of horizontal equity 
in the Allentown School District as in the analysis of vertical equity. As stated above, 
these resources can be categorized into expenditures and human capital resources. 
Expenditures include total operating funds, operating funds intended to be directed to 
address the needs of students in poverty, and operating funds intended to be directed to 
address the needs of ELL students. Expenditures also include salaries, aggregate as well 
as for specific responsibilities (i.e., instruction, support and professional development, 
leadership, operations and maintenance, and pupil services). Human capital resources 
include various measures of, or proxies for, teaching quality. The indicators identified 
for this study include average salaries for core and non-core teachers, professional 
development, FTE’s (with measures of students per staff, students per teacher, students 
per administrator, and students per paraprofessional). Closely tied to the review of 
FTE’s at the school level is a review of average class size at each school. Additional 
measures of teaching quality include teacher effect (based on teacher-level value added 
scores), teacher self-efficacy (for classroom management, student engagement, and 
instructional strategies), average years of teaching experience, the percentage of 
teachers in a building with less than three years of experience, the percentage of 
                                                 
120
 These weights were put forth in the Costing-Out Study Report funded by the PA legislature and 
adopted by the Rendell administration.    
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teachers in a building with more than four years of experience, and the percentage of 
teachers with a masters or above. Finally, three school-wide measures of teaching 
quality are also considered: the schools growth index for math and reading and 
collective efficacy.   
 Vertical Equity Analysis. Two analyses were conducted to evaluate vertical 
equity: one among elementary schools (n=14) and one among middle schools (n=4). 
Due to the small sample size, there are fewer statistically significant results than might 
otherwise be expected; this effect is exaggerated in the analysis of middle schools. 
Statistically significant positive correlations would indicate that there is a measurable 
relationship between resources and school need, and as need increases, so do resources. 
Statistically significant negative correlations would indicate that there is a measurable 
relationship between resources and school need, but as need increases, resources 
decrease.    
Table 22. Needs Index for Elementary and Middle Schools in Allentown, SY2010  
School Needs Index 
Lehigh Parkway 1.35 
Ritter 1.40 
Muhlenberg 1.41 
Union Terrace 1.42 
Sheridan 1.42 
Roosevelt 1.45 
Jackson 1.46 
Washington 1.50 
McKinley 1.51 
Dodd 1.51 
Cleveland 1.51 
Mosser 1.53 
Central 1.54 
Jefferson 1.54 
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Table 23. Vertical Equity among Elementary Schools in ASD, SY2010   
 
Elementary Schools 
Resources Allocated among Schools 
Correlation 
Coefficients 
Horizontal 
Equity post 
Vertical 
Equity 
Financial Resources 
Operating Funds (PPE)    .24 94% 
Poverty Spending (PPE)   .15 98% 
ELL Spending (PPE)    .48** 77% 
Discretionary Bldg Funds (PPE)   -.41* 83% 
Title I Funds (PPE) – all schools   -.11*** 99% 
Title I Funds (PPE) – excluding 
Sheridan   .92*** 100% 
Teacher Support 
Professional Development (PPE)   .00 100% 
Human Capital Salaries 
Total Salary (PPE)   .29 91% 
Instruction Salaries (PPE)   .38*  86% 
Instruction Support/PD Salaries 
(PPE)   .01 100% 
Leadership Salaries (PPE)  -.22 95% 
Operations/Maintenance Salaries 
(PPE)  -.05 100% 
Pupil Services Salaries (PPE)   .22 95% 
Average Teacher Salaries 
Core Teachers  -.22 95% 
Non-Core Teachers   .30 91% 
Special Populations Teachers  -.30 91% 
All Teachers  -.22 95% 
Full Time Equivalents (FTEs) 
Students per staff   -.50** 75% 
Students per teacher   -.56*** 69% 
Students per administrator    .08 99% 
Students per paraprofessional   -.21 95% 
Average class size (w/o 100% SPED)   -.08 99% 
Individual Measures of Teacher Quality 
Low teacher effect (district gain)    .35 88% 
High teacher effect (district 
gain)   -.56***    69% 
Teacher Efficacy-Classroom Mgmt   -.50** 75% 
Teacher Efficacy-Student 
Engagement   -.23 95% 
Teacher Efficacy-Instructional   -.36 87% 
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Strategies 
Avg. years of teaching exp.   -.47** 78% 
% of teachers w/ less than 3 yrs 
exp.   -.10 99% 
% of personnel w/ Masters or above   -.22 95% 
School-wide Measures of Teacher Quality 
Growth Index (Math)   -.01 100% 
Growth Index (Reading)    .11 99% 
Collective Efficacy   -.56*** 68% 
Note. *** p<.05, **p<.10, *p<.20  
 
Table 24. Vertical Equity among Middle Schools in ASD, SY2010   
 
Middle Schools 
Resources Allocated among Schools 
Correlation 
Coefficients 
Horizontal 
Equity 
post 
Vertical 
Equity 
Financial Resources 
Operating Funds (PPE)   .39 85% 
Poverty Spending (PPE)  .54 71% 
ELL Spending (PPE)   .34 89% 
Discretionary Bldg Funds (PPE)   .87* 24% 
Title I Funds (PPE)  .57*** 68% 
Teacher Support 
Professional Development (PPE) -.74 45% 
Human Capital Salaries 
Total Salary (PPE)  .37 86% 
Instruction Salaries (PPE)  .57 68% 
Leadership Salaries (PPE) -.94** 12% 
Operations/Maintenance Salaries (PPE) -.91** 17% 
Pupil Services Salaries (PPE) -.24  94% 
Average Teacher Salaries 
Core Teachers -.04 100% 
Non-Core Teachers  .09 99% 
Special Populations Teachers -.67 55% 
All Teachers -.17 97% 
Full Time Equivalents (FTEs) 
Students per staff -.82* 33% 
Students per teacher -.57 68% 
Students per administrator -.86* 26% 
Students per paraprofessional -.15 98% 
Average class size (w/o 100% SPED) -.47 78% 
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Individual Measures of Teacher Quality 
Low teacher effect (district gain) -.20 96% 
High teacher effect (district gain) -.17     97% 
Teacher Efficacy-Classroom Mgmt -.56 69% 
Teacher Efficacy-Student Engagement -.89* 22% 
Teacher Efficacy-Instructional 
Strategies -.61 63% 
Avg. years of teaching exp. -.75 44% 
% of teachers w/ less than 3 yrs exp.  .90** 19% 
School-wide Measures of Teacher Quality 
Growth Index (Math)  .33 33% 
Growth Index (Reading)  .62 62% 
Collective Efficacy -.77 41% 
Note. ***p<.05, **p<.10, *p<.20    
 
Of the various financial resources allocated to schools, there are only two 
statistically significant findings: ELL spending is strongly, positively correlated with 
school need, r(12) = .48, p < .10; and the principal’s discretionary funds are negatively 
correlated with school need, r(12) = -.41, p < .20. Categories of salaries were reviewed 
to determine their relationship with school need and instructional salaries (making up 
the bulk of school funding) are found to be positively correlated with school need, r(12) 
= .38, p < .20. Interestingly, the number of students per staff, and the number of 
students per teacher are each strongly, negatively correlated with school need, r(12) = -
.50, p < .10 and r(12) = -.56, p < .05. As many students per staff or per teacher is not 
desired, a negative correlation is a good sign, indicating that high needs schools are 
more likely to have fewer students per staff and per teacher. This finding conflicts with 
the correlation coefficient for class size and school need, which reveals no statistically 
significant finding, and does not even indicate a clear direction. The fact that “teachers” 
are not all “classroom teachers” might explain this finding.   
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Teaching quality is also a resource distributed among schools considered in this 
analysis. The teaching quality of individual teachers and the teaching quality of the 
entire school are investigated, with noteworthy results. Individual measures of teaching 
quality include effectiveness, self-efficacy, experience, and credentials. High teacher 
effectiveness, as measured by value-added scores, and school need are strongly 
negatively correlated, r(12) = -.56,  p < .05. This indicates that the most impactful 
teachers are less likely to be in high needs schools. Additionally, teacher self-efficacy 
with regard to classroom management is strongly, negatively correlated with school 
need, r(12) = -.50, p < .10. This indicates that teachers more certain of their classroom 
management skills are less likely to be in high needs schools. Also, average years of 
teaching experience is strongly negatively correlated with school need, r(12) = -.47, p < 
.10. This indicates that schools in which teachers have more years of teaching 
experience are less likely to be high needs schools. A school-wide measure of teaching 
quality, collective efficacy is strongly negatively correlated with school need, r(12) = -
.56, p < .05. This indicates that greater collective efficacy is less likely to be seen in 
high needs schools.        
Analysis of the correlations between needs and resources in ASD middle 
schools is difficult due to the very small sample size; there are very few correlation 
coefficients which are statistically significant. Of all financial resources allocated to 
schools, the principal’s discretionary budget stands out as being very strongly, 
positively correlated with school need, r(12) = .87, p < .20. Leadership salaries and 
operations and maintenance salaries are negatively correlated with school need, r(12) = 
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-.94, p < .10 and r(12) = -.91, p < .10. This indicates that administrators and facility 
staff salaries are lower in schools with higher needs. The number of students per staff 
and the number of students per administrator are each strongly negatively correlated 
with school need, r(2) = -.82, p < .20, r(2) = -.86, p < .20. As explained above, a 
negative correlation is a good sign in this case, since it means that high needs schools 
are more likely to have fewer students per staff and per administrator. Two indicators of 
teaching quality show statistically significant correlations with school need: teacher 
self-efficacy with regard to student engagement and the percentage of new teachers 
(those with less than three years of experience). Teacher self-efficacy with regard to 
student engagement and school need are strongly negatively correlated, r(2) = -.89, p < 
.20¸ indicating that teachers more certain of their ability to foster student engagement 
are less likely to be in high needs schools. The percentage of new teachers in a school 
and school need are strongly positively correlated, r(2) =.90, p < .10,  indicating higher 
percentages of new teachers in high needs schools.   
Another means of evaluating vertical equity (and comprehensive equity) entails 
looking at horizontal equity statistics after taking into account school need. The 
construction of the needs index allows for each school to have a weighted student 
count. This, in turn, can be used to considering the allocation of operating funds among 
schools with differing requirements due to the composition of the student body. Table 
25 and Figure 30, which provide horizontal equity statistics and a graphical depiction of 
the allocation of operating funds, again reveal inequities among schools. 
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Table 25. Review of Horizontal Equity Statistics for Operating Funds per Weighted 
Student, SY2010   
  
Operating Funds per 
Vertical Equity  
Weighted Student Count 
Operating Funds per 
Comprehensive Equity 
Weighted Student Count 
Elementary Schools 
  
Mean $ 4,397 $ 11,372 
SD $ 3,298 $ 2,575 
Range $ 13,170 $ 7,626 
CV 0.36 0.23 
MI  0.61 0.86 
Middle Schools 
  
Mean $ 1,829 $ 8,531 
SD $ 475 $2,155 
Range $ 1,057 $ 4,787 
CV 0.26 0.25 
MI 0.76 0.94 
 
 
Figure 30. Operating Funds per Weighted Student Count, SY2009-2010 
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 Considering specific needs. I conducted additional analysis to unpack the needs 
index by considering the number of students in a building identified in a given category 
(i.e., poverty, ELL status, and special education status) and the corresponding financial 
resources allocated to each school to specifically address the needs of these students. 
Simple calculations provide expenditures per student in poverty, per ELL student, and 
per special education student. As seen in Table 26, horizontal equity statistics 
demonstrate that expenditures per student in poverty and expenditures per special 
education student are not allocated equivalently across schools. (For expenditures per 
student in poverty, this lack of equivalency is more pronounced in elementary school 
than middle school.) Also, expenditures per ELL student in elementary schools stand 
out as being highly variable among schools. 
Table 26. Review of Horizontal Equity Statistics for Expenditures per Student in 
Poverty, Expenditures per ELL Student, and Expenditures per Special Education 
Student, SY2010  
 
  
Expenditures 
per student in 
poverty 
Expenditures 
per ELL 
student 
Expenditures per   
special ed. 
student 
Elementary Schools 
  
Mean $ 1,126 $ 4,397 $ 11,372 
SD $ 276 $ 3,298 $ 2,575 
Range $ 986 $ 13,170 $ 7,626 
CV 0.25 0.36 0.23 
MI  0.89 0.61 0.86 
Middle Schools 
   
Mean $ 1,333 $ 1,829 $ 8,531 
SD $ 220 $ 475 $2,155 
Range $ 485 $ 1,057 $ 4,787 
CV 0.16 0.26 0.25 
MI 0.84 0.76 0.94 
Note. Lehigh Parkway is not included in the statistics under Expenditures per ELL student. Only 3.2% of 
students at this school are ELL status. This outlier skews the results. (The CV = .75 and the MI = .83 
with Lehigh Parkway included in the calculation.)  
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Figure 31 provides information on average poverty spending in each school for 
every student in poverty. Similarly, Figures 32 and 33 provide information on average 
special education spending in each school for every special education student and 
average ELL spending in each school for every ELL student.  
 
Figure 31. Expenditures per Student in Poverty, SY2010 
Note. High expenditures per student in poverty at Sheridan elementary school is due to 
its high Title I budget ($820 per student).  
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Figure 32. Expenditures per Special Education Student, SY2010 
   
 
Figure 33. Expenditures per English Language Learner Student, SY2010 
Note. Only 3.2% of students at Lehigh Parkway are designated as being ELL status. 
My final analysis looks at the relationship between expenditures per high needs 
student and the percentage of high needs students. This provides a means of evaluating 
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the extent to which higher need schools are more or less likely to receive supports to 
address their needs. Correlations between expenditures for students in poverty and the 
percentage of students in poverty were positive, but not significant (ES: r(12) = .21; 
MS: r(2) = .80). This was also the case for expenditures for special education students 
and the percentage of special education students (ES: r(12) = .38; MS: r(2) = .21). 
Lastly, while there was a non-significant, slightly negative correlation between 
expenditures for ELL students and the percentage of ELL students in middle school 
(r(2) = -.08), there was a significant positive correlation between expenditures for ELL 
students and the percentage of ELL students in elementary school, r(14) = .42, p < 
.20.
121
 Only in the case of ELL in elementary schools can an argument be made that 
schools with greater need due to the portion of ELL students served are more likely to 
receive funds tied to ELL. 
 School budgeted dollars versus centrally budgeted dollars. As discussed 
earlier, analyzing school budgets within districts can be extremely difficult as many 
expenditures are conducted centrally, even though they are intended to address the 
needs of specific schools. This means that there is no accounting for where a large 
portion of resources go. In their analysis of ASD expenditures, Cross & Joftus 
identified over $63 million (34% of the entire district budget and 37% of the funds 
directed to specific schools) that were not tied to specific schools in FY 2009-2010. 
With input from district administrators, I expanded Cross & Joftus’s analysis and was 
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 Lehigh Parkway elementary school was removed from this analysis due to its outlier status. 
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able to identify the schools in which an additional $34 million were spent.
122
 My 
analysis of horizontal equity and vertical equity includes all funds to schools, including 
both those budgeted specifically at the schools and those budgeted centrally.  
In conducting this analysis, I was concerned that centrally-budgeted dollars may 
be more or less equitably allocated to schools, and that this would be hidden by my 
aggregate analysis. To address this concern, I include in my analysis the correlation 
between total expenditures, school expenditures, and centrally-budgeted school 
expenditures and the school need index. For elementary schools, I find a non-
statistically significant positive correlation between school expenditures and the school 
needs index, r(12)=.25. The correlation coefficient is smaller for centrally-budgeted 
expenditures, r(12)=.16. This finding shows more variation among school-budgeted 
dollars per pupil than centrally-budgeted dollars per pupil in elementary schools. At the 
middle school level, the correlation coefficients, while not statistically significant, are 
stronger. A positive correlation is shown between school expenditures and the school 
needs index, r(2)=.53, and a negative correlation is shown between centrally-budgeted 
school expenditures and the school needs index, r(2)=-.38. There is a much larger 
discrepancy among school-budgeted dollars per pupil and centrally-budgeted dollars 
per pupil in middle school than elementary school. Overall, the impact of centrally-
budgeted dollars on vertical equity is mixed.  
Delving into this further requires an investigation of the relationship between 
specific student needs and centrally-budgeted expenditures to address these needs. 
                                                 
122
 This includes expenditures directed to the high schools and alternative schools which are not 
considered in my analysis. 
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Table 27 provides horizontal equity statistics to evaluate centrally-budgeted 
expenditures per student in poverty, centrally-budgeted expenditures per special 
education student, and centrally-budgeted expenditures per ELL student. In elementary 
schools, centrally-budgeted expenditures per student in poverty and centrally-budgeted 
expenditures per ELL student are indisputably not equivalently allocated to schools. 
This is less evident for centrally-budgeted expenditures per special education student. 
Middle schools reveal a different picture, with greater variation among schools for 
centrally-budgeted expenditures per student in poverty and centrally-budgeted 
expenditures per special education student. 
Table 27. Centrally-Budgeted Expenditures per Student in Poverty, per Special 
Education Student, and per ELL Student, SY2010   
  
Centrally-
budgeted 
expenditures 
per student in 
poverty 
Centrally-
budgeted 
expenditures 
per special ed. 
student 
Centrally-
budgeted 
expenditures 
per ELL student 
Elementary Schools 
  Mean $242 $5,456 $265 
Range $594 $3,643 $778 
CV 0.72 0.22 0.73 
MI  0.85 0.93 0.85 
SD $173 $1,211 $194 
Middle Schools 
Mean $306 $2,837 $103 
Range $291 $2,900 $60 
CV 0.40 0.44 0.26 
MI 0.81 0.70 0.76 
SD $123 $1,252 $27 
 
As with the review of poverty, special education, and ELL spending, Figures 
34-36 provide information on average spending in each school for every student in a 
given classification (i.e., poverty, special education, ELL), but look specifically at the 
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dollars that are allocated from the central budget. 
 
Figure 34. Centrally-Budgeted Expenditures per Student in Poverty, SY2010 
  
 
Figure 35. Centrally-Budgeted Expenditures per Special Education Student, 
SY2010 
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Figure 36. Centrally-Budgeted Expenditures per English Language Learner 
Student, SY2010 
 
Correlation coefficients provide another means of evaluating the relationship 
between dollars budgeted at the school and school need and dollars budgeted centrally 
and school need. As seen in the table below, for elementary schools there are 
statistically significant, positive relationships between the percentage of students in 
poverty, the percentage of special education students, and the percentage of ELL 
students and both school budgeted expenditures and centrally budgeted expenditures 
dedicated to address the needs of these students. However, the correlation between 
students in poverty and centrally-budgeted poverty spending is weak, r(12) = .05, 
p<.05. At the middle school level, while positive, the correlation between ELL students 
and both school budgeted and centrally budgeted ELL spending are not significant. 
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Furthermore, the correlation between special education students and centrally-budgeted 
special education spending is weak, r(2) = .03, p<.05.   
Table 28. Correlation Coefficients relating School-Budgeted and Centrally-Budgeted 
Expenditures to High Needs Students, SY2010   
 
School-
budgeted 
expenditures 
Centrally-
budgeted 
expenditures 
Elementary Schools 
 
 
Students in poverty  .73** .05** 
Special Education students .79** .76** 
ELL students .64** .60**   
Middle Schools 
 
 
Students in poverty  .73** .60** 
Special Education students .79* .03** 
ELL students .66 .66  
Note. ** p<.05, * p<.10  
 Comprehensive Equity. The final equity measure is comprehensive equity, 
which incorporates both adequacy and vertical equity as a means of understanding the 
implications of resource allocation for students according to which school in the district 
they attend. Specifically, comprehensive equity can be used to determine whether 
resources are distributed such that schools composed of students with greater needs 
(including both students that are not on track to meet standards AND students that 
“cost” more due to poverty, ELL status, or Special Education status) receive greater 
resources to address those needs.  
This measure is constructed in the same way as the vertical equity measure, 
through the use of correlation coefficients to identify relationships between school need 
(using a needs index) and resources allocated to the school. The innovation to the 
measure of vertical equity in the comprehensive model is the development of the needs 
index. The needs index for comprehensive equity includes a weight for prior 
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performance by accounting for the number of students who demonstrated inadequate 
performance in the recent past. Then, as with the vertical equity needs index, the 
comprehensive equity needs index takes into account the number of students in poverty 
(as determined by Free and Reduced Price Lunch status), the number of ELL students, 
and the number of students with disabilities within a school building. The difference 
between comprehensive equity and vertical equity is that comprehensive equity takes 
into account the fact that schools with greater numbers of struggling students will need 
greater resources. In essence, it seeks to address the goal of having all students achieve 
“adequacy” at the same time as compensating for students’ “disadvantages.” This 
construct provides a means of evaluating intradistrict equity as defined in the equity 
framework.  
Once again, the resources considered in the analysis of comprehensive equity 
are the same as those considered when establishing the extent of horizontal and vertical 
equity in the Allentown School District.  
 Comprehensive Equity Analysis. Two analyses were conducted to evaluate 
comprehensive equity: one among elementary schools (n=14) and one among middle 
schools (n=4). Again, the small sample size results in fewer statistically significant 
findings. 
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Table 29. Comprehensive Equity among Elementary Schools in ASD, SY2010  
 
Elementary Schools 
Resources Allocated among Schools 
Correlation 
Coefficients 
Horizontal 
Equity 
post 
Vertical 
Equity 
Financial Resources 
Operating Funds (PPE)   .17 97% 
Poverty Spending (PPE)  .15 98% 
ELL Spending (PPE)   .59*** 65% 
Discretionary Bldg Funds (PPE)  -.32 90% 
Title I Funds (PPE)- all schools -.08*** 99% 
Title I Funds (PPE) – excluding 
Sheridan  .88*** 100% 
Teacher Support 
Professional Development (PPE) -.16 97% 
Human Capital Salaries 
Total Salary (PPE)  .17 97% 
Instruction Salaries (PPE)  .23 95% 
Instruction Support/PD Salaries (PPE) -.16 97% 
Leadership Salaries (PPE) -.34 88% 
Operations/Maintenance Salaries (PPE)  .02 100% 
Pupil Services Salaries (PPE)  .37* 86% 
Average Teacher Salaries 
Core Teachers -.39* 85% 
Non-Core Teachers  .37* 86% 
Special Populations Teachers -.34 88% 
All Teachers -.37* 86% 
Full Time Equivalents (FTEs) 
Students per staff -.38* 86% 
Students per teacher -.51** 74% 
Students per administrator  .23 95% 
Students per paraprofessional -.05 100% 
Average class size (w/o 100% SPED) -.28 92% 
Individual Measures of Teacher Quality 
Low teacher effect (district gain)  .21 96% 
High teacher effect (district gain) -.42*    82% 
Teacher Efficacy-Classroom Mgmt -.65*** 58% 
Teacher Efficacy-Student Engagement -.41* 83% 
Teacher Efficacy-Instructional 
Strategies -.53** 72% 
Avg. years of teaching exp. -.60* 65% 
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% of teachers w/ less than 3 yrs exp. -.02 100% 
% of personnel w/ Masters or above -.47** 78% 
School-wide Measures of Teacher Quality 
Growth Index (Math)  .22 95% 
Growth Index (Reading)  .39 85% 
Collective Efficacy -.65*** 58% 
Note. *** p<.05, **p<.10, *p<.20  
 
Table 30. Comprehensive Equity among Middle Schools in ASD, SY2010 
 
Middle Schools 
Resources Allocated among Schools 
Correlation 
Coefficients 
Horizontal 
Equity post 
Vertical 
Equity 
Financial Resources 
Operating Funds (PPE)  .39 85% 
Poverty Spending (PPE) .55 70% 
ELL Spending (PPE)  .32 90% 
Discretionary Bldg Funds (PPE)  .87* 24% 
Title I Funds (PPE) .58* 67% 
Teacher Support 
Professional Development (PPE) -.74 45% 
Human Capital Salaries 
Total Salary (PPE)  .38 86% 
Instruction Salaries (PPE)  .57 68% 
Leadership Salaries (PPE) -.93** 13% 
Operations/Maintenance Salaries (PPE) -.92** 16% 
Pupil Services Salaries (PPE) -.24  95% 
Average Teacher Salaries 
Core Teachers -.03 100% 
Non-Core Teachers  .09 99% 
Special Populations Teachers -.66 56% 
All Teachers -.17 97% 
Full Time Equivalents (FTEs) 
Students per staff -.82* 33% 
Students per teacher -.56 68% 
Students per administrator -.86* 27% 
Students per paraprofessional -.14 98% 
Average class size (w/o 100% SPED) -.48 77% 
Individual Measures of Teacher Quality 
Low teacher effect (district gain) -.20 96% 
High teacher effect (district gain) -.18     97% 
236 
 
Teacher Efficacy-Classroom Mgmt -.56 69% 
Teacher Efficacy-Student Engagement -.89* 20% 
Teacher Efficacy-Instructional 
Strategies -.62 62% 
Avg. years of teaching exp. -.74 45% 
% of teachers w/ less than 3 yrs exp.  .90* 19% 
School-wide Measures of Teacher Quality 
Growth Index (Math)  .33 89% 
Growth Index (Reading)  .60 63% 
Collective Efficacy -.78 40% 
Note. ***p<.05, **p<.10, *p<.20    
Of the various financial resources allocated to elementary schools, there is only 
one statistically significant finding: ELL spending is strongly, positively correlated with 
school need, r(12) = .59, p < .05. Categories of salaries were reviewed to determine 
their relationship with school need and only pupil services salaries are found to be 
positively correlated with school need, r(12) = .37, p < .20. Unlike the relationship 
between the vertical equity needs index that does not take into account prior 
performance and average teacher salary, the comprehensive equity needs index is 
negatively correlated with average teacher salary, r(12)=-.37, p < .20. This indicates 
that average teacher salaries are lower in schools with greater needs. Interestingly, the 
number of students per staff, and the number of students per teacher are each strongly, 
negatively correlated with school need, r(12) = -.38, p < .20 and r(12) = -.51, p < .10. 
Since many students per staff or per teacher is not desired, a negative correlation is a 
good sign; high needs schools are more likely to have fewer students per staff and per 
teacher. As is the case with vertical equity, this finding conflicts with the correlation 
coefficient for class size and school need, which reveals no statistically significant 
finding, but indicates a similar direction. (A stronger disparity is found when prior 
performance is excluded from the needs index.) 
237 
 
This analysis investigates the teaching quality of individual teachers and the 
teaching quality of the entire school as resources which are allocated among schools. 
Individual measures of teaching quality include effectiveness, self-efficacy, experience, 
and credentials. High teacher effectiveness, as measured by value-added scores, and 
school need are strongly negatively correlated, r(12) = -.42,  p < .20. This indicates that 
the most impactful teachers are less likely to be in high needs schools. Additionally, 
teacher self-efficacy with regard to classroom management, student engagement, and 
instructional strategies are all strongly, negatively correlated with school need, r(12) = -
.65, p < .05, r(12) = -.41, p < .20, r(12) = -.53, p < .10. This indicates that teachers more 
certain of their skills are less likely to be in high needs schools. (This finding is more 
pronounced when considering students’ prior performance.) Additionally, average 
years of teaching experience is strongly negatively correlated with school need, r(12) = 
-.60, p < .10. This indicates that teachers with more years of teaching experience are 
less likely to be high needs schools. A school-wide measure of teaching quality, 
collective efficacy, is strongly negatively correlated with school need, r(12) = -.65, p < 
.05. This indicates that greater collective efficacy is less likely to be seen in high needs 
schools. (Again, this finding is more pronounced when considering students’ prior 
performance.)         
Analysis of the correlations between needs and resources in middle schools is 
especially difficult due to the very small sample size; there are very few correlation 
coefficients which are statistically significant. The findings for comprehensive equity at 
the middle school level are almost completely aligned with the findings for vertical 
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equity. Of all financial resources allocated to schools, the principal’s discretionary 
budget stands out as being very strongly, positively correlated with school need, r(12) = 
.87, p < .20. Leadership salaries and operations and maintenance salaries are negatively 
correlated with school need, r(12) = -.93, p < .10 and r(12) = -.92, p < .10. This 
indicates that administrators and facility staff salaries are lower in schools with higher 
needs. The number of students per staff and the number of students per administrator 
are each strongly negatively correlated with school need, r(2) = -.82, p < .20, r(2) = -
.86, p < .20. As explained above, a negative correlation is a good sign in this case as it 
means that high needs schools are more likely to have fewer students per staff and per 
administrator. Two indicators of teaching quality show statistically significant 
correlations with school need: teacher self-efficacy with regard to student engagement 
and the percentage of new teachers (those with less than three years of experience). 
Teacher self-efficacy with regard to student engagement and school need are strongly 
negatively correlated, r(2) = -.89, p < .20¸ indicating that teachers more certain of their 
ability to foster student engagement are less likely to be in high needs schools. The 
percentage of new teachers in a school and school need are strongly positively 
correlated, r(2) =.90, p < .10,  indicating higher percentages of new teachers in high 
needs schools.   
Table 31 provides a summary of the evidence on the extent to which resource 
allocation is equitable according to my comprehensive equity measure. The right 
column indicates the school level, elementary or middle, in which the evidence for each 
particular resource falls. 
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Table 31. Summary of Evidence on Equity in ASD, SY2010  
 Vertical 
Equity 
Comprehensive 
Equity 
Evidence of equity 
ELL spending per pupil is likely to be 
greater in high needs schools  
ES ES 
Instructional salaries per pupil is 
likely to be higher in high needs 
schools 
ES  
Pupil services salaries per pupil is 
likely to be higher in high needs 
schools 
 ES 
Average non-core teacher salaries are 
likely to be higher in schools with 
greater needs 
 ES 
The principal’s discretionary budget is 
likely to be higher in high needs 
schools 
MS MS 
Pupils per staff ratios are likely to be 
lower in high needs schools 
ES, MS ES, MS 
Pupils per teacher ratios are likely to 
be lower in high needs schools 
ES ES 
Pupils per administrator ratios are 
likely to be lower in high needs schools 
MS MS 
Evidence of strong misalignment with equity 
The principal’s discretionary budget is 
likely to be lower in schools with 
greater needs 
ES  
Leadership salaries per pupil are likely 
to be lower in schools with greater 
needs 
MS MS 
Operation and maintenance salaries per 
pupil are likely to be lower in schools 
with greater needs 
MS MS 
Average teacher salaries are likely to 
be lower in schools with greater needs 
 ES 
Average core teacher salaries are likely 
to be lower in schools with greater 
needs 
 ES 
The most effective teachers are less 
likely to be in high needs schools 
ES ES 
Teachers more certain of their skills 
(with regard to classroom management, 
student engagement, and instructional 
strategies) are less likely to be in 
high needs schools 
 ES 
Teachers more certain of their classroom 
management ability are less likely to be 
in high needs schools 
ES  
Teachers more certain of their ability 
to foster student engagement are less 
likely to be in high needs schools 
MS MS 
Teachers with more years of teaching 
experience are less likely to be high 
ES ES 
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needs schools 
Novice teachers are more likely to be in 
high needs schools 
MS MS 
Teachers with masters degrees or above 
are less likely to be in high needs 
schools 
 ES 
Greater collective efficacy is less 
likely to be seen in high needs schools 
ES ES 
 
As can be seen in this table, there are many resources for which there is either 
no evidence of comprehensive equity or evidence that there is strong misalignment with 
comprehensive equity.  
Average teacher salaries. As noted in Chapter 2, previous studies on the distribution of 
average salaries among schools have revealed a mal-distribution of average salaries, 
with higher average salaries in schools with lower needs. Unlike these studies, my 
research finds no statistically significant negative correlations between average teacher 
salary and school need when only poverty, ELL status and special education status are 
used to define school need. When prior test scores are included in the definition of 
school need, however, a statistically significant negative correlation is found for core 
teachers, special population teachers, and all teachers.  
Table 32 provides horizontal equity statistics and correlation coefficients for 
human capital resources to schools in the ASD.   
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Table 32 
Table 32. Horizontal Equity Statistics and Correlation Coefficients for Human Capital 
Resources in the ASD, SY2010 
 HE (CV) VE (corr) CE (corr) 
 ES MS ES MS ES MS 
Total salary (PPE) 0.12 0.07 +0.29 +0.37 +0.17 +0.38 
Avg. tch sal(all)  0.07 0.05 -0.22 -0.17 -0.37 -0.17 
Avg. tch sal(core) 0.08 0.05 -0.22 -0.04 -0.39 -0.03 
Avg. tch sal(non-core) 0.16 0.10 +0.30 +0.09 +0.37 +0.09 
Students per teacher 0.11 0.07 -0.56 -0.57 -0.51 -0.56 
Avg. class size 0.07 0.03 -0.08 -0.47 -0.28 -0.48 
Avg. teaching exp 0.24 0.19 -0.47 -0.75 -0.60 -0.74 
% of novice teachers 0.39 0.31 -0.10 +0.90 -0.02 +0.90 
% teachers with 
Masters or higher 
0.25  ** -0.22 ** -0.47 ** 
Note: ** indicates that the data is not available. Equity statistics highlighted in yellow indicate “nearly 
horizontally equitable” and equity statistics highlighted in purple indicate “horizontally inequitable.” 
Highlighted correlation coefficients indicate statistically significant results. 
 
Average salaries are distributed in accordance with horizontal equity, but not 
vertical or comprehensive equity as average teacher salaries are lower in high needs 
schools. This is driven by core teacher salaries given their large numbers.  However, 
correlation coefficients indicating inequity are dampened by average non-core teacher 
salary which is positively correlated with need, most notably in elementary school.  
Further investigation provides additional insight into this finding. Figure 37 
offers a view of the distribution of teacher salaries within the two highest and lowest 
need schools, based on the needs index used to measure comprehensive equity. On 
average, Jefferson Elementary School and Central Elementary School, the higher-needs 
schools, have lower teacher salaries than Muhlenberg Elementary School and Lehigh 
Parkway Elementary School, the lower-needs schools. However, there is considerable 
variation in all schools. Another important note is that Lehigh Parkway is one of the 
schools with the highest percentage of teachers with less than three years experience.  
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Figure 37: Distribution of Average Teacher Salary within the Two Highest and 
Two Lowest Need Schools, SY2010 
 
 School budgeted dollars versus centrally budgeted dollars. The possibility that 
centrally-budgeted dollars, as opposed to school budgeted dollars, might be driving 
inequities remains a concern when considering comprehensive equity. An analysis of 
the correlation between total expenditures, school expenditures, and centrally-budgeted 
school expenditures and the school need index reveals findings similar to those in the 
vertical equity analysis. In this analysis for elementary schools I find a non-statistically 
significant positive correlation between school expenditures and the school needs 
index, r(12)=.20. The correlation coefficient is smaller for centrally-budgeted 
expenditures, r(12)=.15.  The correlations coefficients, while not statistically 
significant, are stronger at the middle school level. There is a positive correlation 
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correlation between centrally-budgeted school expenditures and the school needs index, 
r(2)=-.35. Again, this finding indicates that centrally-budgeted expenditures are not 
allocated to schools is such a way as to take school need into account.  
Because the school district does not consider expenditures directly tied to 
students’ past performance, it is not possible to conduct an analysis that looks at the 
relationship between student needs (in a building) based on prior performance and 
resources allocated to buildings.    
 Horizontal equity post vertical equity. As part of the evaluation of vertical 
equity and comprehensive equity, this analysis attempts to contextualize the findings by 
providing a measure which quantifies how much of the relationship between the needs 
indexes and the various resources investigated explains the total variation among 
resources to schools. Originally conceived to study interdistrict equity to identify 
discrepancies of resource allocation among similarly situated school districts, the 
horizontal equity post vertical equity (HEVE ) measure conveys unexplained variance 
after vertical equity is taken into account (Toutkoushian and Michael, 2009).  
Tables 24 and 25 present horizontal equity post vertical equity results. By 
construction, 0% ≤ HEVE ≤ 100%, and horizontal equity post vertical equity is achieved 
when HEVE = 0%. Across the board, HEVE is quite high, revealing considerable 
variation among schools that is not explained by the studied relationships. Only for 
those statistically significant correlation coefficients is a higher percentage of variation 
among schools explained. This result is consistent with my qualitative findings which 
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indicate that allocation decisions are not driven by school need alone, but rather a 
mixture of policy, administrative, and personal objectives.  
Implications of ASD resource allocation 
My analysis of Allentown’s resource allocation reveals definite inequities 
among schools. To understand the impact of these inequities on students, it is helpful to 
look more closely at what additional resources are buying, and similarly, how a 
reduction in resources impacts different parts of the budget.   
 Influence of additional resources. It is useful to consider the relationship 
between operating funds and salaries, since salaries make up the largest part of school 
resources. Figure 38 illustrates a very strong correlation between the two (elementary 
schools: r(12)=.97; middle schools: r(2)=.93).  
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Figure 38. Operating Funds and Total Salary (PPE), SY2010 
Note. Includes dollars budgeted at school level as well as dollars budgeted at central, but spent at school 
level. The discrepancy between total salary at schools and operating funds at schools is exaggerated due 
to the fact that salary data is not included in centrally budgeted dollars.   
 
One can also consider the relationship between operating funds and other 
inputs. For example, there are strong negative relationships between operating funds 
per pupil and students per staff, r(12)=-.89 in elementary schools. When other teaching 
quality resources are tested, however, the correlations are much weaker.  
 Spending decisions. The data suggests that schools with lower overall financial 
resources (operating funds) differ from schools with higher overall financial resources 
in how dollars are spent.  
 Elementary Schools. On average, school level spending in the fourteen 
elementary schools in Allentown is $7,947 per pupil – with a high of $9,871 per pupil 
to a low of $6,901 per pupil. As much of a school’s budget goes to teacher salaries 
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(with teachers making up a large percentage of the workforce), it is no surprise that 
extremely strong correlations exist between operating funds and total salaries and 
instructional salaries; the school with the highest per pupil operating funds also has the 
highest per pupil total salary; and the school with the lowest per pupil operating funds 
also has the lowest per pupil total salary. Per pupil salary is driven by both the number 
of staff in the schools and the salaries of these staff. In Allentown, there are very strong 
(negative) correlations between operating funds and students per staff, students per 
teacher, and class size, indicating that operating funds are covering more staff, more 
teachers, and smaller class sizes. There is also a relationship between per pupil 
operating funds and average salaries, though not nearly as strong as with class size 
measures or salaries expenditures.    
The lowest funded elementary school in the district spends among the least of 
all the elementary schools on students in poverty and ELL students. Likewise, the 
school with the highest per pupil operating funds spends more per pupil for students in 
poverty and for ELL students.   
None of the measures of teacher quality, including individual measures and 
school-wide measures, show strong correlations with operating funds. So, while schools 
may be funding teachers in line with their resources, there is no indication that they are 
funding efforts tied to teaching quality in line with their resources. It is interesting to 
note, however, that teacher efficacy is lowest in the two schools with the lowest per 
pupil funding.  
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 Middle Schools. Harrison-Morton MS has noticeably fewer financial resources 
than the other three middle schools. Across the entire range of resources considered in 
this study, a number of important inputs were aligned with total operating funds, 
meaning that HMMS got the smallest portion of all the middle schools. These resources 
include: discretionary building funds per pupil, total salary per pupil, instructional 
salaries per pupil, and pupil services salaries per pupil. When considering additional 
inputs to classroom environment which are thought by to influence student outcomes 
(i.e., average salaries for core and non-core teachers, students per staff, students per 
teacher, students per paraprofessional, and class size), HMMS also has the “least” 
resources (e.g., lowest teacher salaries, largest class size). Additionally, a review of 
teaching quality measures indicates that the highest percentage of ineffective teachers 
and the lowest percentage of highly effective teachers, reside in HHMS. Finally, 
HHMS, as a school, reports the lowest score on the state’s growth index, calculated to 
indicate a school’s value-add to student learning. Interestingly, of all middle school 
teachers, teachers at HHMS report the highest self-efficacy with regard to instructional 
strategies. 
Expenditures on staff, teachers in particular, are lowest at a school with fewer 
resources. Lower average salaries and few educators per student help to explain this 
phenomenon. One might expect that measures of teacher effectiveness and the school’s 
overall growth index would, in fact, be lower at a school where fewer resources are 
dedicated to teachers. However, my findings do not bear this out.       
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 A Weighted Formula Approach – Implications for ASD. In the previous 
section I examined the variation of resources among schools by looking at the 
relationship between school need and resource allocation and found that ASD resource 
allocation, in school year 2009-2010, does not align with a vertical equity framework 
(based on State weights) or a comprehensive equity framework (based on state weights 
and weights for prior performance). Now I take another approach: I compare how funds 
are allocated to schools in school year 2009-2010 to how funds would be allocated to 
schools had the district based their disbursement of funds to schools on vertical and 
comprehensive equity frameworks. In essence, I conduct a simulation of what school 
funding would look like if the district adopted my approach to resource allocation.   
 School level impact. For the purposes of this simulation, only operating funds 
for elementary schools and middle schools are considered. This is due to data 
constraints, as the resource allocation study does not consider resources allocated to 
high schools, or the needs of their students. The following tables offer two approaches 
to simulating a weighted funding formula in the Allentown School District. In Table 33, 
all dollars spent in elementary and middle schools are re-allocated to elementary and 
middle schools based on the schools’ need, given enrollment and characteristics of the 
students in each school. Table 34 separates dollars spent on elementary schools and 
middle schools and re-allocates all elementary school dollars to elementary schools and 
all middle school dollars to middle schools, again based on enrollment and the 
characteristics of the students in each school. Both tables provide simulation results for 
Vertical Equity, using the state’s weights to evaluate the allocation of resources based 
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on need, and Comprehensive Equity, using the state’s weights along with weights for 
prior performance. Per pupil expenditures for each school are provided to make 
comparisons more useful.  
Simulation findings offer a hint as to what resource allocation might look like if 
a weighted formula were employed in ASD, rather than the current approach to 
resource allocation which is much less deliberate in distributing funds and human 
capital equitably among schools. In Table 33, where dollars are re-allocated from 
elementary and middle schools combined, middle schools lose more dollars than they 
gain under both Vertical Equity and Comprehensive Equity weighted funding 
scenarios, losing more under Vertical Equity. Under the Vertical Equity weighted 
funding scenario, ten schools lose funds, with Jefferson Elementary School losing the 
greatest per pupil amount at $1,582, and eight schools gain funds, with Washington 
Elementary School gaining $1,171 per pupil and Central Elementary School gaining 
$1,056 per pupil. This is slightly different from the Comprehensive Equity weighted 
funding scenario, in which nine schools lose funding, with Jefferson Elementary School 
again losing the greatest in per pupil operating dollars at $1,501 per pupil, and nine 
schools gaining funds, with Central Elementary School reaping the greatest rewards at 
$1,513.  
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Table 33. Simulation of Weighted Funding - Combined Expenditures for Middle and 
Elementary School, SY2010   
  Vertical Equity Comprehensive Equity 
 
Operating 
Funds 
(PPE) 
Operating 
Funds (PPE) 
with  
Weighted 
Budget 
using state 
weights Diff. 
Operating 
Funds (PPE) 
with  
Weighted 
Budget using 
state 
weights + 
weights for 
prior 
performance Diff. 
Elementary Schools 
Central ES 7,218 8,275 1,056 8,731 1,513 
Cleveland ES 8,796 8,142 (654) 7,724 (1,072) 
Dodd ES 7,249 8,129 880 8,134 885 
Jackson ES 8,483 7,863 (621) 7,684 (799) 
Jefferson ES 9,871 8,289 (1,582) 8,370 (1,501) 
Lehigh Park ES 8,308 7,280 (1,027) 7,112 (1,196) 
McKinley ES 9,317 8,114 (1,203) 8,349 (968) 
Mosser ES 7,766 8,226 460 8,170 404 
Muhlenberg ES 7,920 7,565 (355) 7,287 (633) 
Ritter ES 6,901 7,526 625 7,418 517 
Roosevelt ES 7,132 7,787 655 7,755 623 
Sheridan ES 8,093 7,643 (450) 7,431 (661) 
Union Terrace ES 7,294 7,623 329 7,627 333 
Washington ES 6,916 8,087 1,171 7,851 935 
Middle Schools 
Harrison-Morton 
MS 8,340 8,523 183 8,519 179 
Raub MS 9,122 9,054 (68) 9,355 233 
South Mountain MS 9,212 8,510 (702) 8,492 (720) 
Trexler MS 9,084 8,711 (374) 8,825 (260) 
 
Table 34 looks at re-allocating funds within each level of schooling. This is 
consistent with my analysis of vertical equity and comprehensive equity with ASD as I 
examine the variability among elementary schools and middle schools separately. 
Under the Vertical Equity weighted funding scenario, nine schools lose funds, with 
Jefferson Elementary School losing the greatest per pupil amount at $1,715, and nine 
schools gain funds, with Washington Elementary School gaining $1,041 per pupil. 
Under the Comprehensive Equity weighted funding scenario, again with equal 
“winners” and “losers,” Jefferson Elementary School loses the greatest in per pupil 
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operating dollars at $1,592 per pupil, and Central Elementary School receives an 
additional $1,418 per pupil. When considering Comprehensive Equity weighted 
funding, Lehigh Parkway comes in second place in reduction in operating funds. This, 
however, may be partially due to the school’s small enrollment. Two other schools with 
small enrollment, Cleveland Elementary School and McKinley Elementary School, also 
lose significant operating funds as a result of both these weighted funding formulas. 
While school size may help to explain inequitable resource allocation, it, by no means, 
explains the whole story.  
Table 34. Simulation of Weighted Funding- Expenditures for Middle Schools and 
Elementary Schools Considered Separately, SY2010 
  Vertical Equity Comprehensive Equity 
 
Operating 
Funds 
(PPE) 
Operating 
Funds (PPE) 
with  
Weighted 
Budget 
using state 
weights Diff. 
Operating 
Funds (PPE) 
with  
Weighted 
Budget using 
state 
weights + 
weights for 
prior 
performance Diff. 
Elementary Schools 
Central ES 7,218 8,141 923 8,637 1,418 
Cleveland ES 8,796 8,011 (786) 7,640 (1,156) 
Dodd ES 7,249 7,998 749 8,046 797 
Jackson ES 8,483 7,736 (747) 7,601 (882) 
Jefferson ES 9,871 8,155 (1,715) 8,279 (1,592) 
Lehigh Park ES 8,308 7,163 (1,144) 7,035 (1,273) 
McKinley ES 9,317 7,984 (1,334) 8,259 (1,058) 
Mosser ES 7,766 8,093 327 8,081 315 
Muhlenberg ES 7,920 7,443 (477) 7,208 (712) 
Ritter ES 6,901 7,405 504 7,337 436 
Roosevelt ES 7,132 7,662 529 7,671 539 
Sheridan ES 8,093 7,519 (573) 7,351 (742) 
Union Terrace ES 7,294 7,500 206 7,544 250 
Washington ES 6,916 7,957 1,041 7,766 850 
Middle Schools 
Harrison Morton 
MS 8,340 8,793 453 8,697 357 
Raub MS 9,122 9.340 218 9,551 429 
South Mountain MS 9,212 8,779 (433) 8,669 (543) 
Trexler MS 9,084 8,986 (98) 9,009 (75) 
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The ‘difference’ column in these tables represents the change in funding per 
school necessary to achieve compliance with the weighted funded formula in my equity 
framework. Clearly, the district would need to make considerable changes to school 
level funding were a weighted formula implemented. 
253 
 
The following figures provide graphical depictions of the changes in funding at 
the school level resulting from a change in the distribution of operating funds to 
schools. 
 
Figure 39. The Financial Impact of a Vertical Equity Weighted Formula 
Approach 
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Figure 40. The Financial Impact of a Comprehensive Equity Weighted Formula 
Approach   
 
These figures reveal a great deal of variability among each school’s per pupil 
operating funds. Even with this variability, Figure 39 is more in line with ASD resource 
allocation than Figure 40.  
 Impact of current ASD budget allocation on equity. Considering the 
relationship between school needs, resource allocations, and student outcomes provides 
another way to analyze the impact of ASD’s allocation of resources among schools. 
 Relationship between need and student outcomes. The literature on the 
relationship between student need and student outcomes consistently finds strong 
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positive correlations (Ludwig, Ladd & Duncan, 2001), and the data provided by the 
Allentown School District is consistent with this research. Figure 41 illustrates the 
relationship between school need (based on my comprehensive equity needs index) and 
student outcomes (as measured by the percentage of students that are proficient in 
math). 
 
Figure 41. Relationship between Schools' Comprehensive Needs Idenx and the 
Percentage of Students in the School that Score at Proficient or Above on the 
PSSA (Math) 
 
The research on outcomes also reveals that, although demographic 
considerations are strongly correlated with student outcomes, the progress a student 
makes while in school is not pre-determined by demographics. Rather, the learning 
environment, often characterized as the teacher effect, is the strongest indicator of 
student growth (Hanushek, 1997; Sanders & Rivers, 1996).   
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 Relationship between need and resources. While there is a strong correlation 
between student need and student outcomes, there is virtually zero correlation between 
student need and school level expenditures in the ASD.  
 
Figure 42. Relationship between Schools' Comprehensive Needs Index and Per 
Pupil Operating Funds in Each Building, SY2010 
 
This finding reflects statements of district administrators, who generally 
assumed that funds were distributed primarily on a per pupil basis, with the exception 
of Title I and Special Education Funds.  
 Relationship between resources and student outcomes. Figure 43 demonstrates 
zero correlation between school level resources and student outcomes. This is not to say 
that money doesn’t matter; as mentioned earlier, all these schools are severely 
underfunded. What this figure does illustrate is that, overall, dollars do not appear to be 
directed to schools to address concerns related to student performance. 
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Figure 43. Relationship between School-based Operating Funds and Percent 
Proficient and Above on the PSSA (Math), SY2010 
 
The data to explain what this figure would look like if dollars were tied to need 
does not exist. We do know, however, that while resources are necessary to support 
student achievement, they are not sufficient, as reported by administrators throughout 
the district. When one considers alternative inputs (e.g., teacher effectiveness, teacher 
self-efficacy), somewhat stronger correlations are found between resources and student 
outcomes. Figures 44-49 consider inputs which were significantly correlated with need. 
The strongest correlations between school need and resources are teacher efficacy with 
regard to classroom management (r
2
 =.42), average years of teaching experience (r
2
 
=.35), and teachers’ collective efficacy (r2 =.42).    
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Figure 44. Relationship between each School's Comprehensive Equity Needs Index 
and Each School's Average Teacher Salary, SY2010 
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Figure 45. Relationship between Each School's Comprehensive Equity Needs 
Index and Each School's Students per Staff and Students per Teacher Ratios, 
SY2010 
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Figure 46. Relationship between Each School's Comprehensive Equity Needs 
Index and Each School's Percentage of Effective and Highly Effective Teachers, 
SY2010 
 
R² = 0.1802 
0% 
20% 
40% 
60% 
80% 
100% 
1.45 1.55 1.65 1.75 1.85 
Comprehensive Equity Needs Index 
High Teacher Effect         
261 
 
 
Figure 47. Relationship between Each School's Comprehensive Equity Needs 
Index and Each School's Average Teacher Efficacy (Classroom Management, 
Student Engagement, and Instructional Strategies), SY2010 
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Figure 48. Relationship between Each School's Comprehensive Equity Needs 
Index and Average Years of Teaching Experience in Each School, SY2010 
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Figure 49. Relationship between Each School's Comprehensive Equity Needs 
Index and School-Wide Collective Efficacy in Each School as Reported on Survey 
of Teachers, SY2010 
 
Summary 
The findings presented in this chapter investigate how one mid-sized, urban 
school district allocates resources among its schools and students. The analysis 
evaluates equity in the district according to a comprehensive view of equity that 
encompasses adequacy (that all students be afforded the opportunity to meet a standard 
that will ensure their ability to sustain themselves economically and socially, and to be 
able to participate in our democracy as informed citizens) and vertical equity (that 
students are not penalized for morally arbitrary disadvantages).  
This chapter assesses three versions of equity: adequacy, vertical equity, and 
comprehensive equity. A summary of major findings follows: 
 Many schools do not achieve adequacy.  
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 Academic success of students varies greatly among schools. Different 
subgroups of students within the school district also achieve varying levels of 
academic success.  
 The gap between current proficiency levels and the adequacy target is 
differentially distributed among schools in Allentown. Further, among student 
subgroups, achievement of Hispanic students and ELL students stand out as 
being most uneven across schools. 
 The suspension rate among elementary and middle schools varies greatly.  
 Some resources are allocated in accordance with vertical equity  
 ELL spending per pupil is likely to be greater in high needs elementary schools 
 Instructional salaries per pupil are likely to be higher in high needs elementary 
schools 
 The principal’s discretionary budget is likely to be higher in high needs middle 
schools. 
 Pupils per staff ratios are likely to be lower in high needs schools. 
 Pupils per teacher ratios are likely to be lower in high needs elementary schools. 
 Some resources are not allocated in accordance with vertical equity  
 The most effective teachers are less likely to be in high needs elementary 
schools. 
 Teachers with more years of teaching experience are less likely to be in high 
needs elementary schools. 
 Novice teachers are more likely to be in high needs middle schools.  
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 Greater teacher collective efficacy is less likely to be seen in high needs 
elementary schools. 
 Expenditures per student in poverty and expenditures per special education 
student are not allocated equivalently across schools.  
 Expenditures per ELL student in elementary schools are highly variable among 
schools. 
 Centrally budgeted expenditures per student in poverty are not equitably 
distributed among schools. 
 Centrally budgeted expenditures per special education student are not equitably 
distributed among schools. 
 Centrally budgeted expenditures per ELL student are not equitably distributed 
among schools. 
 Some resources are allocated in accordance with comprehensive equity  
 ELL spending per pupil is likely to be greater in high needs elementary schools. 
 The principal’s discretionary budget is likely to be higher in high needs middle 
schools. 
 Pupils per staff ratios are likely to be lower in high needs schools. 
 Pupils per teacher ratios are likely to be lower in high needs elementary schools. 
 Some resources are not allocated in accordance with comprehensive equity  
 Average teacher salaries are likely to be lower in elementary schools with 
greater needs. 
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 The most effective teachers are less likely to be in high needs elementary 
schools. 
 Teachers more certain of their skills are less likely to be in high needs 
elementary schools. 
 Teachers with more years of teaching experience are less likely to be in high 
needs elementary schools. 
 Novice teachers are more likely to be in high needs middle schools.  
 Greater teacher collective efficacy is less likely to be seen in high needs 
elementary schools. 
 There is considerable variation among schools that is not explained by vertical 
or comprehensive equity 
 A change in policy to accommodate a weighted funding formula based on the 
comprehensive equity framework would result in an increase in funds for half 
the elementary schools and half the middle schools, and a decrease in funds for 
the remaining elementary and middle schools  
Based on the results of these analyses, and a comparison of allocations determined 
by using weighted funding formulas and actual 2009-2010 school year allocations, I 
conclude that the Allentown School District does not achieve comprehensive equity. 
Although the district is engaged in efforts to improve outcomes for students, my 
research shows that, in many instances, these efforts are not distributed among students 
in a way that supports students according to their specific needs.     
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CHAPTER 7 – CONCLUSION 
The primary goal of my dissertation was to conduct a case study of a mid-sized 
urban school district to evaluate equity among schools. The analyses for my dissertation 
build on the development of a comprehensive equity framework created to evaluate 
equal educational opportunity. This framework satisfies a view of equity in which 
students have access to resources such that their subsequent opportunities are equalized 
(Berne & Stiefel, 1984; Rawls, 1971). This perspective does not move away from a 
focus on student outcomes but instead supports student outcomes by incorporating a 
means of addressing the relative needs of students such that all students are able to have 
greater opportunities for and attain higher levels of success. 
Using the comprehensive equity framework as a guide, I conclude that the 
Allentown School District does not allocate resources among its schools equitably. The 
allocation of human capital resources stands out as most incompatible with the 
comprehensive equity framework. Using various teacher characteristics (i.e., salary, 
experience, effectiveness, self-efficacy, collective efficacy) as proxies for teacher 
quality, I find higher teacher quality within a school to be positively related to greater 
need among the student population. Specifically, average teacher salaries are likely to 
be lower in elementary schools with greater needs; teachers with more years of teaching 
experience are less likely to be in high needs elementary schools; novice teachers are 
more likely to be in high needs middle schools; the most effective teachers are less 
likely to be in high needs elementary schools; teachers more certain of their skills are 
less likely to be in high needs elementary schools; and, greater teacher collective 
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efficacy is less likely to be seen in high needs elementary schools. Even as these 
findings show significant inequities among schools, it is important to note that these 
inequities are not systematic, but haphazard in nature.  
I further tested the extent to which equal educational opportunity exists in 
Allentown by simulating a weighted funding formula based on the comprehensive 
equity framework. Implementation of this resource allocation strategy would have 
resulted in an increase in funds for half the elementary schools and half the middle 
schools, and a decrease in funds for the remaining elementary and middle schools. 
Some of this “misallocation” is likely due to economies of scale, as two of the three 
schools that would gain the most money are in the top three in student enrollment and 
three of the four schools that would lose the most money (over $1,000 per student) have 
enrollments below the district average for elementary schools
123
. However, enrollment 
size does not explain why Washington Elementary School stands out as lacking 
financial resources, with lower than average teacher salaries and the highest class size 
in the district. Despite this, Washington has the highest teacher efficacy and collective 
efficacy in the district and high growth index in math and above the district average in 
reading. Also, enrollment size does not explain why Jefferson Elementary School 
stands out among elementary schools as being richer in financial resources and having 
higher average teacher salaries and smaller class sizes. Jefferson is also above average 
in their teacher efficacy and collective scores and in their school wide growth index. 
Taking a broader view and recalling ASD’s “adequacy funding gap,” Jefferson’s level 
                                                 
123
 The average enrollment in ASD elementary schools in SY2010 is 573. 
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of funding may be appropriate, and schools with fewer and/or lesser inputs are 
inadequately resourced.  
Qualitative research supports my conclusion that the ASD does not allocate 
resources among its schools equitably, as district practices related to the allocation of 
resources help explain the misalignment between school-level student needs and 
financial and human capital resources. Notably, addressing the differential needs of 
schools plays no part in driving resource allocation in the ASD. Considerations of 
vertical and comprehensive equity among schools do not influence budget priorities or 
human resource policies. Also, information on both the financial position of schools, 
and the variation among teaching quality in schools, is not readily available and, 
consequently, is unknown to key stakeholders. A weak relationship between building 
and central office administrators aggravates this situation. Lastly, with scant 
information available to them, few stakeholders inside or outside the district focus their 
attention on discrepancies among schools.  
Implications  
This case study has implications beyond the Allentown School District in two 
major ways. First, it builds on the extant literature on intradistrict resource allocation, 
corroborating some previous findings and adding new human capital “resources” to the 
range of inputs considered in resource allocation. Second, this case study provides 
district and state policy makers with a viable approach to evaluating resource allocation 
within school districts.  
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 Adding to the research. For the most part, the equity findings from my 
dissertation research are consistent with the findings of other studies and reports, not 
only examinations of intradistrict equity, but examinations of interdistrict equity, as 
well. However, there are notable differences. A comparison of my findings to those of 
other policy-makers and researchers bears this out.  
As states are constitutionally responsible for ensuring that all students are 
provided with an adequate education, many analyses of equity consider distributions of 
funds from the state to school districts. A number of these equity reviews focus on 
expenditures and/or revenues, and do not separately consider human capital resources. 
Quality Counts, Education Week's annual report on state-level efforts to improve public 
education, provides indicators annually of the status of education finance at the state 
level. This report presents two school finance indicators which evaluate horizontal 
equity: the coefficient of variation and the McLoone Index, providing measures for 
each state as well as an average across all states.
124
 The most recent publication 
included school finance indicators based on 2009 data. The following table presents 
horizontal equity statistics for the ASD based on my calculations alongside horizontal 
equity statistics for Pennsylvania, and the U.S. average included in the Quality Counts 
report.  
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 Hawaii is not included in this analysis as the state has only one school district. 
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Table 35. Comparison of Equity Statistics from Quality Counts 2012 and the ASD 
 Allentown School 
District 
PA 
United 
States 
 ES MS ES+MS+HS+Central  
Coefficient of 
Variation 
0.12 0.05 0.15 0.17 
McLoone Index 0.92 0.96 0.91 0.91 
Note: The CV and MI provided for the ASD are based on per-pupil expenditures for operating funds and 
elementary and middle schools are presented separately. The Pennsylvania and U.S. measures are based 
on per-pupil expenditures obtained from the U.S. Department of Education’s 2008-2009 Common Core 
of Data and U.S. Census Bureau's Public Elementary-Secondary Education Finance Data for 2009, and 
include funds that fall outside the category of operating funds. Also, the Quality Count report considers 
funds at the district level, and therefore combines all school levels as well as central administration. 
 
As seen in Table 35, horizontal equity statistics are similar across the state and 
the district. In this comparison, ASD middle schools stand out as being more 
horizontally equitable when considering per pupil expenditures. Looking at the entire 
country, the Quality Count reports that only three of 49 states achieve horizontal equity 
based on the level of variability in funding across all districts; 36 of 49 states fall within 
a range which approaches horizontal equity, and ten of 49 states are far from horizontal 
equity. However, when the definition of horizontal equity is based on the number of 
districts spending well below the mean in the state, 33 of 48 states achieve horizontal 
equity and 15 of 49 states fall within a range which approaches horizontal equity.   
In another review of interdistrict equity, Baker, Sciarra, and Farrie (2010) 
investigate the fairness of the distribution of state funds by looking at both the absolute 
dollars disbursed to school districts, as well as the ratio of high poverty to low poverty 
revenue per pupil. When analyzing states’ vertical equity using this ratio, 13 of 48 
states were found to be progressive, six of 48 states were found to be regressive, and 12 
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of 48 states, no relationship between poverty and variation in spending was found.
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While there are no statistically significant results among the remaining 17 states, a large 
number of these states appear more similar to the regressive states. These findings are 
similar to findings in the ASD, where statistically insignificant correlations indicate that 
resource allocation is asystematic.   
Analysis of the vertical equity of financial resources in two states, Indiana and 
Kentucky, provide additional examples of state-level equity studies to consider 
alongside the district-level equity study in Allentown. The state of Indiana considers 
five factors in determining how to allocate funds to districts: the percentage of adults 
who did not graduate from high school; the percentage of single-parent families; the 
percentage of population below the poverty level; the percentage of students receiving 
free lunch; and, the percentage of students with limited English proficiency. 
Toutkoushian and Michael (2007) compute bivariate correlations between these vertical 
equity factors and per-pupil revenues. The researchers propose that, by looking at these 
correlations over time, policy makers could determine if vertical equity is improving in 
the state.  
Statistically, it was not possible to disaggregate vertical equity factors in 
Allentown due to the number of schools in the district. Therefore, I created an index of 
need for evaluating vertical equity. Because of the large numbers of economically 
disadvantaged students in the ASD, poverty (measured by the percentage of students 
receiving free and reduced price lunch) has the greatest influence on my Needs Index. 
                                                 
125
 These findings are all statistically significant. 
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Thus, it is reasonable to compare Indiana’s correlation between poverty and revenues. 
Using 2007 data, Toutkoushian and Michael’s (2007) find a correlation of +0.61 
between the percentage of students receiving free lunch and revenues. This can be 
compared to the correlation between operating funds and the Needs Index in the ASD 
which is +0.24. While both are positive, these metrics indicate that the state of Indiana 
is allocating resources more equitably to economically disadvantaged populations than 
is the ASD.  
A study of equity in Kentucky, conducted by Picus, Odden, and Fermanich 
(2004), analyzed vertical equity by computing horizontal equity statistics for the state 
by weighting district enrollments to account for the additional needs of subgroups of 
students. This approach is similar to the weighted funding approach utilized in my 
simulations of resource allocation in the ASD. The coefficient of variation computed 
for Kentucky in the 1999-2000 school year was +0.10 and the McLoone Index was 
+0.96. When computing similar horizontal equity calculations on weighted student 
enrollment in the ASD in the 2009-2010 school year, the coefficient of variation was 
+0.11 and the McLoone Index was +0.91. Vertical equity findings in the ASD are far 
closer to those in Kentucky than in Indiana. Additional research is necessary to validate 
the usefulness of comparing equity among districts in a state to equity among schools in 
a district. However, the intention of serving all students fairly guides equity analyses at 
multiple levels.   
Considerations of equity have gone beyond the study of overall expenditures, 
and include more targeted studies of the allocation of personnel expenditures. One 
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means of evaluating how the ASD measures up to others in terms of the equitable 
allocation of personnel expenditures would be to examine the debates around Title I 
comparability. A report issued by the U.S. Department of Education finds that “more 
than 40 percent of Title I schools had lower personnel expenditures than non-Title I 
schools in the same district” (Heuer & Stullich, 2011, p.1).126 As discussed in Chapter 
Two, while Title I currently requires that schools be comparable prior to receiving 
compensatory federal funds, this requirement can be met with measures that are far less 
stringent than the equivalent allocation of total personnel expenditures. According to 
Heuer and Stullich (2011), if the rules were to change, and Title I comparability 
required that district resource allocation minimally be horizontally equitable, 
approximately 18 to 28% of all Title I schools would be out of compliance, depending 
upon the specific requirements for comparability.   
If compliance with Title I comparability were to require an “average-to-
average” measure, whereby the average per pupil spending on personnel of all “high 
needs” schools is compared to the average per pupil spending on personnel of all 
schools in the district, then the ASD would be in compliance. However, if the 
requirement is that the average per pupil spending on personnel in each “high needs” 
school individually meets the average per pupil spending on personnel of all schools in 
the district, then the ASD would not be in compliance. This would remain true even if 
                                                 
126
 For school districts in which all schools are classified as Title I schools, this report assumes that these 
districts would still be required to conduct this comparability analysis, in order to ensure that lower 
poverty schools are not further disadvantaged by lower spending on personnel expenditures. 
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the threshold were higher and each “high needs” school individually had to meet only 
90% of the average per pupil spending on personnel of all schools in the district. 
Based on a simulation conducted to evaluate the impact of revising the Title I 
comparability requirement, the Department of Education report finds that “low 
spending Title I schools and higher-poverty schools would see their per-pupil 
expenditures rise by an average of four to fifteen percent” (Heuer & Stullich, 2011, 
p.1). In the ASD, three of seven higher needs elementary schools would see an average 
increase of 11%. It is important to note that in Allentown not all schools with higher 
needs are under-spending relative to the district average. This appears to be consistent 
with the findings of the Department of Education report, as only 28% of all Title I 
schools would be out of compliance with the strictest revisions to the comparability 
requirement. 
At the district level, studies of equity have looked at horizontal equity, vertical 
equity, and adequacy. My literature review provides more detail, but a brief synopsis of 
34 studies of intradistrict equity reveals that overall expenditures are often distributed 
according the principles of horizontal and vertical equity, with equivalent or greater 
financial resources being allocated to schools and students with greater needs. Although 
there is some indication that vertical equity exists in many of the districts studied, there 
is a question as to the sufficiency of the additional resources directed to disadvantaged 
schools and students to achieve vertical equity. My study of horizontal equity in 
Allentown was consistent with this research. Operating funds per pupil were allocated 
relatively equivalently among elementary and middle schools. Also, I found a weak, yet 
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positive, relationship between school need and operating funds per pupil, r(14) = 0.24. 
This relationship was not statistically significant.  
Another finding among many of the studies of intradistrict resource allocation is 
that human resources, as opposed to financial resources, are less likely to be distributed 
equitably. Disparities in teacher quality – as defined by measurable indicators such as 
years of experience, certification status, and content and pedagogical knowledge – are 
most often perversely related to school and student characteristics (i.e., schools with 
more disadvantaged students often have more teachers with less experience, fewer 
qualifications). A number of these measures of teacher quality were evaluated in 
Allentown and the findings were similar to those of the 34 studies. For example, 
average years of teaching experience is negatively correlated with school need, 
indicating that less experienced teachers are more likely to be in schools with students 
with greater needs. Additional measures of teacher quality, not considered in the 34 
studies but evaluated in the ASD, include teacher effectiveness, as measured by value-
added scores, and teacher efficacy, as determined by the survey responses of teachers. 
These measures provide additional evidence that human capital resources, or teacher 
quality, is not distributed across schools in the district in alignment with vertical equity 
or comprehensive equity.      
While the large majority of studies on intradistrict equity evaluate equity in 
large districts, Miller and Rubenstein (2007) provide an analysis of equity in four mid-
sized districts in New York State. The table below looks at the areas of overlap in the 
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studies to compare findings in the ASD alongside the findings presented in the study of 
New York districts. 
Table 36. Comparison of Bivariate Correlation Coefficients from ASD study and 
NYS study 
 
Average 
Salary 
Pupil-teacher 
ratio 
Avg. teacher 
experience 
District A -0.367** -0.135 -0.278* 
District B -0.255   0.018 -0.366 
District C -0.619*  0.549 -0.508 
District D  0.020  0.154 -0.596* 
Mean(SD) of A-D -0.306(0.265)  0.147(0.293) -0.437(0.142) 
ASD -0.219 -0.561** -0.469* 
Note. **p<0.05; *p<0.10 
As seen in Table 36, the correlation coefficient indicates that the distribution of 
average salary in Allentown is negative but not statistically significant. Therefore, there 
may be a week inverse relationship between average salary and school need. This ASD 
finding is close to the mean of four mid-sized districts evaluated, and quite similar to 
two of them considered individually. Similarly, average teacher experience in the ASD 
is distributed in the same way as it is in all four districts in the Miller and Rubenstein 
study. When considering pupil-teacher ratio, however, a major difference arises 
between the ASD and the four New York districts. It appears that the ASD is more 
successful in addressing vertical equity as there are fewer students per teacher as the 
school need increases. That being said, the distribution of average class sizes, with a 
correlation of +0.08, does not follow. In fact, we see that there is virtually no 
relationship between school need and class size. Having additional teachers in some 
buildings does not impact the school’s class size.   
Situating Allentown’s resource allocation among other mid-sized districts, in 
addition to larger districts and states, provides greater context for understanding school-
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level equity. The work I have done in Allentown adds to this existing knowledge base 
by providing an additional study of resource allocation.  It also provides a framework 
for policy makers to use as they consider where to add and where to cut resources. 
 Providing a framework. As an IES pre-doctoral fellow in Allentown, I worked 
with the Superintendent and central office administrators to support the district through 
better use of data. ASD proved to be an interesting site to conduct my study. While the 
small size of the district prevented the use of sophisticated statistical methods, I was 
able to learn a great deal about how districts operate. In the 2009-2010 school year, the 
district served almost 18,000 students in 22 buildings with a budget of $212.6 million. 
Outcomes for the students were mixed, but often weak, with a low graduation rate and 
too many students earning low scores on state assessments. This environment is not 
unique; many school districts struggle with high needs students and inadequate 
resources.  
Another commonality between ASD and other school districts is that their data 
systems have not been designed to evaluate resource allocation. This is consistent with 
the fact that most school districts have not been acculturated to use data to inform 
policy making. As a researcher in the district, I took on the task of investigating 
resource allocation. The data I used in this study includes reports and documents from 
both the ASD and the Pennsylvania Department of Education. It also includes newly 
computed measures on teacher quality: survey results from a large majority of ASD 
teachers and teacher level value-added scores provided by the district through its 
contract with the state’s value-added provider, SAS EVAAS. Additional data was 
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compiled by the consulting firm Cross & Joftus, Inc., who conducted a complementary 
investigation of district resources. My research also relies on interviews with school 
level and district level administrators to provide context and a greater understanding of 
how and why resource allocation decisions were made.  
As a result of my analysis, I was able to demonstrate the value of accessible 
information and provide actionable data to district administrators. It is my hope that the 
systems I helped to develop will be used in the future to inform the district’s agenda.  
As school districts gain access to data systems which are more integrated, and 
more comprehensible, the use of data should become more prevalent, allowing 
administrators and the public to construct better-informed policies.   
My study has the potential to act as a tool kit for districts intent on embracing 
the vision of equal educational opportunity developed in this dissertation. This 
approach would be a definite shift from current practice, in which systems only focus 
on student outcomes. By taking into account both the relative position and the absolute 
achievement of students, district administrators would be better able to rectify 
inequities and provide for the equal educational opportunity of all students.  
Recommendations 
As districts continue to struggle to meet the needs of their student populations’ 
increasingly limited resources, it becomes even more important to use those resources 
to the greatest advantage of all students. The findings of this dissertation are relevant to 
this goal, and include the following recommendations:  
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 Districts’ missions should incorporate the goal of comprehensive equity, 
whereby students have access to resources such that their subsequent 
opportunities are equalized. 
 Based on this mission, districts should develop resource allocation policies 
which support equal educational opportunities for all students. 
 Districts should regularly collect and examine data on inputs (financial and 
human capital resources) and outcomes (academic and other) at the school level 
in order to assess intradistrict equity. 
 Districts should collect new indicators on teacher quality (i.e., measures of 
efficacy, measures of effectiveness). No single measure should be used. 
 Based on the review of the data, districts should investigate the relationship 
between inputs and outcomes – to learn how resources are impacting outcomes. 
 Districts should ensure that resource allocation data is transparent so that school 
administrators educators can make informed decisions. 
 Districts should ensure that resource allocation data is available so that key 
stakeholders, including parents and policy makers, can advocate for equity.  
Study Limitations 
There are several limitations to my research. First, my findings are based on a 
case study of only one district, which prevents the reader from generalizing the results 
of the study to the larger population of school districts. Related to this limitation in 
scope, the Allentown School District is considerably under-funded, which may 
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influence the distribution of resources
127
. For example, in a district with fewer funds, 
one school may receive a disproportionate allocation to keep middle class families in 
the school system. Also, the demographic make-up of the district, with high poverty 
rates in all schools, somewhat limits my ability to discern patterns that demonstrate 
inequitable resource allocation. 
Another weakness of this study is that it is difficult to test adequacy. With the 
data available, it is possible to describe some inputs and outcomes, and compare these 
variables across schools. To truly understand how resources impact outcomes, it would 
be necessary to conduct a much more comprehensive investigation, including in-depth 
classroom observations, to better understand the true relationship between resources 
and student outcomes.   
Additional issues which cause concern have to do with the variables used to 
measure resources and outcomes. The available measures of one resource I have 
investigated, teacher quality, including certification and years of experience beyond 
year four, have not been found to be strongly related to improved student outcomes 
(Clotfelter et al., 2007; Goldhaber, 2008; Rice, 2003; Rockoff, 2004). Student outcomes 
also present a problem as the metrics most often used are state assessments which 
represent only a portion of the learning that takes place in the school. 
Another potential problem with my study is the construction of the needs index 
I use to measure vertical and comprehensive equity. The needs index is based on 
                                                 
127
 According to Pennsylvania’s Costing-Out Study, the funding gap – the difference between an 
adequate education and actual spending - was $5,625 per pupil in the Allentown School District in 2006. 
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Pennsylvania’s costing out formula, designed to allocate state dollars to districts. It is 
not clear that this formula translates seamlessly to the district-school environment.     
Additional omissions on my part include a lack of attention to school size or 
concentrations of poverty. 
A last concern is that, as an intern in the Allentown School District, I am closely 
identified with the Superintendent, Dr. Zahorchak. This may have compromised my 
ability as a researcher because key informants may have been reluctant to share 
information with me which they think may reflect negatively on them with their boss.  
Future Research 
Additional research is necessary to help policymakers understand the 
implications of different resource allocation policies, including impacts on 
opportunities and outcomes for students, so that they may make informed decisions that 
will support the learning of all children. Two areas that I identify as fruitful for this 
project are resource allocation as it pertains to special education students, and to 
students in poverty. In the present analysis, I had to use very blunt measures to look at 
these groups of students and although I had wanted to analyze resource allocation for 
special education students according to the hours they received pull-out services, I was 
unable to access useful data. Another area which deserves attention is student mobility. 
As in many high poverty, urban districts, I found high student mobility in Allentown, 
which should be taken into consideration when using measures such as teacher 
effectiveness based on student outcomes. It would be very useful to understand the 
impact of student mobility on both the students that are moving in and out of schools 
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and the students in classrooms with shifting populations. Similarly, I had no useful data 
to investigate the impact of varying levels of poverty and its relationship to school 
resources. As the current study shifts the scale from districts to buildings, another 
important analysis would be to look at how resources are allocated to classrooms within 
each building. Finally, the manner and degree to which race is related to resource 
allocation should be investigated, to inform understanding of the variation of outcomes 
across schools for various subgroups of students, as well as for all students.  
Two additional research agendas follow from my findings. Qualitative research 
reveals a great deal of misinformation among building principals as a result of an 
incoherent district mission around equity and weak communication between the schools 
and the central office. Much could be learned from an investigation of the relationship 
between schools and district central offices. A second issue is related to “rectifying” 
inequitable allocation of human capital resources, specifically teachers. Further work is 
necessary to develop strategies for ensuring that all students have access to effective 
teachers without redistributing teachers that are reluctant to move.  
Finally, I hope to develop this work to provide greater focus on implications for 
policy and practice, answering the question: “What criteria should district leaders 
employ when determining how to best allocate resources?”  
This dissertation weaves together a theoretical discussion of equity with the 
practical application of theories of equity through the use of various measurement tools. 
In so doing, it offers scaffolding for policy makers and scholars alike to understand the 
requirements of equal educational opportunity.
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APPENDIX A: STUDIES OF INTRADISTRICT RESOURCE ALLOCATION 
Study Equity Data Source 
                 Relationship between 
Resource (Inputs)        Variable of     
 Interest 
Methodology Findings 
Ajwad, M.I. (September 2006). 
Is intrajurisdictional resource 
allocation equitable?: An 
analysis of campus-level 
spending data for Texas 
elementary schools. The 
Quarterly Review of Economics 
and Finance, 46(4), 552-564. 
vertical  
equity 
 
Elementary schools 
(3664) within Texas 
school districts (908). 
(The school campus-
level data for 1996–
1997 came from the 
Texas Education  
Agency Academic 
Excellence Indicator 
System. School 
neighborhood 
information came from 
the 1990 Census of 
Population and 
Housing.) 
Discretionary resources: 
total expenditures per 
pupil; instructional 
expenditure per pupil; 
expenditure on school 
leaders per pupil; other 
expenditures per pupil; 
teacher experience; 
teacher tenure; and 
pupil-teacher ratio. 
Low-income, minority 
neighborhoods: median 
family income; % Black; 
% Hispanic; % Other; % 
of population with 
college degree; % of 
population who lived in 
same housing unit since 
1985; and, % of 
population aged 5-17. 
Also, information on % 
LEP, % economically 
disadvantaged, % 
special education, and 
% gifted/talented. 
Estimation of a 
district fixed-
effects model. 
The discretionary resources of 
school districts are skewed 
toward schools in low-income, 
minority neighborhoods, 
beyond the amounts that would 
be allocated based on the state 
aid formula. The combined 
effect of poor students and a 
poor neighborhood is to raise 
school spending per pupil. 
Districts are skewing resources 
toward Black students, but not 
Hispanic and other races. 
Neighborhoods that are better 
educated and exhibit lower 
population turnover also receive 
more school funds. 
Baker, B. D. (2009). Within-
district resource allocation and 
the marginal costs of providing 
equal educational opportunity: 
Evidence from Texas and Ohio. 
Education Policy Analysis  
Archives. 17(3). 
vertical  
equity 
Elementary schools in 
Texas and Ohio large 
city school districts and 
in their surrounding  
metropolitan areas 
Weighted Student 
Funding, elementary  
school budgets 
Greater resource 
equity, special  
education populations, 
poverty rates,  
and school size 
Conventional 
expenditure 
function approach 
Widely reported WSF success 
stories provide no more 
predictable funding with respect 
to student needs than other 
large urban districts in the same 
state. In some cases, resource 
levels in urban core elementary 
schools are relatively 
insufficient for competing with 
schools in neighboring districts 
to achieve comparable 
outcomes. 
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Study Equity Data Source 
                 Relationship between 
Resource (Inputs)        Variable of     
 Interest 
Methodology Findings 
Baker, B.D. & Green, P.C. 
(2009). Equal Educational 
Opportunity and the 
Distribution of State Aid to 
Schools: Can or Should School 
Racial Composition Be a 
Factor? Journal of Education 
Finance. 34(3). 289-323. 
vertical  
equity 
  Black student 
population 
Education cost-
function approach 
for estimating the 
sensitivity of cost 
models and 
predicted 
education costs to 
the inclusion of 
school district 
level racial 
composition 
variables. 
Strong, consistent evidence 
across settings that black 
student concentration is 
associated with higher-
predicted costs of achieving 
constant outcomes, and that 
those cost differences are quite 
large for majority black school 
districts. 
Baker, B.D. (2003). State Policy 
Influences on the Internal 
Allocation of School District 
Resources: Evidence from the 
Common Core of Data. Journal 
of Education Finance. 29(1) 1-
24. 
vertical  
equity 
District-level data on 
state revenues and  
financial and human 
resource allocation 
were gathered from the 
Common Core of Data 
of the National Center 
for Education Statistics. 
Financial allocations to 
core instruction,  
administration, and 
central administration, 
and data on human 
resources, including 
teachers, support staff 
and administrators 
(including classroom 
teachers per pupil; all 
instruction related staff 
per pupil, district level 
administrators) district 
staffing levels; 
classroom teachers, 
allocations to 
instruction and 
instruction-related 
staff, including 
librarians and school 
counselors; 
administrative 
expenses, central office 
staffing levels, shares of 
administrative staffing. 
District size; increased 
prevalence of  
students with 
disabilities; Limited 
English proficient and 
low-income populations 
Statistical tests of 
the relationship 
between state 
policies and 
practices and 
resource 
allocation across 
districts and 
across states using 
a national dataset. 
A range of additional external 
factors, such as student 
population characteristics, have 
an influence on internal 
resource allocation practices; 
increased prevalence of 
students with disabilities was 
tied to significant increases in 
district staffing levels, from the 
classroom to the central office, 
though some findings were 
inconsistent. Limited English 
proficient and low-income 
populations, on the other hand, 
led to increased allocations to 
instruction and instruction- 
related staff, including librarians 
and school counselors, but not 
to increases in classroom 
teachers. Further, higher levels 
of limited English proficient 
student populations led 
consistently to higher 
administrative expenses and 
higher central office staffing 
levels, though not higher total 
administrative staffing shares. 
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Study Equity Data Source 
                 Relationship between 
Resource (Inputs)        Variable of     
 Interest 
Methodology Findings 
Berne, R. & Steifel, L. (1994). 
Measuring equity at the school 
level: The finance perspective. 
Education Evaluation and 
Policy Analysis. 16(4).  
415-421. 
vertical  
equity 
32 community 
subdistricts and 800 
schools 
Average teacher salary 
statistics 
Poverty Regression 
analysis assesses 
the relationship 
between the 
resource (budget, 
expenditure, or 
position) data and 
poverty. 
All variables except positions 
are distributed in higher per-
pupil amounts to low poverty 
sub-district (and school)… On 
the other hand, the coefficients  
for middle/junior high schools 
show that all variables except 
average teacher's salary are 
distributed in higher per-pupil 
amounts to high poverty 
schools. 
Betts, J.R., Rueben, K.S. & 
Danenberg, A. (2000). Equal 
Resources, Equal Outcomes? 
The Distribution of School 
Resources and Student 
Achievement in California. 
Public Policy Institute of 
California. 
adequacy, 
horizontal  
equity,  
vertical  
equity 
California (1997-1998 
census of all schools);  
1998 Stanford 9 
achievement tests. 
Detailed measures of 
resources at the school 
and classroom levels 
(i.e., class size, teacher 
preparation, 
curriculum) 
Economically 
disadvantaged 
students; student 
performance 
Variation California schools exhibit 
considerable inequality in 
teacher preparation and 
curriculum offered and 
relatively little inequality in 
average class size. Schools that 
have less of one resource tend 
to have less of many other 
resources as well. Inequalities in 
teacher preparation among 
schools are large, and they 
matter for student outcomes, 
whether measured in terms of 
test scores or course-taking 
patterns. 
Burke, S.M. (1999). An analysis 
of resource inequity at the 
state, district, and school 
levels. Journal of Education 
Finance, 24(4). 435-458. 
horizontal  
equity,  
vertical  
equity 
Data on the student/ 
teacher ratio for the 
school years 1987/1988 
through 1992/1993 via 
the U.S. Department of 
Education. The sample 
contains 1,204 unified 
school districts located 
in 37 states. School 
districts with less than 
10 total schools in the 
1991/1992 school year 
were not included. 
Teacher-pupil ratio 
(used as a proxy for  
educational resources) 
Variation from perfect 
equality 
Gini coefficient 
analysis 
School level inequalities exist in 
the distribution of educational 
resources within and across 
districts. However, the intra-
district distribution of education 
resources appears to be 
equitable. Only 75 of the  
1,204 total school districts (6.23 
percent) had school level Gini 
coefficients that were above 
0.10 - the standard established 
by Odden and Picus (2008) 
accepted in the literature. 
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Study Equity Data Source 
                 Relationship between 
Resource (Inputs)        Variable of     
 Interest 
Methodology Findings 
Boyd, D.J., Lankford, H., Loeb, 
S., Rockoff, J.E. and Wyckoff, 
J.H. (September 2007). The 
Narrowing Gap in New York 
City Teacher Qualifications and 
Its Implications for Student 
Achievement in High Poverty 
Schools (Working Paper 10). 
Washington, DC: National 
Center for the Analysis of 
Longitudinal Data in Education 
Research. 
adequacy, 
horizontal  
equity, 
vertical  
equity 
Data on New York City 
teachers, students, and 
schools between 2000 
and 2005. The database 
is constructed from 
administrative data 
from the New York City 
Department of 
Education, the New 
York State Education 
Department, alt. 
certified teacher 
programs, and the 
College Board.  
Observed teacher 
characteristics: SAT 
scores, certification 
status, teacher 
experience, teacher 
demographics, 
undergraduate, test 
performance, pathway, 
college recommended. 
Student growth using 
student performance 
(statewide student 
exams). Poverty status, 
minority status, 
expenditures per pupil. 
Using value-added 
analysis to 
measure student 
growth, regression 
models are 
developed to 
estimate the 
relationships 
between student 
performance and 
teacher 
characteristics. 
Changes in these observed 
qualifications of teachers (i.e., 
SAT scores or certification 
status) account for a modest 
improvement in the average 
achievement of students in the 
poorest schools. 
Carr, M., Gray, N., & Holley, M. 
(2007, September 20). 
Shortchanging disadvantaged 
students: An analysis of intra-
district spending patterns in 
Ohio. Policy Report No. 14. 
Columbus: The Buckeye 
Institute for Public Policy 
Solutions. 
vertical  
equity 
Ohio - 72 high-poverty 
school systems during  
the 2005-06 school year 
 Students who are 
disadvantaged, in 
special education 
programs, or gifted. 
 Districts, especially larger ones, 
tend to use staffing allocations 
to distribute funding. However, 
these allocations are often a 
result of central office decisions 
and collective bargaining 
agreements, which do not 
necessarily reflect student 
need.” In our study of 72 high-
poverty school systems during 
the 2005-06 school year, the 
difference between what 
individual school buildings 
should have spent based on the 
demographics of their student 
population and what they 
actually spent per pupil resulted 
in nearly $300 million being 
diverted from students who are 
disadvantaged, in special 
education programs, or gifted. 
  
2
8
8
 
Study Equity Data Source 
                 Relationship between 
Resource (Inputs)        Variable of     
 Interest 
Methodology Findings 
Clark, C. (1998). Using School-
Level Data to Explore 
Resources and Outcomes in 
Texas. Journal of Education 
Finance. 23(3). 374-89. 
vertical  
equity 
8 large school districts 
in TX from 1994-1995  
school year (from the 
Academic Excellence  
Indicator dataset). 
Resources Students who are 
disadvantaged 
Students who are 
disadvantaged 
School districts in Texas allocate 
approximately 60 percent of 
operating expenses to the 
school. They also showed that 
although teacher costs are a 
strong determinant of resource 
levels in schools, the nature of 
the relationship is complicated 
by policies and practices that 
are unique to each school 
district. Moreover, the results 
indicated that even in a large 
Texas district that seems to be 
distributing more resources to 
schools serving students with 
the greatest need, there is little 
measurable effect from the 
resources. 
Clotfelter, C. T., Ladd, H. F., & 
Vigdor, J. L. (2005). Who 
Teaches Whom? Race and the 
Distribution of Novice 
Teachers. Economics of 
Education Review. 24(4). 377-
392. 
horizontal  
equity 
A micro-level data set 
provided by the North  
Carolina Department of 
Public Instruction - 
focus on 7th grade 
students (2000 - 2001 
school year) 
Teacher experience Minority status Descriptive data 
analysis 
Black students are much more 
likely than white students to 
face a novice teacher, and that 
much of the differential 
exposure reflects differences 
across schools and across 
classrooms within districts. 
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Study Equity Data Source 
                 Relationship between 
Resource (Inputs)        Variable of     
 Interest 
Methodology Findings 
Clotfelter, C. T., Ladd, H. F., & 
Vigdor, J. L. (2006). Teacher-
student matching and the 
assessment of teacher 
effectiveness. Journal of 
Human Resources, University 
of Wisconsin Press. 41(4). 
Adequacy Administrative data on 
teachers and school  
administrators in North 
Carolina provided by 
the North Carolina 
Department of Public 
Instructions through the 
North Carolina 
education Research 
Center at Duke 
University. - 5th grade 
data is used 
Teacher experience, 
licensure test scores, 
teacher performance in 
math and reading 
Student performance, 
socio-economic status 
Descriptive 
analysis of data, 
chi-squared tests  
were conducted 
to test the 
relationships 
There is a tendency for more 
highly qualified teachers to be 
matched with more advantaged 
students. Also, the authors 
consistently find significant 
returns to teacher experience in 
both math and reading and to 
licensure test scores in math 
achievement. They also find that 
the returns in math are greater 
for socioeconomically 
advantaged students. Also, 
Black teachers and teachers of 
other races teach students with 
significantly lower test scores. 
And teachers with degrees from 
less competitive institutions 
teach students with significantly 
lower test scores, and teachers 
with advanced degrees show a 
slight but insignificant tendency 
to teach students with higher 
test scores. Higher licensure test 
scores are associated with 
higher-test scores. 
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Clotfelter, C., Ladd, H. F., 
Vigdor, J. L., & Wheeler, J. 
(2007). High-poverty schools 
and the distribution of 
teachers and principals 
(Working Paper 1). 
Washington, DC: National 
Center for the Analysis of 
Longitudinal Data in Education 
Research. 
horizontal  
equity 
Administrative data on 
teachers and school  
administrators in North 
Carolina provided by 
the North Carolina 
Department of Public 
Instructions through the 
North Carolina 
Education Research  
Center at Duke 
University. 
Measures of teacher 
quality: 
• Experience - % under 
3 years of teaching  
• Quality of 
undergraduate 
institution - a 
competitive ranking 
based on information 
for the 1997-98 
freshman class from the 
Barron’s College  
Admissions Selector. 
(the percentage of  
teachers who 
graduated from  
uncompetitive 
institutions) 
• Licensure type - the 
percentage of teachers 
who do not have a 
regular license. 
• Average licensure test 
scores 
• National Board 
Certification - % of  
Board Certified 
Teachers. 
Poverty (percentage of 
students who apply for 
and were found eligible 
for the federally 
sponsored free lunch  
program (those with 
incomes below 130 
percent of the poverty 
line) 
 Students in the high poverty 
schools are served by school 
personnel with lower 
qualifications than those in the 
lower poverty schools (in many 
cases the differences are large). 
Clotfelter, C.T., Ladd, H.F., & 
Vigdor, J.L. (2007). Teacher 
Credentials and Student 
Achievement in High School: A 
Cross-Subject Analysis with 
Student Fixed Effects (Working 
Paper 11). Washington, DC: 
National Center for the 
Analysis of Longitudinal Data in 
Education Research. 
horizontal  
equity 
Test scores on the five 
EOC tests typically 
taken by North  
Carolina students in 
either the ninth or the 
tenth grades. Those test 
scores are matched 
with detailed 
administrative data on 
teacher characteristics 
and credentials. 
Teacher credentials, 
experience 
Student performance, 
race, socio-economic 
status 
Student fixed 
effects in the 
context of a model  
estimated across 
subjects 
There is an uneven distribution 
of teacher credentials by race 
and socio-economic status of 
high school students. 
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DeAngelis, K.J., Presley, J.B. & 
White, B.R. (2005). The 
Distribution of Teacher Quality 
in Illinois (IERC 2005-1). 
Edwardsville, IL: Illinois 
Education Research Council. 
horizontal  
equity 
140,000 teachers in 
2002-2003 among 
Illinois’ public schools 
(from the Teacher  
Service Record data 
maintained by the 
Illinois State Board of 
Education. 
A composite measure of 
school teacher quality 
including college 
competitiveness, years 
of experience, type of 
credential, performance 
on the Basic Skills test 
and ACT score. 
Poverty and minority 
status, student 
performance; % 
minority students; %  
low-income students; % 
high-performing 
students 
Descriptive 
analysis of data 
Most of the variation in teacher 
quality is found among schools 
within districts. Students in high 
minority and high income 
schools throughout the state 
typically face teachers with 
lower quality attributes than 
their peers in other schools – 
but other characteristics of 
schools also affect teachers' 
decisions about where to work. 
The Education Trust. (2005) 
California's Hidden Teacher-
Spending Gap: How State and 
District Budgeting Practices 
Shortchange Poor and Minority 
Students and Their Schools. 
vertical  
equity 
Data on teacher salaries 
and teacher 
characteristics came 
from the annual 
California Basic 
Educational Data 
System (CBEDS) and 
2003-2004 California 
Department of 
Education data on  
district salary schedules 
and bonuses 
Percentage of teachers 
with fewer than three 
years of teaching 
experience; teacher 
salaries 
Poverty and minority 
status 
Descriptive 
analysis of data 
There are significant gaps in 
spending on teacher salaries 
between high- and low-poverty 
high schools within eight of the 
ten largest school districts in  
California. Forty-two of the 50 
largest districts spend 
significantly more on teachers in 
their schools serving the fewest 
numbers of African-American 
and Latino students. In most 
cases (31 out of 50), “minority 
gaps” in a given district exceed 
the “poverty gap.” These gaps 
range from $85,534 to 
$574,387. 
The Education Trust. (2008) 
Their Fair Share: How Texas-
Sized Gaps in Teacher Quality 
Shortchange Poor and Minority 
Students. 
vertical  
equity 
School district data 
came from the Texas  
Education Agency's 
Academic Excellence  
Indicator System 
Percentage of teachers 
with fewer than  
three years of teaching 
experience;  
teacher salaries 
Poverty and minority 
status 
 
Descriptive 
analysis of data 
Year after year, Hispanic, 
African-American and low-
income students are less likely 
to be assigned to teachers who 
know their subject matter, less 
likely to be in classrooms with 
experienced teachers and less 
likely to attend schools with a 
stable teaching force. Their 
teachers are paid less, too. 
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Hertert, L. (1995). Does Equal 
Funding for Districts Mean 
Equal Funding for Classroom 
Students? In Picus, L.O. and 
Wattenbarger, J.L. (Eds.) 
Where Does the Money Go? 
Resource Allocation in 
Elementary and Secondary 
Schools. Thousand Oaks, CA: 
Corwin Press: 71-84. 
vertical  
equity 
California (1990-1991) 
unified districts, and the 
"regular" schools within 
them - includes 190 
districts with ADA of 
3,012,498. - Twenty-five 
districts serve as a 
representative sample 
from this population. 
Expenditure data from 
the sample districts. 
Dollars spent for regular 
instruction in 1990 to 
1991: money and a 
number of educational 
resources that money 
buys. 
Equity measured at the 
school level (pupil 
ethnicity data) 
Summary statistics 
are used to 
measure the 
variation in per-
pupil 
expenditures: the 
range, the 
restricted range, 
the federal range 
ratio, the 
coefficient of 
variation, the Gini 
coefficient, and 
the McLoone 
index. The 
association of 
school-level 
characteristics 
with per-pupil 
expenditures is 
assessed by 
stepwise multiple 
regression. 
School-level variations are 
virtually unrelated to the 
ethnicity of pupils in the 
majority of sampled districts. 
There was less variation in the 
amount of money spent per 
pupil at different schools within 
a given district than was spent 
at different schools in different 
districts. (With some notable 
exceptions.) However, the 
distribution of educational 
resources--teacher-pupil ratios, 
teacher experience, teacher 
education, and course offerings 
in higher-level math and 
science--was less equitable 
across schools than was the 
allocation of money used to buy 
these resources. Further, the 
level of equity varied by 
resource, with teacher-pupil 
ratios ....distributed as fairly as 
educational funding but with 
course offerings varying widely 
both across districts and among 
schools. 
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Iatarola, P. & Rubenstein, R. 
(2007). New Stakes and 
Standards, Same Ol’ Spending? 
Evidence from New York City 
High Schools. Education 
Finance and Policy. 2(1). 74-99. 
Adequacy New York city high 
schools 
Re-allocation patterns Low-performing 
students; graduation  
rates 
Regression 
analysis - 
controlling for 
unchanging school 
characteristics 
through school 
fixed effects, and 
for changes 
affecting all 
schools through 
year effects. 
Analysis includes a 
series of time 
variables to 
represent the year 
of the resource 
data (post-
implementation) 
and school fixed 
effects to capture 
unobserved time-
invariant 
characteristics of 
the school that 
could affect 
resource 
allocation 
patterns. 
Some evidence of changes in 
spending levels and resource 
allocation patterns in New York 
City high schools following the 
implementation of new state 
graduation requirements. In 
particular, per pupil spending on 
direct services increased 
significantly over the period; the 
largest increases occurred in 
schools with the largest gaps in 
graduation rates. The analyses 
also presented evidence of 
small resource reallocation 
following the reforms. 
Iatarola, P. & Stiefel, L. (2003). 
Intradistrict Equity of Public 
Education Resources and 
Performance. Economics of 
Education Review.  
22(1). 69-78. 
horizontal 
equity, 
vertical 
equity 
840 elementary and 
middle schools in NYC 
Expenditures, teacher 
resources 
 
Minority status, percent 
special need  
students 
Equity measures Horizontal equity distributions 
are more disparate than what 
would be expected relative to 
results of other studies, vertical 
equity is lacking, especially in 
elementary schools, and 
equality of opportunity is at 
best neutral but more often 
absent. Middle schools exhibit 
more equity than elementary 
schools. 
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Lankford, H., Loeb, S. & 
Wyckoff, J. (2002). Teacher 
Sorting and the Plight of Urban 
Schools: A Descriptive Analysis. 
Educational Evaluation and 
Policy Analysis. 24(1). 37–62. 
horizontal  
equity 
New York - elementary 
schools 
Teacher certification, 
teacher experience 
Minority status, 
urbanicity, student  
poverty, student English 
proficiency,  
and student 
performance on state  
assessment exams 
 Systematic sorting of New York 
State’s elementary school 
teachers in 2000. Non-white 
students were four times more 
likely than white students to 
have a teacher who was not 
certified in any of the courses  
he or she taught and 50 percent 
more likely to have a teacher 
with no prior experience. The 
sorting of teacher qualifications 
within districts can also be 
substantial. In New York City 
elementary schools in 2000, 
non-white students were 40 
percent more likely to have a 
teacher who was not certified in 
any of the courses she taught 
and 40 percent more likely to 
have a teacher with no prior 
experience. 
Miller, L. & Rubenstein, R. 
(2008). Examining the Nature 
and Magnitude of Intradistrict 
Resource Disparities in Mid-
Size School Districts. Public 
Budgeting & Finance. 28(4). 26-
51. 
horizontal  
equity 
1050 elementary and 
middle schools in four  
larger NY State school 
districts (not including  
NYC) 
 
Teacher experience, 
teacher salary 
Student poverty  Clear relationships between 
student poverty and teacher 
characteristics, with more 
experienced and therefore 
higher paid teachers 
disproportionately represented 
in lower poverty schools in 
three of four districts. 
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Monk, D. & Hussain, S. (2000). 
Structural influences on the 
internal allocation of school 
district resources: Evidence 
from New York State. 
Educational Evaluation and 
Policy Analysis. 22(1). 1-26. 
??? 1991-1992 data 
collected by the New 
York State Education 
Department (School 
Financial Master File, 
Institutional Master  
File, Personnel Master 
File of the Basic Ed. 
Data System (BEDS) for 
revenue, expenditure, 
enrollment, and staffing 
information. Sample of 
645 districts. 
Spending levels per 
pupil, full-value 
property wealth per 
pupil, the incidence of 
poverty as measured by  
the percentage of 
students in the free and 
reduced-price lunch 
program, staffing 
resources 
Property wealth, 
poverty, and size 
Estimation of a 
district fixed-
effects model 
(elasticity 
estimates as well 
as the results of a 
simulation where 
they calculate the 
changes in share 
ratios associated 
with a 10% 
increase in 
spending in the 
average district 
within the 
sample.) 
Differences in spending have 
substantially larger effects on 
staffing levels than do 
differences in property wealth, 
poverty, or differences in school 
district size. Also, there is a 
tendency for higher property 
wealth to shift staffing 
resources into secondary 
academic areas along with some 
indication of the tendency for 
higher poverty levels to not be 
associated with larger 
allocations of professional staff 
into the academic program.  
Differences in spending, 
property wealth, poverty and 
school district size were 
positively related to the total 
net supply of resources into 
administration. Finally, 
increases in spending, poverty, 
and size all translate into 
reduction in the academic share 
of the secondary program (with 
the opposite result for property 
wealth). 
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Owens, J.D. (1972). The 
distribution of educational 
resources in large American 
cities. Journal of Human 
Resources. 7(1). 26–38. 
horizontal 
equity, 
vertical 
equity 
9 large cities - 
elementary schools 
Teacher salary 
expenditures, teacher  
experience, verbal 
ability 
Low-income and non-
white neighborhoods 
Regression 
analysis was used 
to measure the 
extent to which a 
school-
expenditure 
variable and a 
number of school-
quality variables 
were influenced 
by within-city 
variations in the 
economic and 
racial character of 
the families 
served by each 
school. 
Educational resources are 
distributed unequally within 
large American cities, with poor 
and nonwhite neighborhoods 
receiving less than their share. 
Owens, T. & Maiden, J. (1999). 
A Comparison of Interschool 
and Inter-district Funding 
Equity in Florida. Journal of 
Education Finance. 24(4). 503-
518. 
horizontal  
equity 
A school district in 
Florida 
Instructional 
expenditures (includes  
teacher salaries and 
benefits, purchased 
services and classroom 
materials) for basic 
programs; interschool 
funding 
Racial/ethnic 
composition and  
household income 
Regression 
analysis 
controlling for size  
differences among 
the schools 
 
When expenditures without 
federal compensatory funds 
were considered, there is clear 
evidence that the percentage of 
African American students in a 
school and the percentage of 
students on free/reduced lunch 
programs are negatively 
associated with instructional 
expenditures.  
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Pan, D., Rudo, Z., & Smith-
Hansen, L. (2003). Resource 
Allocation Does Matter in 
Improving Student 
Performance. Paper presented 
at the Annual Conference of 
the American Education 
Finance Association, March  
27-29, 2003. 
Adequacy, 
??? 
Data from low- and 
high-performing school  
districts in four states in 
the Southwest  
(Arkansas, Louisiana, 
New Mexico, and Texas) 
and 12 districts with 
consistent gains in 
student performance. 
Data sources include: 
NCES, Annual Survey of 
local Government 
Finances: School 
Systems for 1994-95 to 
1998-99; Common core 
of Data, Local Education 
Agency (School District) 
Universe Survey and 
Public Elementary/ 
Secondary School 
Universe Survey for 
school years 1995-96 to 
1999-2000. 
Performance data came 
from State Departments 
of Education. 
Fiscal and staffing data Student performance To examine the 
differences 
between the high- 
and low-
performing groups 
in fiscal and 
human resource 
allocation, group 
means of the five 
years of data were 
compared using 
an analysis of 
variance (ANOVA) 
and Tukey post-
hoc tests. 
High-performing districts spent 
more money and employed 
more staff in certain 
instructional categories when 
compared to low-performing 
districts. The resource allocation 
patterns of the 12 improvement 
districts showed that they had a 
focus on instruction, and also 
re-allocated resources toward 
instructional areas over time, 
more than districts of similar 
size. 
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Roza, M. (2008). Allocation 
Anatomy: How District Policies 
that Deploy Resources Can 
Support (or Undermine) 
District Reform Strategies. 
University of Washington: 
Center on Reinventing Public 
Education. 
vertical  
equity 
 Funds per pupil  Coefficient of 
variation 
computed on the 
total dollars 
received per pupil. 
Funds doled out through central 
budgets were less equitable 
than those allocated in school 
budgets in both districts; Among 
formulaic allocations, those 
distributed by student counts 
were more equitable than those 
distributed by staff counts or by 
school. Among the non-
formulaic allocations, those 
deployed on the basis of central 
staff discretion were the most 
inequitable in both districts. 
Those allocated as a function of 
demand were also highly in-
equitable, but less so. 
Rubenstein, R. (1998). 
Resource Equity in the Chicago 
Public Schools: A School-level 
Approach. Journal of Education 
Finance. 23(4). 468-489. 
horizontal 
equity, 
vertical 
equity 
1994-95 line-item 
school-level budgets for 
every public school in 
Chicago, provided by 
the Chicago Panel on 
School Policy. 
School level spending Student poverty 
 
Univariate 
dispersion 
measures such as 
the Gini 
coefficient, the 
McCloone index, 
the coefficient of 
variation, the 
range, and the 
standard 
deviation; 
regression analysis 
to examine the 
relationship 
between school-
level spending and 
student poverty 
The distribution of base funding 
for both high schools and 
elementary schools is 
horizontally equitable to some 
degree. Horizontal equity 
decreases as various special and 
categorical funds are included in 
the analysis. The findings 
regarding vertical equity are 
somewhat less clear, though. In 
Chicago elementary schools, 
different patterns of resource 
distribution emerge depending 
upon the object used in the 
analysis: schools with higher 
levels of student poverty receive 
lower funding per pupil; 
distribution of General Fund 
resources to elementary schools 
is not strongly related to 
poverty; and schools with higher 
levels of student poverty tend 
to employ lower-paid teachers. 
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Rubenstein, R., Schwartz, A.E., 
& Stiefel, L. (2007). From 
Districts to Schools: The 
Distribution of Resources 
across Schools In Big City 
School Districts. Economics of 
Education Review. 26. 532-545. 
vertical  
equity 
New York City, 
Cleveland, and 
Columbus, Ohio 
 
Resource measures School and student 
characteristics 
Estimating de 
facto expenditure 
equations relating 
resource 
measures to 
school and 
student 
characteristics. 
Schools that have higher 
percentages of poor pupils 
receive more money and have 
more teachers per pupil, but the 
teachers tend to be less 
educated and less well paid, 
with a particularly consistent 
pattern in New York City 
schools. 
Schwartz, A. E. (1999). School 
Districts and Spending in the 
Schools. In William J. Fowler, 
(Ed.), Selected Papers in School 
Finance, 1997-99. Washington, 
DC: National Center for 
Education Statistics. 55-83. 
vertical  
equity 
1995-96 school and 
district level data for 
Ohio (3,284 schools and 
586 districts) 
Number of teachers, 
teacher experience 
Test scores, 
demographic and  
socioeconomic status 
(% of non-white 
students and % eligible 
for FRPL) 
Analysis of de 
facto formula that 
should explain 
school spending. 
The patterns of spending across 
and within school districts in the 
state of Ohio vary substantially.  
These differences are driven by 
both differences in the schools 
and by differences in the 
districts in which these schools 
operate. The regressions  
indicate that the combination of 
interdistrict variation in the 
overall level of spending and the  
intradistrict variation in the 
allocation across schools results 
in a spending system in which 
only about 30 percent of the 
variation in spending is 
explained by a set of factors 
that should play an important 
role in any spending formula 
that might be adopted—
enrollment, the grade level 
served by the school 
(elementary, middle or high 
school), and the percentage of 
non-white students or those 
eligible for free lunch. 
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Schwartz, A.E., Stiefel, L., & 
Rubenstein, R. (2008). Why Do 
Some Schools Get More and 
Others Less? An Examination of 
School-Level Funding in New 
York City. Conference paper 
prepared for the 20th Annual 
Conference of the Association 
for Budgeting and Financial 
Management. 
vertical 
equity 
Dataset includes 
elementary and middle 
schools in New York City 
from school years 2000-
01 to 2003-04. This 
includes information on 
student performance 
and demographics, 
teacher characteristics, 
and school and grade-
level enrollment (from 
NYC DOE Annual School  
Reports), and 
expenditures and 
sources of funds (from 
School Based 
Expenditure Reports). 
Expenditures per pupil, 
revenues (tax levy and 
state operating funds) 
 
Poverty status, percent 
of limited English  
proficiency students, 
performance, percent 
of special education 
students, holding  
constant school size and 
grade level 
A series of models 
regress school-
level per-pupil 
funding variables 
on school-level 
characteristics. 
The relationships between per-
pupil funding and observable 
school characteristics, 
particularly student needs, are 
not as strong. Second, funding 
does not respond crisply to 
changes in characteristics of 
schools, even over a three year 
period (2001 – 2004). In fact, 
previous year funding levels 
account for a large share of 
current year funding. Third, the 
relationship between funding 
and the percentage of the 
students who are poor (based 
upon their free lunch eligibility), 
are of limited English 
proficiency, and are full-time 
and part-time special education 
students, is positive. 
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Steifel, L., Rubenstein, R., & 
Berne, R. (1998). Intra-district 
equity in four large cities: Data, 
methods, and results. Journal 
of Education Finance. 23(4). 
447-467. 
horizontal  
equity 
Chicago, New York, 
Rochester and Fort 
Worth 
General education 
funds, compensatory  
funds 
All students, students in 
poverty, non-white 
students; location 
Coefficient of 
variation, a 
negative 
relationship  
between the 
percentage of 
minority students 
and funding 
In general, schools in these 
cities are in a horizontally 
equitable range. For vertical 
equity with respect to the 
percentage of students in 
poverty, Chicago and New York 
show some vertical equity 
(positive relationships between 
these funds and poverty). For 
general education or total 
funds, all cities show mixed 
results--some positive 
relationships and some weak 
negative relationships. Overall, 
in these cities, there are only a 
few instances of a lack of equal 
opportunity (as indicated by a 
negative relationship between 
the percentage of minority 
students and funding). Dollar 
allocations and average teacher 
salaries tend to favor schools 
with lower poverty levels. There 
is a negative relationship 
between average teacher 
salaries and percentages of 
poor, and sometimes minority, 
students. This relationship 
appears to be compensated at 
times by putting relatively more 
positions in schools with higher 
percentages of poor students. 
Without further evidence on the 
trade-off between what higher 
salaries buy and what smaller 
class sizes buy in terms of 
achievement or other 
outcomes, it is difficult to make 
an equity judgment about this 
trade-off. 
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Summers, A.A. & Wolfe, B.L. 
(1976). Intra-district 
Distribution of School Inputs to 
the Disadvantaged: Evidence 
for the Courts. The Journal of 
Human Resources. 11(3). 328-
342. 
horizontal  
equity 
Philadelphia Measurements of 
teacher and principal  
quality; salaries per 
pupil 
Poverty and race  There is little evidence to 
support the proposition that 
such "rational" distribution 
occurs. 
Tennessee Department of 
Education. (2007). Tennessee’s 
most effective teachers: Are 
they assigned to the schools 
that need them the most? 
(Research Brief). Nashville, TN: 
Author. 
horizontal  
equity 
Tennessee Department 
of Education data 
Teacher quality Poverty and race  Students in the high poverty 
schools are served by school 
personnel with lower 
qualifications than those in the 
lower poverty schools. 
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APPENDIX B: CENTRALLY-BUDGETED EXPENDITURES ALLOCATED TO SCHOOLS 
 
SCHOOL
 Total 
Central 
Budget 
Allocated to 
Schools SpEd EAP Title I Title III
 Substitute 
Teachers 
Tuition 
Reimbursem
ent
Total SS 
budget Benefits
HM MS  $ 1,763,167 377,093$   77,049$    14,202$  94,860$    41,394$  256,164$   902,406$    
Raub MS  $ 1,782,244 312,852$   110,492$   16,991$  137,647$   23,400$  95,157$    1,085,704$  
SM MS  $ 2,551,225 851,592$   27,507$    16,952$  173,929$   53,271$  132,822$   1,295,153$  
Trexler MS  $ 1,689,247 251,811$   105,822$   7,866$   135,181$   27,679$  98,134$    1,062,754$  
Central  $ 1,205,299 220,025$   823$    20,933$    34,212$  84,052$    17,695$  79,106$    748,453$    
Cleveland  $   550,169 144,737$   823$    9,701$     8,185$   33,770$    7,770$   27,903$    317,280$    
Dodd  $ 1,521,704 614,587$   823$    1,545$     19,794$  41,273$    21,815$  70,783$    751,084$    
Jackson  $   793,097 293,256$   823$    3,452$     7,488$   33,186$    8,590$   35,287$    411,016$    
Jefferson  $ 1,703,239 452,362$   121$    156,703$   14,461$  99,595$    23,873$  56,786$    899,338$    
L. Parkway  $   543,118 154,664$   823$    44,366$    8,067$   25,865$    7,770$   26,594$    274,968$    
McKinley  $   623,661 95,770$    823$    9,655$     12,811$  38,954$    11,695$  22,099$    431,854$    
Mosser  $ 1,169,522 495,764$   943$    10,577$    13,877$  115,311$   21,788$  235,021$   276,240$    
Muhlenberg  $ 1,263,819 597,221$   823$    4,348$     4,379$   76,433$    16,160$  55,271$    509,185$    
Ritter  $ 1,095,184 216,920$   823$    1,946$     7,920$   45,131$    32,560$  49,953$    739,932$    
Roosevelt  $ 1,157,878 338,433$   121$    11,792$    11,384$  46,648$    26,380$  61,885$    661,234$    
Sheridan  $ 1,263,190 286,723$   186,197$   18,513$  72,190$    13,785$  228,532$   457,250$    
U. Terrace  $ 1,236,375 334,425$   121$    100,221$   16,283$  65,585$    29,521$  75,426$    614,792$    
Washington  $   993,356 203,661$   823$    9,784$     16,597$  40,717$    23,400$  52,232$    646,143$    
TOTALS  $34,127,809 8,455,221$ 8,949$  1,010,228$ 319,346$ 1,953,198$ 567,656$ 2,289,803$ 18,515,427$  
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APPENDIX C: INTERVIEW PROTOCOL 
My research examines allocation for resources among schools. In order to explain and 
contextualize the current resource allocation practices in the Allentown School District 
(ASD), interviews will be conducted to gather information about the approach to 
allocation of resources across schools. These interviews seek to identify the specific 
methods (i.e., formulas) and procedures that have been used in the District. Also, 
interview responses should provide the rationale for the current resource allocation 
policies.   
1. Who is involved in decision making regarding the school budgets? How and to 
what extent (e.g., budget office, Superintendent, central office staff, school 
leaders, School Board members, parents/community members)? 
2. What is the budget process as it relates to allocating resources to schools? (Who 
does what when? Or, Which decisions are made at the central office versus the 
schools?) 
3. How are budgeting decisions made (e.g., formulas, requests from buildings)? 
Why? 
4. How are formulas used? For what portion(s) of the budget? What is allocated by 
formula (e.g., dollars, staff, programs)? What remains at the central office? How 
much and how are these dollars used at the school level? 
5. Have there been changes to the budget process in recent years? Why? 
6. What resources are distributed equally to all schools?  
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7. What resources are not distributed equally to all schools? (Do certain 
programs/staff exist only at certain schools? What are these programs/staff?) 
8. Is there differentiation between schools when allocating resources? If so, what is 
this based on? Why? 
a. Enrollment 
b. Grade level 
c. Student characteristics (ED status, ELL status, Special Education, student 
performance, etc.) 
d. Prior practice 
e. Other 
9. How do federal, state and local requirements impact the budget process in terms 
of allocating resources to schools? Are you aware of any requirements (legal or 
otherwise) regarding intra-district resource allocation? How does the district 
measure comparability for Title I? 
10. Where do categorical grants factor in? How are they allocated? Are they used to 
supplement expenditures? 
11. ASD has received new funds due to the revision to the State’s funding formula. 
How is the district spending these additional funds? Are they being directed to 
certain schools and/or certain students? Why? How was it decided what schools 
receive the additional resources?  Do these new funds influence intra-district 
resource allocation? Do you think they were meant to impact intra-district 
resource allocation? 
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12. How are teachers assigned to buildings? Are there seniority transfer privileges 
built into the teachers’ labor contract? 
13. Do you find that teachers sort themselves into particular schools? If so, based on 
what characteristics (of both the teachers and the schools)? 
14. How are students assigned to schools (i.e., by neighborhood, parent choice, 
achievement level, other)? 
15. Is there any anecdotal evidence that students move because of the schools? 
16. Has the distribution of resources among schools ever been an issue? For whom 
(e.g., which constituencies)? 
17. What do you think of the current allocation system? Is it equitable? What might 
you do to strengthen this system?   
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APPENDIX D: SURVEY ON TEACHER EFFICACY 
 
 
Dear Principals: 
Please forward to all teachers working in, or affiliated with, your building: 
As you know, ASD is working to expand its thoughtful use of data to best support our 
teachers in their efforts to improve student outcomes. To this end, I am having Stephanie 
Levin, Institute of Educational Sciences Pre-doctoral Fellow, work with Susan Lozada, 
Executive Director of Community & Student Services, to collect and analyze information 
from teachers on teacher and school efficacy. The link 
(https://www.surveymonkey.com/s/5X8KCCV) will take teachers to a 25 question survey 
designed to help us gain a better understanding of the kinds of things that create 
difficulties for teachers (individually and collectively) in their school activities.* All 
responses to this survey are confidential. 
 
Please click on the following link to access the survey: 
https://www.surveymonkey.com/s/5X8KCCV 
Thank you! 
 
*If you would like additional information on this survey, please contact Stephanie Levin 
at levins@allentownsd.org. 
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Teachers’ Sense of Efficacy Scale1 (short form) 
 
Teacher Beliefs 
 
Directions: This questionnaire is designed to help us gain a better understanding of the 
kinds of things that create difficulties for teachers in their school activities. Please 
indicate your opinion about each of the statements below. Your answers are confidential. 
 
Nothing (1),     Very Little (3),     Some (5),    A Great Deal (7),    Quite a Bit (9) 
 
1. How much can you do to control disruptive behavior in the classroom?  
2. How much can you do to motivate students who show low interest in school work? 
3. How much can you do to get students to believe they can do well in school work? 
4. How much can you do to help your students value learning?  
5. To what extent can you craft good questions for your students?  
6. How much can you do to get children to follow classroom rules?  
7. How much can you do to calm a student who is disruptive or noisy?  
8. How well can you establish a classroom management system with each group of 
students? 
9. How much can you use a variety of assessment strategies? 
10. To what extent can you provide an alternative explanation or example when students 
are confused? 
11. How much can you assist families in helping their children do well in school? 
12. How well can you implement alternative strategies in your classroom? 
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Collective Efficacy Scale (short form) 
 
Teacher Beliefs 
 
Directions: Please indicate your level of agreement with each of the following statements 
about your school from strongly disagree to strongly agree. Your answers are 
confidential. 
 
Strongly Disagree (1), Disagree (2), Somewhat Disagree (3), Somewhat Agree (4), Agree (5), Strongly 
Agree (6) 
 
1. Teachers in the school are able to get through to the most difficult students.  
2. Teachers here are confident they will be able to motivate their students.  
3. If a child doesn’t want to learn teachers here give up.  
4. Teachers here don’t have the skills needed to produce meaningful student learning.  
5. Teachers in this school believe that every child can learn.  
6. These students come to school ready to learn.  
7. Home life provides so many advantages that students here are bound to learn.  
8. Students here just aren’t motivated to learn.  
9. Teachers in this school do not have the skills to deal with student disciplinary 
problems.  
10. The opportunities in this community help ensure that these students will learn.  
11. Learning is more difficult at this school because students are worried about their 
safety.  
12. Drug and alcohol abuse in the community make learning difficult for students here. 
 
(Copyright© Goddard & Hoy, 2003) 
Promax-rotated Standardized Regression Coefficients 
(Includes responses for ES and MS teachers – same factors for total sample) 
     Factor 1 – Efficacy 
in Classroom 
Management 
Factor 2 – Efficacy 
in Instructional 
Strategies 
Factor 3 – 
Efficacy in 
Student 
Engagement 
How much can you do to 
control disruptive 
behavior in the 
classroom? 
0.92425 -0.06701 -0.02909 
How much can you do to 
motivate students who 
show low interest in 
school work? 
0.23488 -0.03233 0.72676 
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How much can you do to 
get students to believe 
they can do well in 
school work? 
0.18123 0.04226 0.73353 
How much can you do to 
help your students value 
learning? 
0.05672 -0.03054 0.86670 
Can what extent can you 
craft good questions for 
your students? 
0.01548 0.82380 -0.02486 
How much can you do to 
get children to follow 
classroom rules? 
0.83829 0.02118 0.04853 
How much can you do to 
calm a student who is 
disruptive or noisy? 
0.77372 -0.02741 0.14208 
How well can you 
establish a classroom 
management system with 
each group of students? 
0.69143 0.34004 -0.08284 
How much can you use a 
variety of assessment 
strategies? 
-0.02365 0.81531 0.08179 
To what extent can you 
provide an alternative 
explanation or example 
when students are 
confused? 
-0.00522 0.86497 -0.03660 
How much can you assist 
families in helping their 
children do well in 
school? 
-0.17224 0.12285 0.75629 
How well can you 
implement alternative 
strategies in your 
classroom? 
0.09622 0.67144 0.19170 
 
Correlation Between Factors 
 Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 
Factor 1  1.00000 -0.29793         -0.46398 
Factor 2 -0.29793          1.00000 -0.28160 
Factor 3 -0.46398 -0.28160           1.00000 
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